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Avd. P	Gr 2	Mål En

August 27, 1997

EC

Ambassador Martin Hallqvist
Ambassador Hans Magnusson
Foreign Ministry of Sweden
Malmtorgsq. 3
Stockholm, SWEDEN 10339

Re: Raoul Wallenberg Investigation. Proposed Trip for September 1997

Dear Hans Magnusson and Martin Hallqvist:

First, thank you very much for the conference call. It was most heartening to have a chance to go through these subjects together, with the added incentive that even as we communicated through the 'ether' I could make coffee in my own kitchen.

Regarding our discussions about how the remaining work could be done, I offered to write my own agenda and send it to you. Before doing so, I also would like to say that if Mr. Magnusson is planning to go to Moscow for his own purposes -- if we could overlap I think we could have a very positive discussion with the Russian side about how this work could be done. Mr. Magnusson will do the diplomatic part and I would be on hand to explain whatever it is they need to know on a purely administrative or research basis. In this way we could explore together on the spot ways to make the Russian side "feel safe" even as we arrive at our desired results. I hope you will consider this possibility because I think we will get a yes. As I said often enough on the phone, it's all in the "asking."

The schedule I would propose is to go into Russia for a few weeks in September to finish the 1947 transport research and to make further inroads into the prisoner files in Mr. Nikishkin's office. I would also like to renew my connections with Serbsky, to go over the remaining years with the archivists for that location and to set up a plan for a more in-depth study in a certain special hospital in the Moscow region in late October when I return.

The 1947 data is the most urgent, however, in preparation for the Working Group meeting as it would show a completed inquiry and would also help us confirm or eliminate one of the strongest possibilities for RW's fate after July 17, 1947 -- if he survived. Therefore, after my arrival and going over things with Stefan Gullgren, I would hope to go straight to Vladimir for one week's work (five working days) to complete the collection of data on prisoners who came into the prison in 1947. This does not require the copying of cards. It does however require a double-check to make certain that no card is left out or, for example, were one to find two cards with the same file number -- one will inevitably turn out to be a different year but it is critical to know which is which. For this I would go with Svetlana and Kolya of Memorial (please get last names from Stefan) with the hope/expectation that Alvina of MVD/Vladimir would oversee us and that Vitaly of the Museum would want to join us if he can be released from his work. Basically Svetlana, Kolya, Vitaly and Alvina could do work related to acquiring data on Corpus II should Marvin arrive at a plan which does not require copying.

My point to Marvin is that if methodical and meticulous data collection is carried on in a way that does not aggravate the Russian's fears about delving into other cases, we can arrive at the desired results. I think I can safely say this because I have a more direct eye to that level of work or rather, more "hands on." Copying is not the problem so much as arriving at a system where all the appropriate data can be grouped and coded to help us define those prisoners who have been held in long-term isolation. Once this data is processed, then indeed there may be the need to review particular files of prisoners unknown or known, but at that point the Russians would be presented with a very serious need to know.

The second week I would hope to work full time on prisoner files with Svetlana and Gennadi in Mr. Nikishkin's office. If he is busy or away, he could let us work in the secretary's office adjacent where there is an extra table. In fact, this is preferable I should think for both sides -- as the secretaries can keep watch over us while allowing Mr. Nikishkin to do his own work. Depending upon the file, we can do from two to six a day. Even though we split up the work into groups, we have an agreement among us that we each review files seen by others -- if only because Memorial and ARK have different ways of working, but also because each of the investigators from the West (Susan, Susanne and Marvin) have done different research and eyewitness interviews so there are different elements which may be picked up. Again, we rely on note-taking except in very important cases. One such case would be the transport slip for Kowalski from Angara/Bratsk which gives the date and the officiating body for a transport upon which RW is said to have been conducted.

I have two other interests which could perhaps be attended to during that period -- depending. I have an invitation to meet with Mr. K as long as I don't speak about RW. I would like very much to talk to him about the Joint because, as mentioned, I have uncovered seventeen prisoners on my list of 89 with a direct and very important relationship to the Joint. The fact that many of them were charged with "Nazi collaboration" is also of interest and I would like to discuss the German/Jewish question -- as I have come to call it. I was hoping that someone from the Swedish side would join me.

Related to this, while recently in the Joint archives, I was informed that the Joint's European archives (1922-1941) are in Moscow as they were taken from Paris by the Germans, then seized in Berlin by the Soviets at the end of the War. These are predominantly in English and French, plus a few languages I am used now to scanning for relevant material. I have the Font number and coordinates for these files and would like to begin reviewing them as they would give a very direct insight into one of the Soviet impressions of the Joint related to Stalin's mounting paranoia. I should warn you there seems to be a Wallenberg family connection going way back, since the Joint was active in Eastern Europe even during World War I.

I would have to leave Moscow by September 24th, but could come again mid-October and remain there to work for two months if necessary -- funds pending. The second portion of the work would be to oversee accumulation of data for Corpus II in Marvin's absence, complete the prisoner eyewitness files, and begin making inroads into Font 451 with Susanne and translators. I would also hope to do a number of hospitals in the Moscow region during that time. With the inclusion of all of this data, I would give you a full and complete report -- which would depend


in part on computer processing of information. However, as I intend to forward this to Marvin in Chicago at regular intervals, pending funding we could have certain results quite readily as we have already been working on them. Such results would be quite valuable to present at the Working Group meeting because they would demonstrate quite simply but directly how we are going about this and what could be achieved.

I attach a copy of my passport, if you would be so kind to forward it to Stefan Gullgren in Moscow to request my visa as I remain on budgetary constraints. I am requesting a visa for the month of September, which is just around the corner, and again starting in October -- unless they would see fit to give me a one-time multiple entry visa until the end of the year. (This would indeed be very helpful to getting the work done in the most optimal fashion, but I am not counting on it.) I would pick up my visa at the Consulate in New York.

Thank you again for your efforts in this matter. You won't regret it someday -- which hopefully will be soon. In any case, I think that you will find yourselves in a much stronger position by supporting this investigation which is indeed an extension of your own.

Hope to hear from you soon.

Best wishes,


Susan Ellen Mesinai

*The Secretary of State
of the United States of America
hereby requests all whom it may concern to permit the citizen/
national of the United States named herein to pass
without delay or hindrance and in case of need to
give all lawful aid and protection.*

*Le Secrétaire d'Etat
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique*

*prie par les présentes toutes autorités compétentes de laisser passer
le citoyen ou ressortissant des Etats-Unis titulaire du présent passeport.
sans délai ni difficulté et. en cas de besoin, de lui accorder
toute aide et protection légitimes.*

Susan Ellen Mesmer

SIGNATURE OF BEARER/SIGNATURE DU TITULAIRE

NOT VALID UNTIL SIGNED



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Type/Catégorie Code of issuing / code du pays PASSPORT NO./NO. DU PASSEPORT
P State USA émetteur 110513143
Surname / Nom
MESINAI
Given name / Prénoms
SUSAN ELLEN
Nationality / Nationalité
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Date of birth / Date de naissance
25 SEP 42
Place of birth / Lieu de naissance
MICHIGAN, U.S.A.
Date of issue / Date de délivrance 02 JAN 92
Date of expiration / Date d'expiration 01 JAN/JAN 02
Authority / Autorité
PASSPORT AGENCY
NEW YORK
Amendments/Modifications
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TO: Ambassador Martin Hallqvist
Swedish Foreign Ministry
Attention: Amb. Hans Magnusson

From: Rusou Hersoni
ARK Project
New York.

Notes: _____

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REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

244/006
PROMEMORIA

P 2 Eu¹

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Telefon 08 - 405 3280

1997-09-01

Delges:
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von Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC 2
Fredriksson, DOK
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb Moskva

Ex 97-09-08
/ko



HEMLIG

Telefonkonferens
(1 bil.)

En telefonkonferens om Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet hölls den 22 augusti 1997. I konferensen, som leddes av Hans Magnusson (UD), deltog även Guy von Dardel (Schweiz), Susanne Berger, Marvin Mäkinen och Susan Mesina (USA) samt Martin Hallqvist och Lage Olson (UD). Under konferensen, som varade i knappt två timmar, behandlades följande huvudpunkter.

Inledning

Magnusson inledde med att hälsa alla välkomna till telefonkonferensen och framhöll att två ämnen stod i förgrunden, nämligen utestående frågor och vitboken.

Registreringskort i Vladimir

Frågan om vad som borde ske i syfte att komma vidare i undersökningen av de 6 000 registreringskortet i Vladimir diskuterades. I avsaknad av ett klart positivt besked från rysk sida föreslog Mäkinen att undersökningen kunde genomföras utan att man behövde kopiera registreringskortet. Behövliga uppgifter kunde tas upp manuellt för att sedan överföras och

MD

bearbetas på data. Makinen skulle återkomma inom några dagar med ett konkret förslag (Bil. 1). Kostnadsmässigt skulle de alternativa delförslagen bli mindre betungande.

Mesinai meddelade att hon ville fortsätta en parallell genomgång av 5 300 kort (prisoners' entries). 1 800 av dessa hade hittills undersökts utan att något formellt tillstånd erfordrats. Mesinai skulle ta upp denna fråga med Stefan Gullgren vid ambassaden i Moskva.

Persondossierer i Moskva

Det konstaterades att Mesinai översänt en kompletterande ansökan att få ta del av ca 90 persondossierer i Moskva. Ambassaden stod för översättning och överlämnande av denna.

Psykiatriska sjukhus

Mesinai framhöll att hon önskade slutföra genomgången av Serbskij-sjukhuset och även gå igenom ytterligare ett par andra.

"Fond 451"

Magnusson erinrade om att Galitskij redan gjort en noggrann genomgång av "Fond 451". Berger framhöll att det gällde 9 000 dokument och ansåg att man inte gjort en tillräckligt noggrann undersökning. Nya aspekter hade dessutom tillkommit sedan den förra genomgången. Berger uppgav att hon begärt att få tillstånd att gå igenom fonden med en översättare. Magnusson konstaterade att frågan måste tas upp med ambassaden i Moskva.

Nästa arbetsgruppmöte

Magnusson omtalade att det 14:e och sannolikt sista arbetsgruppmötet i RW-ärendet troligen kunde äga rum först i mitten av oktober. Ett utkast av den svenska rapporten (i rysk översättning) skulle presenteras vid detta tillfälle. Makinen skulle inte kunna delta vid denna tidpunkt, men han kunde skriva en promemoria till mötet och delge detta sina synpunkter. Berger påpekade att det vore bra om man kunde avsluta genomgången av Vladimir och persondossiererna före mötet. Magnusson erinrade om att man borde tala med

ambassaden om lämplig tidpunkt för detta, också med hänsyn till Jeltsins förestående besök i Sverige.

Vitboken

Magnusson framhöll att om man inte kunde komma längre f.n. med undersökningarna, borde man publicera vitboken i en nära framtid, samtidigt som man diskuterade uppföljningen av ärendet. Makinen menade att en publicering nu kunde bli dödsstöten för hela arbetet. Berger ansåg att en publicering i närtid kunde bli kontraproduktiv för våra syften. Mesinai underströk att man borde vänta med att publicera, tills resultaten av undersökningarna förelåg. Magnusson framhöll att en rapport också kunde förväntas ha positiv inverkan på höga vederbörande. Makinen genmälde att ryssarna ej medverkat på det sätt vi förväntat oss. Magnusson tillade att vår ambition var att slutföra arbetet. Man kunde dock avvakta en tid och utröna huruvida undersökningarna i Vladimir jämte genomgången av persondossiererna kunde avslutas inom rimlig tid. En genomgång av psykiatriska sjukhus skulle dock ta längre tid i anspråk. Mesinai menade emellertid att man borde hålla ihop alla delarna av undersökningen. Magnusson genmälde att även vid ett ryskt tillmötesgående på alla dessa punkter, skulle det kräva flera års arbete. Det fanns dessutom ett politiskt tryck att rapportera. Makinen medgav att detta var ett dilemma. Det fanns dock en risk att ge ut en rapport eller pamflett nu och en grundligare rapport vid ett senare tillfälle. Den första rapporten skulle anses vara slutrapporten. Om man angav i rapporten att man ej erhållit ryskt tillstånd att slutföra undersökningarna, skulle detta kunna tolkas som att man inte kunde dra några slutsatser. En rysk vägran att fortsätta undersökningarna i Vladimir kunde betyda att "personen i fråga i fängelset" kunde vara RW. En publicering nu skulle kunna ge fel budskap. von Dardel underströk att läget hade förändrats genom tillgången till andra svenska arkiv. Magnusson sade att man kunde avvakta utvecklingen. von Dardel framhöll sin uppskattning av utkastet till vitbok. Det förelåg dock inte konsensus. Arbetet i Ryssland var inte avslutat. Magnusson tillade att en engelsk version av det nu aktuella utkastet till vitbok skulle distribueras, så snart översättningen var klar.

Amerikanska och andra arkiv

Magnusson erinrade om att man nyligen i Washington åter tagit upp frågan om tillgång till ej frisläppta amerikanska dokument om RW. Liknande förfrågningar hade vidare gjorts bl.a. i London. Mesinai tillade att Storbritannien varit mer tillmötesgående än man kunnat tro.

Praktiska frågor

Frågan om utfärdande av viseringar till Ryssland skulle tas upp med ambassaden i Moskva, så snart det förelåg närmare uppgifter om tillstånd och mötesdatum. Magnusson meddelade att han, oavsett utvecklingen i övrigt, avsåg att besöka Moskva i september. Mesinai sade sig vara beredd att åka till Moskva i september för fortsatt genomgång av person-dossiererna.

Gordievskij


Magnusson omtalade att den i Helsingfors av f.d. KGB-mannen Gordievskij (som hoppat av i Storbritannien) nyligen publicerade boken med ett avsnitt om RW inte innehöll några nyheter.

Prelin

Magnusson meddelade att han med ryssarna skulle ta upp frågan om en intervju med den f.d. KGB-mannen Prelin (som givit en längre intervju om RW i tysk TV för några månader sedan).

Konfrontation med utfrågarna av RW

Makinen sade sig tvivla på att utfrågarna, bl.a. K(opelanskij), skulle säga något, om de konfronterades med utkastet till vitboken. Magnusson genmälde att man kanske borde överväga andra tillvägagångssätt. Mesinai ansåg att det vore en bra idé att ta med Per Anger till Moskva och låta utfrågarna tala med en person som arbetat nära RW.


Lage Olson

Author: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
Date: 1997-08-29 11.32
Priority: Low
TO: Hans (UD) Magnusson at (Pk)Riga-amb-1
Subject: analysis of prisoner registration cards in the Vladimir Pris

Bil. 1

Mr. Martin Hallqvist
Mr. Lage Olson
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Gustav Adolfs Torg
Stockholm, Sweden

Dear Martin and Lage:

This letter is to provide an outline of methods to collect cell occupancy data from the Spetzchast kartoteka in the Vladimir Prison that I have proposed to analyze for the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. Last Friday in a multi-party telephone conference discussion that we had with Hans Magnusson, he requested me to provide a written summary of the various scenarios through which the data could be collected and analyzed and the implementation of which would satisfy the concerns of prison authorities for guarding the anonymity of prisoners not directly associated with the case of Raoul Wallenberg. The outline is given in detail below. Please, communicate this to Hans since at present e-mail is the most efficient manner in which I can communicate with you.

First I wish to once again outline the reasons for which I had originally proposed this analysis and the questions from our archival research that would be answered through this investigation and analysis. I am outlining again this background information in the event that this document will be communicated directly with a translation to the Russian authorities.

As you will recall, through several visits over the 1993-1997 period to the Vladimir Prison with Professor Guy von Dardel, undertaken within the framework of the Working Group, we uncovered two individuals who have been employed at the Vladimir Prison over a lengthy period of time and who described a foreign prisoner not of German origin who had been held in solitary confinement for a long period of time in cell No. 49 of Korpus II. These individuals were Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, who had worked in the hospital and clinic of the Vladimir Prison in Korpus II, and Kukin, Alexandr Timofeivich, who was at the time of our interview with him, retired but had been a guard and later the head guard in the Vladimir Prison in the 1950's and 1960's.

During our initial first three contacts with Larina, we never informed her of the name or family of the prisoner for whom we were searching, and through our later discussions with her, it was evident that she did not know the name Wallenberg and was not familiar with newspaper articles that have been published about him. She described the physical characteristics of this prisoner, which were such as to be compatible with those of Raoul Wallenberg, and she stated that she remembered this particular prisoner because of his constant critical comments and complaints about anything that was not suitable to him. For instance, she stated that he would complain if the soup was cold. Since this prisoner was located in Cell 49 on the third floor of the building and the soup was distributed from a large kettle with which they served prisoners on the ground floor, then the second floor, and finally on the third floor, it is to be expected that the soup would have cooled off by the time she got to him. Because of his constant complaints, however, she was ordered to bring the soup first to the third floor. This is of course a vivid reason to recall a prisoner out of many others because he made life unpleasant for her. Larina stated that she did not know the name of this prisoner

but she described him as a Westerner of non-German origin. She also stated that at the time of this prisoner's incarceration, a prisoner by the name of Osmak died who was located in a nearby cell. From a group of photographs of men of various ages and appearances, one of which was a side profile of RW not ever used in the international press, she identified this prisoner by picking out the picture of RW. Larina was not certain of the period during which this prisoner had been in Vladimir but thought that it was likely to have been in the mid or late 1950's.

Kukin in our interview with him confirmed that there had been a foreign prisoner held in solitary for a long period of time in Korpus II, but he stated that he did not know the name or origin of the prisoner. He described the prisoner similarly according to physical characteristics and when shown photographs he stated that the photograph of RW (also not one that had been in the international press) was not unlike this prisoner.

There are also, as you are aware, other reports that have been collected in the Swedish Foreign Ministry made by former prisoners who had been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison that they had heard of RW or had heard that he had been incarcerated there. These reports, most of which have been discussed within the meetings of the Working Group, date from 1947 to 1972. I myself through my own incarceration in the Vladimir Prison have reported about having heard about a Swedish prisoner who had been there sometime in the 1950's or early 1960's. One prisoner named him "Jan den Berg."

As is known from our first investigation of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in August of 1990, we were not able to locate a registration card with the name of Wallenberg. We cannot be certain that we have missed the card because of a pseudonym used rather than the name of Wallenberg. In addition, there was evidence in the kartoteka for up to 32 numbered prisoners. While most of these have been accounted for, some have not been identified, and cards for some numbered prisoners were not in the kartoteka. For instance, there were cards for numbered prisoners 26, 28, 29, and 32, but as I recall (here in Colorado where I am presently a visiting professor I do not have all of my records and notes on this matter) the cards for numbers 27, 30, and 31 were missing. There also may have been numbered prisoners higher than 32. This background information thus points to the circumstance that a cell, in particular No. 49 in Korpus II, was occupied for a lengthy period of time and that this occupancy is likely not to be accounted for by the kartoteka if the registration card of this prisoner has been removed by authorities earlier in Soviet times or if the prisoner was numbered but the numbered card has been removed from the kartoteka. Also since prisoners were shifted from cell to cell periodically to hinder paths of communication through knocking, etc., it is probable that this prisoner had been transferred to other cells. Since the registration cards in the kartoteka contain a chronicle of date and cell number each time the given prisoner was transferred to a cell, a simple cell occupancy analysis made by extracting this information from the cards would either point to the circumstance that a cell must be considered as "empty" since no card in the kartoteka can account for a prisoner having been in the cell or it may show that all cells were occupied and thus deny the contention that there was a prisoner there in lengthy solitary confinement.

Furthermore by identifying cards of prisoners who died while imprisoned in Vladimir, we should be able to determine whether there was a prisoner by the name of Osmak and when he died (During our visit to the Vladimir Prison in February-March, 1997, we indeed did determine that there had been a prisoner by that name who died.) Thus by identifying who may have been his cellmates in this period and which prisoners were in other nearby cells during this time, there would be a basis to try to find whether any of them may still be alive and could be interviewed to learn what they knew about special foreign prisoners in Vladimir at that time.

Also since it is possible that this special prisoner may have been in the

Vladimir Prison at other times, having been transferred from other prisons, and since other reports place Wallenberg to have been in the Vladimir Prison over the 1947 to 1972 period, by analyzing cell occupancy data from the prisoner registration cards it would be possible to establish whether other cells were ostensibly "empty" at other times over this period and could therefore be considered to have had a prisoner in them that is not accounted for by the cards. Again, prisoners who could be identified and were located in other nearby cells, if alive, may be able to shed further light on the identity of this special prisoner.

In the end of February-beginning of March of this year, with a team of assistants, I traveled to the Vladimir Prison because through the Working Group and through the Swedish Embassy we had been informed that approval had been granted to our request to select and photograph registration cards of all prisoners who had occupied cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period. As is well known, we were not permitted to photograph or copy any of the cards, although we did select cards of those prisoners who had been in cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period, who had died in the Vladimir Prison, or who had entered the Vladimir Prison during this time but did not have any cell occupancy information written onto their cards. We prepared a list of the names of all of these prisoners which numbered close to 6000. The cards of these approximate 6000 prisoners were identified by being placed into a rotated orientation with respect to the other cards in each drawer of the kartoteka, and we were assured that they would be kept in that state in a storeroom of the Prison administration until the matter of copying of the cards would be decided.

Thus, through this background information the objectives of the cell occupancy analysis are evident and it is clear that this analysis could either confirm the reports of a special prisoner held in solitary or deny the statements. The issue to be dealt with is how this information can be collected and analyzed so that Russian authorities can be assured that it will be used only for purposes of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. Although I believe that it has been evident for at least seven years by now that my only objective in this matter, as well as that of Professor Guy von Dardel, the maternal half-brother of Raoul Wallenberg, with whom I have worked closely, is to establish RW's fate and to use all archival materials that has been made available to us only for this goal, I shall outline below different possibilities for handling the information that the Russian authorities may feel sensitive about but that still preserve the intactness and rigorousness of the analysis of the cell occupancy data from those approximate 6000 cards that have been selected earlier in February-March of this year:

(1) We simply photograph all of the selected cards so that we have a permanent record of the cell occupancy data from each card and the identity of the prisoner in the event that we may need to try to find which are still alive and could provide further information through interviews. This is the most accurate method to embark on the analysis since it allows us to verify during the analysis that all data have been entered accurately. Since we must extract the cell occupancy information from each card to be analyzed by algorithms developed for this purpose, it is likely that some errors in data input are to be expected. This method allows cross-checking of the data and makes for the most accurate analysis possible. While some Russian authorities may not feel comfortable with our possession of the photographic images of all of these 6000 cards, I wish to point out that Guy von Dardel and I have been in possession of the copies of over 1300 registration cards from the Vladimir kartoteka since 1990 and have not distributed these cards to the international news media and have used them only within the framework of the Working Group.

(2) We photograph the cards as outlined above, carry out the analysis, and after the report has been made to the Working Group upon completion of the analysis, we return the photographic images of the cards to the Russian authorities. Under this condition, we assure the authorities that

further copies of the cards will not be made. In this way the Russian authorities can feel assured that all information from their archival documents has been returned to them. Again, I point out that Guy von Dardel and I have worked since 1990 in this manner and have continued to use all archival material only according to the objectives of the Working Group. This method permits complete verification of data input and preserves complete accuracy in data analysis.

(3) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of cell occupancy information in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison by entering into our own laptop computers only the following information from the approximate 6000 cards selected: name of prisoner and date of birth, case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data including cell number and date when transferred, and date of departure from prison. This method allows collection of the data that are necessary for the analysis and does not involve making records of other information about each prisoner that does not serve the objectives of the analysis, such as date of arrest, basis of arrest, statute according to which the prisoner was charged and sentenced, length of sentence, etc. Should certain prisoners need to be contacted or identified further for purposes outlined above, we can then simply provide the name and date of birth, etc. to the Russian authorities. During our work in the Vladimir Prison in February-March of 1997, I discussed this possibility with my assistants. We decided that this method would probably require five assistants each with a personal laptop computer to work in the kartoteka for 7-10 consecutive days to enter just the minimal information from each card described above. We would have to use this period of time to verify accuracy of data input as much as possible, but the method suffers from the possibility that some errors in data input may go through undetected and that after our departure from the Vladimir Prison there would be no opportunity to make corrections. The resultant effect on the analysis may be small but cannot be accurately predicted since it would depend on the frequency of errors. There would be no information collected by this method that would allow further public identification of prisoners or their families.

(4) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of data input as described above in point (3) but under the condition that the name of the prisoner not be entered into our laptop computers although all other information such as case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data, etc. would be taken. In this case we would prepare a separate list for the authorities of prisoner name and date of birth with a corresponding identification number which we would enter into the laptop computer, for instance prisoners A1, ..., A9, etc. for prisoners whose last name begins with A, prisoner B1, ..., B9, etc. for prisoners whose last name begins with B, and so forth. In this manner, we keep no copies of personal identification information about the prisoner. Should a prisoner have to be further identified because of the analysis for reasons described above, we would simply provide the Russian authorities with the number A10, for instance, and the Russian authorities could then carry the work further themselves. The method has the same drawback as above in point (3) that verification of data input can be made only on the spot while working in the Vladimir Prison. There would be no further means for public identification of prisoners or their families since we are not going to be able to memorize a list of over 6000 names.

For well over a year I have tried to think of a method of making a permanent copy of just the minimum information needed from each card without recording other data such as length of sentence, etc., that is of no use to us and is of no interest. Unfortunately there is no manner in which only part of each card could be photographed because both sides of each card must be examined to extract the necessary information and the data are not written onto the cards in a uniform manner. Short of this, I have tried to outline above possible ways to collect the necessary information for the analysis and to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion by ensuring as much as possible accuracy of the data input. I hope that agreement can be reached for implementing one of the above described

methods for data input. They are listed in order of decreasing preference to me based purely on the opportunities for verification of data input.

Please, inform me if further details may be necessary.

With best wishes,

Marvin W. Makinen

Temporary address August 18 - October 18, 1997:

Marvin W. Makinen
Department of Chemistry & Biochemistry
University of Colorado
Campus Box 215
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0215

Tel: 303/492-4503 or leave message at 303/492-3545
FAX: 303/492-3586 or 303/492-5894

E-mail: makinen@colorado.edu
makinen@atlantis.colorado.edu

E-mail can be directed also to my permanent address:

m-makinen@uchicago.edu



FÖRSVARSMAKTEN HÖGKVARTERET


Datum
1997-09-02

Beteckning
H 10816:9265



Ex 1(5) Sida 1(1)

Sändlista



Ert datum Ert beteckning

Vårt föregående datum

Vår föregående beteckning

Ert tjänsteställe

Vårt tjänsteställe, handläggare

MUST, SÄK, Övlt Y Hörndahl,
Tfn 788 80 80

Svar på ställda frågor (2 bilagor)

Rasoul Walshamberg

UD har 1996-07-02 genom Hans MAGNUSSON hemställt om bistånd i en utredning.

Ärendet har därefter vid UD övertagits av ambassadrådet Lage OHLSSON.

Vid MUST nådda beslutat redovisas i bilaga 1 och 2.

/1,2

Erland Sönerstedt

Erland Sönerstedt
MUST C SÄK

Sändlista

UD

Inom myndigheten

MUST

Arkivex

Ex nr

1

2-4

5

Avsett för

ambassadråd Lage Ohlsson

Delges:

Kabs

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Magnusson, Riga

Hallqvist, Ec 2

Fredriksson, DOK

Olson, Ei-ESEK

Amb. Moskva

Amb. Washington

Amb. Budapest

exp: 97-09-09

(BF) E:\Arbete\HÖR\Svar på ställda frågor.doc

Postadress

107 85 STOCKHOLM

Besöksadress

Lidingövägen 24

Telefon

08-788 75 00

Telefax

08-788 84 75

1997-09-02

Bilaga 1
H 10816:9265

~~HEMELIG~~
~~Se anteckning sida 1~~

Ex (5) Sida 1 (4)

Begäran om ev material från MUST arkiv

Bakgrund

UD har 1996-07-02 genom Hans MAGNUSSON kontaktat MUST C SÅK m.a.a. de pågående efterforskningarna i Raoul WALLENBERG (RW)-ärendet.

Av kopior av frisläppta handlingar i USA har man dragit slutsatser att eventuellt ytterligare material skulle kunna föreligga i MUST (Fst/In, Fst/Säk) arkiv. Kopia av dessa amerikanska dokument ställdes till förfogande.

Till handläggare vid MUST beordrades övlt Yngve HÖRNDAHL.

Vid telefonsamråd mellan handläggarna framfördes ytterligare några frågor/önskemål avseende:

- Begäran att övriga handlingar i Krigsarkivet, som kan beröra ärendet "granskas fackmässigt" av MUST
- Bistånd från MUST för att få klarlagt namn och adress på ännu levande personer, som kan ha egen kännedom om svensk underrättelsetjänst under vk 2 och dess verksamhet avseende Ungern (HU) med grannområden.
- I handlingarna från USA förekommer begreppet signalplan. UD önskar få detta begrepp förklarat till sin innebörd.

Byte av handläggare har ägt rum vid UD. Ambassadråd Lage OHLSSON är 1997 ansvarig för utredningen.

Vidtagna åtgärder

1. Granskning och utredning av de erhållna kopiorna av USA-dokumenten.
2. Den mycket svårlästa, men i sammanhanget mest intressanta handlingen bedöms vara den från 1944-11-07. Den har uttyts i enlighet med bilaga 2.
3. Alla bedömt möjliga aktuella arkivhandlingar vid MUST har gått igenom.
4. Kvarvarande möjligen berörda arkivhandlingar från C-byrån och T-kontoret har gått igenom vid Krigsarkivet.

1997-09-02

Bilaga 1
H 10816:9265

~~HEMLIG~~
~~Se anteckning sida 1~~

Sida 2 (4)

De personarkiv (motsv), i vilka uppgifter har efterforskats, har varit:

- Hellmuth TERNBERG (HT), stf chef C-byrån
- Jan Rydström
- Carlos ADLERCREUTZ
- JUHLIN-DANFELDT
- Curt KEMPF (tjänstearkiv)
- Carl PETERSÉN
- Per JACOBSSON, mindre del av dennes, vid Uppsala Universitet förvarade, dagböcker

6. Genom förfrågningar o.s.v. har, i den inofficiella underrättelsetjänsten engagerade, ännu levande personer, med bedömt efterfrågade kunskaper, kontaktats.

Dessa är:

- Stig AXELSSON, C-byrån (radio) och FRA, Quartier Olha, 64320 Sainte-Pée-sur Nivelle, Frankrike
- Sven WÄSSTRÖM, FRA, Sturegatan 17 A, 752 23 Uppsala
- Brita KEJLLBERG, chefssekreterare C-byrån/T-kontoret, August Wahlströms väg 5, 182 31 Danderyd

Yttrande, nådda resultat o.s.v.

- 1 Svensk underrättelsetjänst i Ungern.
 - 1.1 Svensk militär underrättelsetjänst verkade i HU under aktuell tid.
 - 1.2 Stf chefen för C-byrån HT reste i varje fall en gång/år till HU 1943 och 1944.
- 2 Radiostationer
 - 2.1 Radiostation (troligen en eller - eventuellt flera) fanns som stöd för underrättelsetjänsten.
 - 2.2 Radiostationen skulle - utöver sin främsta uppgift - även kunna utgöra en reservförbindelse för den svenska legationen om förbindelserna med moderlandet i övrigt skulle brytas.
 - 2.2 Befintligheten av denna förbindelsemöjlighet visavi Sverige måste ha varit känd av legationschefen och troligen/möjligen ytterligare någon/några legationstjänstemän. Detta förhållande bestyrks av texten i bilagan.

1997-09-02

Bilaga 1
H 10816:9265

~~HEMLIG~~
Se anteckning sida 1

Sida 3 (4)

gon/några legationstjänstemän. Detta förhållande bestyrks av texten i bilagan.

3 Signalplan

3.1 Signalplan är sambandstekniskt begrepp för de bestämmelser/överenskommelser, som erfordras för att radioförbindelse skall kunna upprättas mellan två eller flera radiostationer. Dessa är:

- Vilken/-a frekvenser/kanaler som skall utnyttjas.
- Vilka tider (dagar och klockslag) som passning respektive kontakt skall upprätthållas.
- Anropssignaler/benämningar på de berörda radiostationerna.
- Eventuella bestämmelser för byte av/övergång till annan frekvens/kanal.
- Eventuella bestämmelser för kodning/kryptobehandling av meddelanden.
- Eventuella bestämmelser om åtgärd för att informera mottagaren om att radiosambandet upprätthålls under främmande/fientlig kontroll eller ledning.

3.2 Efterforskning av aktuella signalplaner har gjorts vid FRA. Resultat har hittills inte nåtts, men kan framdeles måhända kunna komma att redovisas.

4. Överlämnade kopior av dokument från USA:s UD (State Department).

4.1 Handlingarna berör huvudsakligen HU motståndsrörelse mot tyskarna.

4.2 En av de framträdande gestalterna i dessa handlingar synes GEZA SOOS (GS) vara.

4.3 I telegrammet från 1944-11-07 finns såväl GS som stf chefen för C-byrån HT och RW nämnda.

1997-09-02

Bilaga 1
H 10816:9265

~~HEMLIG~~
~~Se anteckning sida 1~~

Sida 4 (4)

4.4

Av den text som kunnat extraheras från detta (se bilaga 2) framgår -
som MUST ser det - ingen som helst koppling mellan RW och svensk
underrättelsetjänst:

- GS har kontakt med Per ANGER(PA)
- GS har tillgång till den svenska signalplanen.

Slutsats:

- GS har på något sätt kontakt med svensk underrättelse-
tjänst
- RW skall känna till att PA är i Budapest.

Sammanfattning

I handlingar vid MUST respektive Riksarkivet/Krigsarkivet har inte någon
handling kunnat återfinnas som indikerar något samband mellan RW och svensk
underrättelsetjänst. Av de från USA erhållna kopiorna framgår ej heller något
samband mellan RW och svensk underrättelsetjänst.

1997-09-02

Bilaga 2
H 10816:9265

~~HEMLIG~~
Se anteckning sida 1

Ex (5) Sida 1 (1)

Geza Soos (name); address (unknown).

He may be contacted only through Per Anger, Swedish Legation, Budapest.

Raoul Wallenberg of the same legation will know if he is not in Budapest.

Soos had Swedish signal plan, whole affair was administrated by Swedes.

Concerning the signal plan, Nagy, former secretary of the Hungarian Legation should contact Captain Ternberg in Stockholm.

Any reliable Hungarian leaving E???? referring to Gallert can contact Soos. "?????" is the password. The former address of Soos is Budapest XL ?????-???

Anm: ? = Ej tydbara bokstäver



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

1997-09-03 Nr 52 ✓

Handläggare:
Amb. John HM Hagard

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

LO: X
M

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
DNR		
1997-09-05		
Avd.	Gr	M
P	2	Eu ¹

Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bilaga)

Delges:

Kabs
von Dardel

Carl Persson

Magnusson, Riga

Hallqvist, EC2

Olsson, E/SEK

Amb. Moskva

Wallenberg-Föreningen

exp. 17-09-10

För departementets kännedom översänds bifogade
översättning av artikel i Ha'aretz. I den sägs att
Raoul Wallenberg skall ha avrättats med giftspruta.
Artikeln är oklar om tidpunkten.


John HM Hagard

TRANSLATION

HAARETZ - 18.07.97.

*Bil 1/1 kill ambass i Tel Aviv
shu m 52 1997-09-03*

"EXPRESS": FORMER HEAD OF KGB ADMITTED THAT
RAOUL WALLENBERG WAS MURDERED IN PRISON

1/1

By Sharon Sadeh, Haaretz reporter in Britain

Swedish Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, who helped in 1944 to rescue about one hundred thousand Hungarian Jews, was murdered by order of the KGB as reported yesterday by the London newspaper EXPRESS, following an interview with a senior official in the former Soviet Security Service. Wallenberg was killed by poisoning his food, after which he received a fatal injection.

According to the paper, Wallenberg was murdered by a direct order from Viacheslav Molotov, a loyalist of Joseph Stalin. The former Head of the KGB, General Ivan Sarov, admitted that he had crushed with his own hands documents testifying that Molotov had approved the killing of Wallenberg. Wallenberg was buried secretly in a mass grave in the cemetery of the Donskoy Monastery in the South of Moscow.

Furthermore according to the paper, Wallenberg was captured in 1945 by agents of the intelligence organisation SMERSH, which had preceded the KGB, after the Soviets entered Hungary. He was taken to Moscow and has since disappeared. Officially, the Government of Sweden still assumes that he is alive. The President of the State, Ezer Weizmann, said in February this year, when he came to Britain, to unveil the statue in memory of Wallenberg, that the search for him had stopped and that the assumption was that he is dead.

"EXPRESS" interviewed an expert on the KGB, Gnadi Sokolov, who had interviewed Sarov, the latter having also been the Director of the Lubjanka Prison, where Wallenberg was held in 1954 - 1958. A short while before Sarov's death in 1990, he admitted his share in the whitewashing of the affair and in the deceitful campaign of the Soviet Union. "I have been punished for my share in the destruction of evidence, connecting Molotov with the murder of Wallenberg. He had a direct part in this affair", Sarov said. ./2

Sarov was removed from the leadership of the KGB at the directive of Khrushchew, after the plot that Molotov complotted against Krushchew was revealed. Khrushchew was furious, that Sarov had destructed material that might have served against Molotov. Sarov also admitted, that he had signed a false memorandum, which was sent to the Government of Sweden in 1957, to the effect that Wallenberg had died of a sudden heart attack ten years earlier.

* *
*

per Walling

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

250/010
PROMEMORIA

P 2 E n 1

EI/ESEK
Lage Olson
Telefon 08 - 405 3280

1997-09-08

Delges:
Kabs
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC 2
Julin, GAT, EXP
Fredriksson, DOK
Foyer, EC 4
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb Moskva

Exp 97-09-09/L



H E M L I G

Möte om RW-ärendet den 5 september 1997

(2 bil.)

Ett möte hölls den 5 september 1997 om RW-ärendet på Utrikesdepartementet under ledning av Martin Hallqvist, EC 2. Närvarande var även Lars Fredén och Stefan Gullgren, ambassaden Moskva, samt Sven Julin, GAT, EXP, Mats Foyer, EC 4, och Lage Olson, EI-ESEK.

Julin redogjorde inledningsvis för pågående genomgång av dokument i UD:s RW-arkiv för tiden 1970-1991. Det stod redan nu klart att allt material från denna tidsperiod inte kunde utlämnas.

Hans Magnusson i Riga hade utarbetat ett utkast till aide-mémoire (Bil. 1) att överlämnas i Moskva.

Fredén menade att man på svensk sida agerat alltför defensivt i detta ärende och efterlyste en stramare hållning. På rysk sida visade man inte längre något

MD

större intresse för saken. Intrycket var att man i Moskva redan avslutat RW-ärendet. På svensk sida hade man knappast något att förlora genom att visa sig vara bestämd och rakryggad i uppträdandet gentemot ryssarna. Budskapet till Moskva borde vara något i stil med "Vi kräver nu att Ni gör si och så"...."om inte kommer vi att nämna detta i rapporten och lägga skulden för det inträffade på Er". Sverige hade knappast något att förlora på ett sådant agerande. Att överlämna en aide-mémoire till ryssarna var dock ett utmärkt förslag. Den slutliga texten borde dock vara än mer koncentrerad än i utkastet.

Gullgren framhöll att man i Moskva inte längre kunde gå runt och tala med olika personer i RW-ärendet och på den vägen försöka flytta fram ärendet. Det fanns idag en fast RW-politik, som var väl förankrad på alla nivåer.

För ryssarna skulle kommissionens upplösning likställas med frågans avveckling på bilateral basis, samtidigt som frågan överlämnades till historikerna.

Gullgren pekade också på nödvändigheten att skärpa tonen i aide-mémoiret.

Gullgren ställde sig skeptisk till möjligheten att genomföra den s.k. parallella genomgången av fängelsekort i Vladimir, som Susan Mesinai påbörjat i våras. Det kunde övervägas om inte genomgången av persondossiererna i Moskva vägde tyngre och därför borde prioriteras.

Man borde vidare ifrågasätta genomgången av olika psykiatriska institutioner. Mesinaï hade nästan slutfört sin genomgång av Serbskij-institutet. Man borde också ta fasta på Hirdmans samtal för en tid sedan med hälsoministern, som varit chef för Serbskij, och som förklarat att RW inte funnits där.

Gullgren frågade sig också om man borde följa en humanitär eller politisk linje, när man vände sig till ryssarna. Nästan alla högre ledare hade approcherats vid något tillfälle och givit vänliga (men tyvärr ej så resultatrika) svar. Jeltsin, Chubais och Primakov tillhörde denna skara.

Fredén framhöll att man nu uttömt sina krafter i detta ärende och inte kunde komma längre. Frågan var vilka spörsmål som borde tas upp i en sista vända med ryssarna.

Olson erinrade om att man nyligen åter tagit upp RW-ärendet med amerikanska myndigheter i syfte att få fram fler hemligstämplade dokument om RW samt förmå amerikanerna att ta bort övermålade partier på redan överlämnade dokument. von Dardel och hans medhjälpare Susanne Berger hade genom regeringsbeslut den 21 augusti fått tillstånd att få ta del av RW-dokument i SÄPO-arkivet.

Gullgren underströk att aide-mémoiret borde överlämnas till ryssarna i god tid före Jeltsins besök i Sverige i början av december i år.

Fredén föreslog att man skulle presentera det svenska utkastet till vitbok vid arbetsgruppmötet i november i Moskva för att få ryssarnas reaktion på detta. I detta borde det klart framgå att "Om Ni inte gör så och så"...."då kommer vi att skylla på Er" i syfte att ställa vederbörande inför fakta och tvinga fram ett ställningstagande.

Hallqvist menade att man borde försöka gå vidare med Mesinais genomgång av persondossiererna.

Fredén varnade för att på detta sena stadium presentera nya frågor och idéer till ryssarna.

Gullgren framhöll beträffande förslaget att tillsätta en presidentkommission i RW-ärendet att förut-sättningarna för detta saknades.


Fredén underströk att det gällde att avsluta kommissionens arbete på ett balanserat och värdigt sätt samt undvika att arbetet i RW-ärendet negativt påverkade relationerna i allmänhet mellan Sverige och Ryssland.

Hallqvist förklarade på fråga från Gullgren beträffande uppföljningen av kommissionens arbete att man planerade hålla seminarier i USA och Ryssland ett halvår efter publiceringen av vitboken.

Gullgren erinrade om att det skulle föreligga minst tre versioner i RW-ärendet: en rysk, en svensk och en dissidentversion. Det fanns alltid en risk att massmedia skulle tro mest på den senare.

Fredén framhöll att det fanns ett politiskt tryck att agera i frågan. Det var inte möjligt att komma längre i ärendet f.n., då man uttömt alla möjligheter. På svensk sida borde man visa att man var aktiv i frågan och hade denna i sina händer. Försök att lösa några av de viktigaste utestående frågorna borde göras inför Jeltsinbesöket. Detta krävde dock politiskt mod för att lyckas. Massmedias reaktioner och Jeltsinbesöket var vidare viktiga faktorer att ta hänsyn till i det svenska agerandet.

Ett förslag från Susan Mesinai den 27 augusti 1997
beträffande genomgång av arkiv m.m. i Ryssland
bifogas likaså (Bil. 2).


Lage Olson



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

BSU.1
Sid 1 (5)

1997-09-04

Handläggare: H Magnusson

LG

W

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

B R Å D S K A N D E

Avd.	Grupp	Mål

Till: EC (Martin Hallqvist)

Här följer utkast till aide-mémoire för diskussion med Moskvaambassaden den 5/9 och sedermera överlämnande till MID. von Dardel m fl bör väl också delges ramarna för det fortsatta arbetet. Styckena inom klammer är mer tentativa. Återkommer efter helgen om jag kommer på mer sakfrågor att ta upp.

Hälsningar

1. Den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen rörande Raoul Wallenbergs öde har nu varit verksam i nästan sex år. Betydande ansträngningar har lagts ned på att få fram dokumentation och uppgifter ur olika arkiv och på att intervjua personer som har förmodats äga närmare kännedom om en eller annan aspekt av Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Att arbetet dragit ut på tiden och ännu inte kunnat avslutas beror på att arbetsgruppen icke - med någon tillfredsställande grad av säkerhet och bevisning - lyckats slå fast Raoul Wallenbergs öde efter att ha hamnat i sovjetisk fångenskap eller ens varför han arresterades och kvarhölls resp. hur besluten härom fattades.

Vi befinner oss i en situation där en rad motstridiga vittnesmål fortfarande inte kunnat definitivt avfärdas eller bekräftas och där följaktligen endast mer eller mindre starkt underbyggda hypoteser om motiven för RW:s arrestering resp om hans öde kan framläggas.

[Många indicier synes peka fram mot att den svenske diplomaten avled i juli 1947, men de många motstridiga versionerna om hur det i så fall skulle ha gått till skapar problem för trovärdigheten i en sådan hypotes, särskilt som det fortfarande finns vittnesmål som gäller perioden efter denna tidpunkt.]

Både den svenska och den ryska sidan har utarbetat utkast til rapporter, men det måste anses vara såväl oansvarigt som riskfyllt att i frånvaron av ovedersägliga bevis publicera dessa, om det samtidigt kan hävdas att allt icke gjorts för att söka bringa klarhet i frågan om Raoul Wallenbergs öde.

Den svenska sidan noterar att man icke heller från rysk sida hävdar att fullständig bevisning för RW:s död 1947 föreligger. Vi har också med tillfredsställelse noterat att man i flera officiella ryska uttalanden understrukit sin beredskap att fortsätta söka efter alla de fakta och handlingar, vilka hänger samman med RW:s liv och verksamhet, senast i utrikesminister Primakovs brev till Sveriges utrikesminister den 17 juli 1997.

Nedan redovisas de åtgärder som enligt svensk uppfattning är nödvändiga för att en publicering av rapporten skall vara möjlig. De bör vara avklarade

under loppet av första halvåret 1998, men redan vid tiden för president Jeltsins besök i Sverige i december bör det kunna slås fast att arbetet på de ännu utestående punkterna är i full gång.

Vi är från svensk sida medvetna om att inte ens nedan föreslagna åtgärder med nödvändighet kommer att leda fram till att fullständig klarhet nås. I så fall bör detta påpekas i rapporten och öppenhet finnas för att göra de ytterligare undersökningar som kan bli nödvändiga i framtiden.

2. Följande åtgärder bör genomföras.

a) Från rysk sida har man avvisat begäran om kopiering av 6.000 registerkort från Vladimirlängelset, trots utförlig motivering för syftet med denna undersökning. Mot bakgrund av de argument som framförts från rysk sida föreslås nu en ny undersökningsmetod, som även om den är mer arbetskrävande, torde ta hänsyn till invändningar föranledda av den ryska informationslagen. I detta sammanhang bör erinras om de föpliktelser som följer av "the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance" bl a när det gäller att tillhandahålla register över alla personer som berövats sin frihet. (Rättsavd. bör kolla denna mening.)

(Makinens förslag/alt.bifogas)

Det kan tilläggas att det, om denna undersökning inte genomförs, blir omöjligt att en gång för alla fastställa om RW vistats i Vladimirlängelset under annat namn eller nummer (vet ej om S. Mesinai separata registerkortsgenomgång bör nämnas här.)

b) Officiell framställan har den överlämnats om genomgång av dossierer rörande fångar som på ett eller annat sätt haft anknytning till R Wallenberg. Det är angeläget att Susan Mesinai får möjlighet att genomföra detta arbete för arbetsgruppens räkning. Någon kopiering av dokument kommer ej att bli erforderlig.

c) Som bekant finns vittnesuppgifter att RW skulle ha förvarats på en eller flera psykiatriska kliniker. Inom arbetsgruppen finns sedan tidigare en överenskommelse om att stödja ansträngningarna att utröna sanningshalten i dessa uppgifter. Susan Mesinai har redan inlett ett samarbete med personalen på Serbskijinstitutet. Det är angeläget att undersökningarna försätter samt att även tillträde

ges till Kazankliniken och (Kolla med Meshai.)
Det bör fastställas huruvida detta arbete kan utföras
i samarbetet med Presidentens kommission för
rehabilitering av repressionens offer.

d) Det är angeläget att största möjliga öppenhet
framgent visas när det gäller tillträde till
relevanta ryska arkiv (även för oberoende, seriösa
forskare.) Som ett exempel kan nämnas op.fond 451
(exakt benämning?)

e) Från rysk sida har hävdats att de chiffferteleggram
som förvaras separat i det ryska utrikesministeriets
arkiv inte innehåller något av intresse rörande Raoul
Wallenberg. Om inte tillträde kan ges till denna del
av arkivet krävs en uttrycklig försäkran i rapporten
om att inget relevant materiel rörande RW finns i
dessa chiffferteleggram.

f) Sedan arbetsgruppen sist sammanträdde har en del
nya uppgifter framkommit som behöver verifieras
närmare. Det gäller bl a de f d KGB-medarbetarna Igor
Prelin och Gennadij Sokolov.

g) Såsom tidigare föreslagits bör ytterligare ett,
väl förberett, samtal föras med D. Kopeljanskij och
B. Solovov.

h) I ett svar från MID i januari 1997 på tidigare
svenska frågor sägs bl a att Lubjanka-fängelsets
särskilda akter från 1947 förstörts 1955, varvid en
handling om detta upprättades. Denna uppgift har
tidigare inte nämnts för arbetsgruppen och det vore
därför värdefullt att erhålla en kopia av den nämnda
handlingen.

[i) Vid ett flertal tillfällen har framställningar
riktats och konkreta frågor ställts till SVR:s arkiv,
men nästan genomgående har till svar erhållits att
inga uppgifter av intresse finns. Eftersom ingen från
SVR deltagit i arbetsgruppens arbete kan det inte
uteslutas att arkivefterforskningarna där genomförts
på basis av bristande kännedom om alla detaljer i det
för arbetsgruppen tillgängliga materialet. Det vore
därför kanske värdefullt att låta en av de ryska
medlemmarna i arbetsgruppen få fullt tillträde till
detta arkiv.]

[j) För att slutgiltigt fastställa om RW suttit
fängslad under annat namn eller nummer någonstans i
Sovjetunionen torde teoretiskt krävas en fullständig
genomgång att alla fängelse- och lägerarkiv i f d
Sovjetunionen, åtminstone så länge inget avgörande

dokument från de centrala arkiv utesluter en sådan
möjlighet. En arbetsuppgift av denna storleksordning
är givetvis oöverstiglig för arbetsgruppen och kanske
inte kan motiveras enbart av strävan att faställa
Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Den kan dock utgöra en
deluppgift i ett större arbete av t ex en rysk
presidentkommission.]

Från svensk sida vill vi slutligen föreslå att
arbetsgruppen har ett möte i Moskva några veckor före
president Jeltsins besök i Sverige.



FAX COVER SHEET

Ba.g

DATE August 27, 1997

MH

FAX # 011-46-8-723-1176

TOTAL # OF PAGES (including cover sheet) 5

TO: Ambassador Martin Hallqvist
Swedish Foreign Ministry
Attention: Amb. Hans Magnusson

From: Ruben Meroni
ARK Project
New York.

Notes: _____

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August 27, 1997

Ambassador Martin Hallqvist
Ambassador Hans Magnusson
Foreign Ministry of Sweden
Malmtorgsq. 3
Stockholm, SWEDEN 10339

Re: Raoul Wallenberg Investigation. Proposed Trip for September 1997

Dear Hans Magnusson and Martin Hallqvist:

First, thank you very much for the conference call. It was most heartening to have a chance to go through these subjects together, with the added incentive that even as we communicated through the 'ether' I could make coffee in my own kitchen.

Regarding our discussions about how the remaining work could be done, I offered to write my own agenda and send it to you. Before doing so, I also would like to say that if Mr. Magnusson is planning to go to Moscow for his own purposes -- if we could overlap I think we could have a very positive discussion with the Russian side about how this work could be done. Mr. Magnusson will do the diplomatic part and I would be on hand to explain whatever it is they need to know on a purely administrative or research basis. In this way we could explore together on the spot ways to make the Russian side "feel safe" even as we arrive at our desired results. I hope you will consider this possibility because I think we will get a yes. As I said often enough on the phone, it's all in the "asking."

The schedule I would propose is to go into Russia for a few weeks in September to finish the 1947 transport research and to make further inroads into the prisoner files in Mr. Nikishkin's office. I would also like to renew my connections with Serbsky, to go over the remaining years with the archivists for that location and to set up a plan for a more in-depth study in a certain special hospital in the Moscow region in late October when I return.

The 1947 data is the most urgent, however, in preparation for the Working Group meeting as it would show a completed inquiry and would also help us confirm or eliminate one of the strongest possibilities for RW's fate after July 17, 1947 -- if he survived. Therefore, after my arrival and going over things with Stefan Gullgren, I would hope to go straight to Vladimir for one week's work (five working days) to complete the collection of data on prisoners who came into the prison in 1947. This does not require the copying of cards. It does however require a double-check to make certain that no card is left out or, for example, were one to find two cards with the same file number -- one will inevitably turn out to be a different year but it is critical to know which is which. For this I would go with Svetlana and Kolya of Memorial (please get last names from Stefan) with the hope/expectation that Alvina of MVD/Vladimir would oversee us and that Vitaly of the Museum would want to join us if he can be released from his work. Basically Svetlana, Kolya, Vitaly and Alvina could do work related to acquiring data on Corpus II should Marvin arrive at a plan which does not require copying.

My point to Marvin is that if methodical and meticulous data collection is carried on in a way that does not aggravate the Russian's fears about delving into other cases, we can arrive at the desired results. I think I can safely say this because I have a more direct eye to that level of work or rather, more "hands on." Copying is not the problem so much as arriving at a system where all the appropriate data can be grouped and coded to help us define those prisoners who have been held in long-term isolation. Once this data is processed, then indeed there may be the need to review particular files of prisoners unknown or known, but at that point the Russians would be presented with a very serious need to know.

The second week I would hope to work full time on prisoner files with Svetlana and Gennadi in Mr. Nikishkin's office. If he is busy or away, he could let us work in the secretary's office adjacent where there is an extra table. In fact, this is preferable I should think for both sides -- as the secretaries can keep watch over us while allowing Mr. Nikishkin to do his own work. Depending upon the file, we can do from two to six a day. Even though we split up the work into groups, we have an agreement among us that we each review files seen by others -- if only because Memorial and ARK have different ways of working, but also because each of the investigators from the West (Susan, Susanne and Marvin) have done different research and eyewitness interviews so there are different elements which may be picked up. Again, we rely on note-taking except in very important cases. One such case would be the transport slip for Kowalski from Angara/Bratsk which gives the date and the officiating body for a transport upon which RW is said to have been conducted.

I have two other interests which could perhaps be attended to during that period -- depending. I have an invitation to meet with Mr. K as long as I don't speak about RW. I would like very much to talk to him about the Joint because, as mentioned, I have uncovered seventeen prisoners on my list of 89 with a direct and very important relationship to the Joint. The fact that many of them were charged with "Nazi collaboration" is also of interest and I would like to discuss the German/Jewish question -- as I have come to call it. I was hoping that someone from the Swedish side would join me.

Related to this, while recently in the Joint archives, I was informed that the Joint's European archives (1922-1941) are in Moscow as they were taken from Paris by the Germans, then seized in Berlin by the Soviets at the end of the War. These are predominantly in English and French, plus a few languages I am used now to scanning for relevant material. I have the Font number and coordinates for these files and would like to begin reviewing them as they would give a very direct insight into one of the Soviet impressions of the Joint related to Stalin's mounting paranoia. I should warn you there seems to be a Wallenberg family connection going way back, since the Joint was active in Eastern Europe even during World War I.

I would have to leave Moscow by September 24th, but could come again mid-October and remain there to work for two months if necessary -- funds pending. The second portion of the work would be to oversee accumulation of data for Corpus II in Marvin's absence, complete the prisoner eyewitness files, and begin making inroads into Font 451 with Susanne and translators. I would also hope to do a number of hospitals in the Moscow region during that time. With the inclusion of all of this data, I would give you a full and complete report -- which would depend

in part on computer processing of information. However, as I intend to forward this to Marvin in Chicago at regular intervals, pending funding we could have certain results quite readily as we have already been working on them. Such results would be quite valuable to present at the Working Group meeting because they would demonstrate quite simply but directly how we are going about this and what could be achieved.

I attach a copy of my passport, if you would be so kind to forward it to Stefan Gullgren in Moscow to request my visa as I remain on budgetary constraints. I am requesting a visa for the month of September, which is just around the corner, and again starting in October -- unless they would see fit to give me a one-time multiple entry visa until the end of the year. (This would indeed be very helpful to getting the work done in the most optimal fashion, but I am not counting on it.) I would pick up my visa at the Consulate in New York.

Thank you again for your efforts in this matter. You won't regret it someday -- which hopefully will be soon. In any case, I think that you will find yourselves in a much stronger position by supporting this investigation which is indeed an extension of your own.

Hope to hear from you soon.

Best wishes,

Susan Ellen Mesinai
Susan Ellen Mesinai

*Le Secrétaire d'Etat
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique*

*prie par les présentes toutes autorités compétentes de laisser passer
le citoyen ou ressortissant des Etats-Unis titulaire du présent passeport.
sans délai ni difficulté et, en cas de besoin, de lui accorder
toute aide et protection légitimes.*

Sunan Ellen Meshzi

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State USA
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25 SEP 42
Place of birth / Lieu de naissance
MICHIGAN, U.S.A.
Date of expiration / Date d'expiration
01 JAN 92
Amendments / Modifications
SEE PAGE
24

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Raoul Wallenberg Institute

of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

UNIVERSITY OF LUND

TELEFAX

Date: 10 september 1997

To: Utrikesdepartementet

Attention: Amb. Martin Hallqvist EC X

Fax No.: 08-723 1176

From: Göran Melander

Phone: 046-222 1202

Number of pages, including this one: 2

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
DNR 253/007 10		
1997-09-11		
Avd.	Gr	Mål
EC	2	8u1

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FROM:

PHONE NO. :

SEP. 05 1997 08:44AM P1



**ЗАСТУПНИК
ГОЛОВИ КОНСТИТУЦІЙНОГО СУДУ УКРАЇНИ**

№ 201-10-19/709

29 " серпня 1997 року
м. Київ

Шановний пане Меландер,

Конституційний Суд України, як гарант верховенства основного закону держави, створено у жовтні 1996 року. Забезпечення роботи суду вимагає широкої поінформованості щодо розвитку світових демократичних процесів і тісної взаємодії з міжнародним співтовариством.


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Користуючись нагодою, дозвольте висловити щирі вдячність за взаєморозуміння.

З повагою,

В.о. Голови
Конституційного Суду України


В. Німченко

Пану Горану Меландеру
Директору Інституту Прав Людини
і Гуманітарного Права
ім. Рауля Валленберга
м. Лунд



REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

253/001
P 2 EU

1997-09-10

Ambassadsekreteraren
Stefan Gullgren

Moskva

HEMLIG

RW-dokumenten

(# bil)

Broder,

Enligt överenskommelse sänder jag härmed en omgång av de RW-dokument som Moskva-ambassaden bör yttra sig om beträffande lämpligheten av frisläppande. Det är möjligt att jag senare återkommer med enstaka handlingar, men detta är "le gros morceau".

Jag vore tacksam få samtliga handlingar i retur med påteckningar (det räcker med lakoniska sådana) om ambassadens synpunkter beträffande offentliggörande.

Jag påminner återigen om departementsledningens starkt kända önskemål om största möjliga öppenhet.

Sven Julin

P.S. P.g.a ett förbiseende från min sida kom detta ej iväg med dagens kurir. Å andra sidan tar jag nu semester t.o.m. den 21 september. D.S.

Exp m kurir 970917

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103 39 STOCKHOLM
Internet: ud@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE

Besöksadress
Gustav Adolfs Torg 1

Telefon växel 08 - 405 10 00
Telefax 08 - 723 11 76
Telex 105 90 MINFOR S



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UNIVERSITY OF LUND

aa
MFr/EC
980506

TELEFAX

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
DNR 253/009		
1997-08-12		
Avd. U	Gr U	Må Ea

Date: 10 september 1997
To: Utrikesdepartementet
Attention: ✓ Amb. Martin Hallqvist EC
Fax No.: 08-723 1176
From: Göran Melander
Phone: 046-222 1202
Number of pages, including this one: 2

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
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В. Німченко

Пану Горану Меландеру
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ім. Рауля Валленберга
м. Лунд

Tuk us 97-09-12
P2 Eu

INK. UD

1997-09-28
12

MEMO

DATUM: 1997-09-10
TILL: Lage Olson, UD-EI-ESEK
FRÅN: Johan Tunberger, FRA
ANG: Wallenberg
KOPIA:

Delges:

Kals
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, Ec. 2
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb. Budapest
Amb. Moskva
Amb. Washington
97-09-12

Broder!

Vår i arkivfrågor mycket kunnige och uthållige arkivarier har gått igenom det material vi har. Tyvärr, men föga oväntat blev det in get napp.

Jag bifogar arkivariens meddelande till mig och återsänder grundmaterialet.

Mvh

Johan Tunberger

a.s.
Lo

Till
DIR

970902

Jag har gjort en relativt grundlig genomgång
av vårt arkivmaterial, men - som jag trodde - finns
inget substantiellt. Utifrån materialet är det
dessutom svårt att fastställa vad som menas
med signalplan. Några sådana dokument verkar inte
finnas.

Däremot har upplysningsvis nämnas att kaptenen
som omnämns i telegrammet är Helmut Thunberg
(numera artilleri) som under kriget arbetade vid

- C-kyrån. Han omnämns bl a i Erika Schwarze
- bok. Finns möjligen "signalplanen" i Fst eller C-kyrån
arkiv?

Göran

OUTGOING MESSAGES

(SECRET)

FOR ~~SECRET, GUSTIA~~
FROM ~~FILED, FBI~~
INFORMATION.

PARAPHRASE
DATE ~~NOV 7, 1944~~
NUMBER ~~1117~~
PARAPHRASED BY.

Goss Goss (name); address (unknown).

He may be contacted only through per Agent Swedish legation Budapest.
Karl Wallenberg of the same legation will know if he is not in
Budapest. Goss had Swedish signal plan, whole affair was administered
by Goss. Concerning the signal plan, they, former secretary of the
Hungarian legation should contact Captain Thornberg in Stockholm.
Any reliable Hungarian knowing Goss, referring to Gollert, can contact
Goss. Gollert is the person. The former address of Goss is
Budapest II. Kőrösi 32.

100/105 100/105

1
dus Göran R. P.
0

Confirma : Liller
Sajo : co
1
Jen

ATTN To XPR2-2897P

201-592



Raoul Wallenberg Institute

of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

046-2221200

LUND UNIVERSITY

P 2 Eu¹

HP 484 Christes

Utheshminiken har tillkännagivits

Till: **Henric Ankarcrona**
Peder Bonde
Claes Cronstedt
Jan Eliasson
Henry Montgomery

1997-09-16

(varmt) att jag hoppas
fems att regel i denna
styrelse. Vi är med-
vetna om att det
innehåller att vi kan
ge ett bidrag till
Raoul Wallenberg

cc: **Carl-Gustaf Andrén**
Gunnar Lagergren

Reg. direktiv att 1/1

Lund, 12 september 1997

Bästa styrelseledamöter.

På uppdrag av Claes Cronstedt översänder jag härmed de sista utkastet till stadgar och direktiv, vilka styrelsen för Stiftelsen för Raoul Wallenberg Priset senare skall fastställa.

Vi räknar med att inge ansökan om registrering av Stiftelsen under vecka 38. Vi ber er notera att ytterligare styrelseledamöter kan komma att utses enligt §10 i stadgarna. Claes Cronstedt återkommer senare för en diskussion därom.

Eventuella synpunkter på utkastet mottages tacksamt.

Med vänlig hälsning

var papparna
kan ha kommit
ifrån (2000000
?)

Pernilla Berlin

Pernilla Berlin
Verkställande Sekreterare
Stiftelsen Raoul Wallenberg Priset

Bifogas: utkast till stadgar för Stiftelsen för Raoul Wallenberg Priset
utkast till styrelsedirektiv
utkast till tidplan

Inga
vänder sig
mot denna
utkast?
(i behov av
än mer till
om bidrag)

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S-33533

Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation

Preliminary Timetable

September 1997

- Forming of the Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation in Sweden and First Board Meeting
- Drafting of pamphlets for fund-raising and nomination procedure
- Initiation of nominations of Jury members

October 1997

- Forming of a foundation for fund-raising purposes in the USA
- Initiation of fund-raising
- Initiation of nomination procedure

November 1997

- Board meeting for the appointment of Jury members

1998

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| - Deadline for nominations | May 31 |
| - Due diligence procedure | June-November |
| - Presentation of nominees to the Jury | December 1 |

1999

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|
| - Selection procedure by the Jury | January 1-15 |
| - Announcement of Prize Winner | January 17 |
| - Ceremony preparations | January - May |
| - Prize ceremony | May |

Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation

Draft Board Directives adopted by the Board of the Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation 1997

The Board

The Board of the Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation will have the following responsibilities: public relations, basic policy-setting, fund-raising, administration of funds, jury selection and liaison with the Jury and the Secretariat.

The Secretariat

The Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (hereinafter the Secretariat, see exhibit), will, under the direction of the Board, be the Secretariat of the Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation. The role of the Secretariat will be that of a non-political and objective administrator of the nomination- and selection procedures.

The Jury

Established under the authority of the Board, the Jury consists of eleven members appointed by the Board for a sitting term of three years. The sitting term may be prolonged. The Jury will annually appoint its own Chairman as well as a Preparatory Committee consisting of the Chairman and two Jury members.

Members of the Jury should have an interest in humanitarian affairs, and be worthy of Jury designation by virtue of their own capacity. Diversity will be encouraged but not mandated. Race, religion, sex, national origin or professional standing will not be relevant factors for Jury participation.

The Jury shall be guided in its deliberations by the guidelines below, but may select a Prizewinner found outside the nomination procedure.

The Prizewinner

The deeds of Raoul Wallenberg will be the guiding influence in judging the Prizewinner. He or she must be a person who performs or has performed an heroic or courageous act without regard to personal benefit or danger. Hence, the laureate will have altruistically provided humanitarian assistance or other preventive and protective initiatives, such as saving lives in situations of armed conflict, including occupation and internal strife.

The main objective of the Prize is to inspire young people to act in the spirit of Raoul Wallenberg. To publicize the Prize, it is imperative to elevate and ennoble contemporary deeds and ideals to which young people relate. The Prizewinner should exemplify the virtue of undertaking selfless actions in times of crisis.

The Prize

The Board shall annually decide the amount of the prize. It may consist of two parts. One part is a personal cash award. The other part is a grant for a project proposed by the laureate and approved by the Jury.

The Nomination Procedure

The Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation will annually invite organizations and individuals to submit nominations. After approval by the Board, information on the Prize and the nomination procedure will be distributed by the Secretariat. Solicitation of nominees will proceed on a broad basis, utilizing a wide variety of resources such as embassies, consulates, universities, NGOs and individuals worldwide. The nomination procedure will close on May 31 of each year, and should be submitted to the Secretariat.

The Letter of Nomination

The letter of nomination should contain the following information.

The nominee:

- all relevant personal information;
- description of his or hers activities, their nature and effect;
- evidence of the activities such as statements, letters, news articles and video-tapes from individuals who know of the nominee through personal, direct or indirect experience;
- any further information available.

The nominator:

- name and address;
- status of the nominator (national institution, NGO, individual etc.);
- indication of any current or past direct or indirect association between the nominator and the nominee.

The Selection Procedure

The Preparatory Committee of the Jury will, in cooperation with the Secretariat, establish a short list of the most interesting candidates, which subsequently will be subject to a uniform due diligence procedure to be designed by the Preparatory Committee and the Secretariat. This procedure should include e.g. independent personal visits with prospective laureates by employing methods approved by the Preparatory Committee. Assistance can be sought from residents of, or foreign visitors to the country of the nominee, such as journalists, academics and NGOs. The results of the due diligence procedure will be presented to the Jury no later than on December 1. The Jury will announce the Prizewinner on January 17.

EXHIBIT

Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

The Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (hereinafter the RWI) is an academic institution formed in 1984 at the University of Lund, Sweden. Under law, the RWI is a charitable trust, supported by annual grants from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Its purpose is to promote research, training and academic education in the fields of human rights and humanitarian law.

The RWI works in close cooperation with the Faculty of Law at the University of Lund as well as a number of academic institutions and international organizations dealing with human rights and humanitarian law. By establishing a research library, the RWI maintains a high international standard in Public International Law, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, and initiates, develops and supports other activities in these fields. The RWI cooperates with the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), organizing an academic program for the dissemination of human rights standards and democratic values in developing countries, particularly in Africa and Asia. This program concentrates on long-term commitments, from financial and program development perspective.

The current, by the RWI designated Executive Secretary of the Raoul Wallenberg Prize Foundation, Ms Pernilla Berlin, is a Swedish lawyer with academic specialization in Public International Law at the RWI and the Faculty of Law at Lund University. Ms. Berlin has professional experience from non-governmental organizations in the field of human rights, and has worked with the United Nations Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia in 1996, as well as the United Nations Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda in 1997. She is fluent in Swedish, English, French and Spanish.

STADGAR
FÖR
STIFTELSEN RAOUL WALLENBERG PRISET

Mänskligt liv under värdiga former förutsätter respekt för andra människor, samförstånd och frihet från fruktan och nöd. Det är denna stiftelses ändamål att finna och hedra personer som aktivt upprätthåller dessa livsbetingelser. Raoul Wallenberg är en sådan person. Han räddade under svåra omständigheter ett stort antal medmänniskor undan förintelsen i Budapest under andra världskriget.

Stiftelsens ändamål fullgöres genom att hålla Raoul Wallenbergs namn och gärning levande för kommande generationer, att instifta och årligen utdela ett pris, Raoul Wallenberg Priset.

§1

Raoul Wallenberg Priset skall tilldelas en person, som i Raoul Wallenbergs anda genom mod och självupppoffring värnat om liv och mänsklig värdighet under svåra omständigheter i situationer som präglas av förtryck.

Priset kan endast tilldelas enskilda personer.

§2

Raoul Wallenberg Priset kan ges i två delar. En del skall tillfalla pristagaren personligen. En andra del skall tillfalla pristagarens fortsatta verksamhet.

§3

Pristagare utses av en jury bestående av elva ledamöter. Juryn utses av stiftelsens styrelse och utser inom sig sin ordförande. För beslutsförmåga fordras att minst sju av juryns ledamöter deltagit i beslutet. Vid oenighet vinner det förslag som efter omröstning erhållit flest röster. Vid lika röstetal sker förnyad omröstning om de två förslag som fått flest röster. I sista hand gäller den mening som biträdes av ordföranden.

§4

Förslag till pristagare skall senast den 31 maj varje år inkomma till Raoul Wallenberg Institutet för Mänskliga Rättigheter och Humanitär Rätt vid Lunds Universitet eller annan institution som stiftelsen anvisar.

Juryen äger utse pristagare oberoende av förslag.

§5

Priset utdelas årligen. Namnet på pristagaren tillkännages på årsdagen av Raoul Wallenbergs försvinnande i Ungern den 17 januari 1945.

§6

Utdelning av priset äger rum i Stockholm i maj månad på sätt som stiftelsens styrelse bestämmer.

§7

Stiftelsens tillgångar utgörs av medel som tillförts genom gåva, donation, testamente, legat eller liknande, ävensom avkastningen av sådana medel.

§8

Stiftelsens tillgångar skall förvaltas på betryggande sätt. Till stiftelsen hörande värdehandlingar skall i stiftelsens namn förvaras i bank.

§9

För fullgörande av stiftelsens ändamål äger styrelsen förfoga över den årliga avkastningen samt den behållna kapitalökningen under närmast föregående räkenskapsår.

§10

Förvaltningen av stiftelsens tillgångar och handhavandet av dess angelägenheter skall ombesörjas av styrelsen, som skall ha säte i Stockholm.

Styrelsen skall bestå av fem till sju ledamöter. Intill dess styrelsen annorlunda beslutar skall styrelsen bestå av följande personer.

Henric Ankarcrona
Peder Bonde
Claes Cronstedt
Jan Eliasson
Henry Montgomery

Styrelsen utser ordförande inom sig.

Avgår eller avlider styrelseledamot skall styrelsens kvarvarande ledamöter välja ny ledamot i dennes ställe. Skulle enighet om nyval icke kunna nås skall valet anförtros ordföranden i Sveriges Advokatsamfund.

§11

Styrelsen är beslutför när fyra ledamöter är närvarande, och är om beslutet ense. Eljest gäller den mening, varom flertalet enas. Vid lika resultat gäller den mening som biträdes av ordföranden.

§12

Stiftelsens firma tecknas, förutom av styrelsen, av den eller de personer som styrelsen därtill utser.

§13

Styrelsen sammanträder på kallelse av ordföranden så ofta förhållandena därtill föranleder, dock minst en gång per år.

Styrelsen skall sammanträda, då minst tre ledamöter för visst angivet ärende påyrkar sammanträde.

Kallelse till sammanträde skall utgå minst tio dagar i förväg.

§14

Stiftelsens räkenskapsår är kalenderåret.

Styrelsen skall före den 1 mars varje år till stiftelsens revisor avge berättelse över sin förvaltning under föregående år.

Förvaltningen av stiftelsen och dess räkenskaper granskas årligen av två auktoriserade revisorer som utses av Sveriges Advokatsamfunds styrelse.

Styrelse- och revisionsberättelserna för stiftelsen skall överlämnas till Sveriges Advokatsamfunds styrelse, som har att besluta om ansvarsfrihet för stiftelsens styrelse.

§15

Ändring av dessa stadgar må ske genom enhälligt beslut av stiftelsens styrelse med godkännande av Sveriges Advokatsamfunds styrelse, dock må bestämmelserna om stiftelsens ändamål icke bli föremål för ändring.

Stockholm i september 1997

.....
Carl-Gustaf Andrén

.....
Claes Cronstedt

.....
Jan Eliasson

.....
Nina Lagergren



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

1997-09-15


Handläggare: S. Lundvall

Ambassadör Martin Hallqvist

Utrikesdepartementet

Lax Olson: ✓

(EC)



Raoul Wallenberg

Hbr Anderson - Hallqvist 1997-08-12 ✓
1 bil.

Broder,

Ryska medborgaren Prokofeva uppsökte idag ambassaden i sällskap med Horst Niebaum i rubricerade ärende. Bifogade skriftliga uppgifter på tyska språket överlämnades som komplettering till vad Prokofeva och Niebaum berättat för ambassaden vid sitt förra besök. Prokofeva framhöll en önskan om att hon ville uppta en direktkontakt med Wallenbergs släktingar i Sverige. Denna sade sig Sören Lundvall, som tog emot besökarna, skola vidarebefordra jämte de skriftliga uppgifterna.

Härliga hälsningar
Jan Lundvik

Jan Lundvik

Delges:

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Magnusson, Riga

Hallqvist, EC 2

Olson, EI-ESEN

Amb. Moskva

ap. 97-09-25

a. a. / to

Lioudmila Prokofeva

Balatonfüred, den 14. September 1997

Frau
Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor
Embassy of Sweden

Ajtósi Dürer sor 27/A.
1146 B u d a p e s t

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson,

für den freundlichen Empfang, den Sie mir und Herrn Niebaum vor einigen Wochen gewährten, möchte ich Ihnen noch einmal ganz herzlich danken.

Mein Anliegen möchte ich absprachegemäß schriftlich vortragen:

Meine gesetzlichen Familiendaten sind:

Lioudmila Alexandrownaja Prokofeva
geb. am 18.10.1945 in Moskau
wohnhaft in Moskau, Samarinskaj No. 1 - 8, Quartier 158,
Tel. 952 98 75

Meine gesetzlichen Eltern waren:

Drogulskij, Alexander Simeonowitsch
geb. am 17. September 1912

Drogulskij, Maria Simeonowitsch
geb. am 18. September 1914

Herr Drogulskij war Leiter der Finanzverwaltung des

Marschalls Worobiev,

dem beim

Kriegsministerium der Sowjetunion
(Nationales Vokskomitee für Verteidigung)

die Leitung der

Lager für politische Gefangene

oblag.

Frau Dragulskij wiederum war jahrelang Sekretärin des NKWD in Stawropol.

Als Kind wuchs ich in einer Umgebung auf, in der ranghohe Offiziere des NKWD ein- und ausgingen.

Ich erinnere mich an Bemerkungen, die Offiziere gegenüber meinem Vater in meiner Umgebung machten:

Das ist also die kleine Wallenberg.

Ebenso erinnere ich mich an zwei Episoden aus meiner frühen Kindheit:

Frau Drogulskij, meine gesetzliche Mutter, besuchte zweimal mit mir in Moskau das Bolschoi-Theater. Sie folgte einer persönlichen Einladung Stalins. Uns wurde die Staatsloge zugewiesen, die normalerweise für Theaterbesuche Stalins oder für Besuche privilegierter Staatsgäste reserviert war.

Anschließend erzählte mir meine Mutter, daß sich Stalin persönlich von meiner Anwesenheit überzeugt habe, weil er das Schicksal der Wallenberg-Tochter verfolgte.

Diese Episoden und die Bemerkungen von NKWD-Offizieren gegenüber meinem Vater in meiner Gegenwart machten mich neugierig. Ich interessierte mich zunehmend für mein Schicksal, d.h. meine frühe Kindheit.

Von meiner Mutter erfuhr ich sukzessive folgendes:

Es sei der Wunsch meines gesetzlichen Vaters gewesen, auch eine Tochter zu haben. Spätere Bemerkungen, die meine Mutter mir gegenüber machte, lassen aber darauf schließen, daß man bei der Leitung des NKWD, möglicherweise auf eine Weisung Stalins hin, entschieden hatte, mich in die Obhut der Familie Drogulskij zu geben.

In Ausübung seiner dienstlichen Funktion reiste mein Vater häufiger im dienstlichen Auftrag nach Workuta, in dessen unmittelbarer Nähe am Pechora-Fluß ein Gulag für ranghohe politische Häftlinge lag.

Im Jahre 1947 kehrte mein Vater von einer seiner Dienstreisen aus Workuta zurück und bat seine Frau, ihn bei der nächsten Dienstreise nach Workuta zu begleiten, um die künftige Tochter abzuholen.

Dieses geschah noch im selben Jahr. An die erste Begegnung mit meinen künftigen Eltern erinnere ich mich noch sehr gut; an diese Begegnung knüpfen sich meine ersten Kindheitserinnerungen.

Bis zum Jahre 1951 lag meiner Familie bezeichnenderweise nicht meine übliche Geburtsurkunde vor. Nachdem mein Vater, Herr Drogulskij, Opfer einer der letzten Repressionen Stalins geworden war, bemühte sich meine Mutter um die Ausfertigung einer Geburtsurkunde für mich, die jetzt für das Leben in Moskau ohne den bisherigen Schutz des Vaters dringend erforderlich geworden war.

Sehr geehrte Frau Anderson, ich bin gerne bereit, noch einmal an anderer Stelle über meinen Lebensweg zu erzählen. Mein vorrangiges Anliegen ist es jedoch, Licht in das Dunkel meiner Herkunft zu bringen.

Mir ist es durchaus bewußt, daß mein Vortrag Assoziationen mit einer Frau Astanasia wecken wird. Gleichwohl bin ich fest davon überzeugt, daß mehr als Indizien darauf schließen lassen, daß ich einer noch unbekannten Verbindung des verschollenen Raoul Wallenberg entsprossen bin. Deshalb bitte ich Sie herzlichst, mich bei meinem Wunsche zu unterstützen, einen Kontakt mit der Familie Wallenberg herzustellen, um ggfs. über eine moderne gentechnische Untersuchung Verwandtschaftsgrade festzustellen.


Lassen Sie mich bitte nach Ihrer Rückkehr aus dem Urlaub wissen, ob mein Vorschlag auch Anklang bei den zuständigen Stellen des schwedischen Auswärtigen Amtes in Stockholm gefunden hat.

Ich werde mir erlauben, dieses Schreiben Herrn Londvall in Ihrer Abwesenheit zu übergeben.

In der Zwischenzeit verbleibe ich

mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ihre Lioudmila Prokofeva

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Lioudmila Prokofeva', written in a cursive style.




SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

1997-09-16

Ambassadrådet Lage Olson

UD/EI



(EI)

Delges;

Kabs

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Anger

Magnusson, Riga

Hallqvist, EC 2

Olson, EI-ESEK

Amb Moskva

Amb Washington

Raoul Wallenberg och den ungerska motståndsrörelsen
1 bil

Broder,

Vi har delgivits en från MUST härrörande handling betitlad "Svar på ställda frågor", i vilken vissa förhållanden i Budapest under kriget utredes. Bland de personer som nämnes finns en Géza Soos, som tillhörde Per Angers kontakter.

exp-97-09-23

K

a, a' / L

Detta påminner mig om att jag på mottagningen efter invigningen av Raoul Wallenberg Emlékpark i juli i år träffade två damer, av vilka den ena presenterade sig som Soos' dotter och den andra som amerikansk forskare. De ville veta vad vi på svensk sida hade svarat på Soos' till Per Anger framförda begäran i oktober 1944 om svensk förmedling av kontakt med ryssarna. Ämnet var för mig nytt, och jag bad dem återkomma skriftligen. Det har de inte gjort, men jag fick en bok med titeln "A Ráday Gyűjtemény Évkönyve IV-V 1984-85" (Rádaysamlingens årsbok), en samling historiska uppsatser från 1986 i vilken det förekommer en skildring på ungerska och engelska av motståndsrörelsen MFM:s verksamhet efter den tyska ockupationen 1944. Utan att det klart anges tycks den engelska texten vara hämtad ur en amerikansk rapport i ämnet baserad på förhören med Soos m fl medlemmar av en ungersk grupp som i december 1944 per flyg flydde till de allierade i Italien. Här sägs bl a: "...the Hungarian Front transmitted a note-verbale to the Swedish Legation and asked that it be delivered to the Russians. This note which Soos personally handed to Per Anger, First Secretary of the Swedish Legation, explained the position Two days after the transmittal of the first note, the Swedish Legation was given a second....."

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225647

Jag har muntligen vidarebefordrat damernas fråga till Per Anger, som sade sig utgå från att han vidarebefordrat noterna till Stockholm och att de därför borde vara anträffbara i UD:s arkiv.

Jag förmodar att den i Rådaysamlingen återgivna engelska texten ingår i det material amerikanerna ställt till vårt förfogande. Jag har därför inte insänt den men är naturligtvis beredd att göra det om Du så önskar.

Hjärtliga hälsningar
Jan Lundvik

I.

Some Aspects of the History of the Hungarian Resistance Movement (19 March-15 October 1944)

Introduction and Conclusions

The following pages represent an attempt to organize and evaluate the information provided by the Soos party concerning the development of the Hungarian resistance movement. The party consists of Dr. Géza Soos, first secretary of the MFM, Air Force Major Domokos Hadnagy, military delegate of the MFM, 1st Lt. Johannes Adolf Bentinck of the Dutch Army, formerly a German prisoner of war, and four other persons. The party flew to Italy on 9 December in order to contact Allied authorities on behalf of the resistance movement. Besides the interrogation which was carried on at irregular intervals during the period 13-31 December, this analysis is based on a number of documents which the Soos party brought with them. These documents will be identified at the appropriate places in the analysis.¹

Because of the quantity of information provided by the Soos party, and because of the new light it sheds on recent Hungarian developments, it has seemed advisable to break the account short at 15 October, and to present the story of the resistance between that date and 9 December in a second paper. Soos and Hadnagy have not always been consistent, and there are significant gaps in their information. Moreover, their story is highly complicated if not confused. An appendix has therefore been added in order to identify the individual actors in greater detail. Furthermore, a chronological summary has been introduced before the main body of the text.

The reader should constantly keep in mind the fact that Soos and Hadnagy represent a particular resistance group, predominantly Magyar and Calvinist in character, whose membership comes almost exclusively from the professional, military, and administrative classes of Hungary. The two sources regard the MFM as the spiritual descendant of Count Paul Teleki and his circle, although it seems that the experience of German occupation has caused the MFM to move leftwards, until now it apparently stands for a drastic and democratic reorganization of Hungary's social structure as the necessary prerequisite to any solution of the Hungarian problem. This outlook is the basis of the MFM's membership in the Hungarian Front, the overall organization of the resistance.

Certain tentative conclusions may be reached on the basis of the evidence provided by the Soos party. First of all, the MFM was closely identified with the Horthy regime and felt that Horthy could be saved only by turning against the Germans. Many people close to Horthy were responsible leaders in the MFM. They took orders from Horthy, and did not seek an alliance with the popularly based Hungarian Front, composed of parties long in opposition to the regime, until too late in the game. Secondly, the failure of the resistance on 15 October 1944 seems to

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

265/011
PROMEMORIA

1997-09-22

P 2 E U¹

EI/ESEK
Lage Olson
Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Delges:
Kabs
von Dardel
Carl Persson
Elm, UMK
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC 2
Julin, GAT, EXP
Fredriksson, A—DOK
Foyer, EC 4
Olson, EI-ESEK
Amb Moskva

Exp 97-09-22



HEMLIG

Guy von Dardel m.fl. besöker kabinetssekreteraren i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet

Professor Guy von Dardel med hustru Matilda jämte medarbetaren Susanne Berger besökte kabinetssekreteraren den 17 september 1997 för att diskutera Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet. Från Utrikesdepartementet deltog även Martin Hallqvist, EC 2, Christer Elm, UMK, och Lage Olson, EI-ESEK.

Kabinetssekreteraren hälsade välkommen och omtalade att han tidigare samma dag diskuterat med kolleger hur man skulle gå vidare i RW-ärendet. En viktig fråga i sammanhanget gällde hur man kunde utnyttja dynamiken efter utrikesminister Primakovs brev den 17 juli till utrikesministern och kring president Jeltsins besök i början av december i år. Avsikten var att definiera tre-fyra viktigare ärenden, som skulle tas upp i en aide-mémoire till ryssarna inom kort. Ett arbetsgruppmöte skulle därefter följa i Moskva i november. Efter detta fanns det möjlighet att under några veckor förbereda sig inför Jeltsins besök.

Kabinetssekreteraren förklarade att han tagit intryck av de kommentarer som kommit från de utomstående experterna och som gick ut på att uppskjuta publiceringen av vitboken. Först borde man avvakta vad som

1997-09-22

kunde komma ut av Jeltsinbesöket, innan man beslutade om publiceringsdatum.

von Dardel tackade för att han fått komma på besök och betygade sina goda förbindelser med arbetsgruppen. Hans Magnusson hade gjort en stor insats i denna. Det var dock för mycket begärt att man skulle vara överens på alla punkter. Man kunde därför inte utesluta att det blev ett säryttrande i vitboken.

von Dardel nämnde vidare Jeltsins besök och Primakovs brev. Det senare hade gett honom intryck av att vara av privat natur.

Kabinettssekreteraren framhöll att samvaron mellan utrikesministern och hennes ryska kollega Primakov var otvungen och avspänd. De hade träffats vid ett flertal tillfällen. Brevet kunde dock inte betecknas som privat.

Kabinettssekreteraren nämnde vidare att RW-ärendet tagits upp i en intervju som statsministern gav under sitt besök i Ryssland i ett av de populära nyhetsprogrammen i TV med en beräknad tittarskara på 35 miljoner människor. Man kunde vidare hoppas på att Primakov var "mannen" som skulle göra att man kom vidare i RW-ärendet.

Hallqvist inflikade att den ryska TV-sändningen hade omnämnts i svensk TV.

Kabinettssekreteraren tillade att det var en positiv gest av Primakov att skicka brevet till sin svenska kollega.

Berger erinrade om att brevet var daterat den 17 juli., dvs. på 50-årsdagen av RW:s uppgivna dödsdag, och ej den 4 augusti, hans 85-årsdag.

Berger tillade att brevet kanske kunde öppna dörren till ett bredare samarbete. Hon var dock inte expert på ryska budskap.

Berger undrade vad som kunde hända om Ryssland inte ville samarbeta. Hon trodde sig ha förstått att regeringen avsåg att ge ut vitboken i början av 1998 och därefter avveckla arbetsgruppen.

1997-09-22

Kabinettssekreteraren upprepade att man först borde avvakta vad som kunde komma ut av Primakovs brev och Jeltsins besök och därefter utvärdera situationen.

Hallqvist tillade att arbetsgruppen efter publiceringen av vitboken inte kunde fortsätta som hittills. På svensk sida skulle man dock begära av ryssarna att fortsätta samarbetet. En avgörande faktor i samarbetet borde bli Jeltsins svar om RW.

Kabinettssekreteraren framhöll att man först borde identifiera tre-fyra ärenden, typ Vladimir etc., att ta upp med ryssarna. Därefter skulle man utfärda en instruktion till ambassaden i Moskva. I första hand torde man få arbeta via egen beskickning, då Ryssland ännu inte hade fått någon ny ambassadör i Stockholm.

von Dardel untrade vad det var fråga om för slags besök.

Kabinettssekreteraren omtalade att det var fråga om ett statsbesök med en stark exekutiv president som gäst. Viktiga politiska frågor som säkerhetspolitiken, Östersjön, Baltikum, Barents hav, EU och naturgas skulle stå på dagordningen. Det rörde sig om en dynamisk process i våra relationer. Själva inbjudan gick formellt tillbaka på en inbjudan utfärdad av Carl Bildt i samband med ett besök i Moskva 1993.

Man ville visa ryssarna största tillmötesgående beträffande samarbetet om RW och därefter utvärdera hur ärendet utvecklats.

Berger menade att ryssarna efter drygt 50 år borde försöka lösa gåtan RW. Kanske borde man också lägga in ett personligt möte med Jeltsin för von Dardel och hans syster Nina Lagergren i programmet.

Kabinettssekreteraren genmälde att han skulle se om man kunde koppla detta till den positiva andan i Primakovs brev. Frågan måste dock först diskuteras med värden, dvs. statsministern. Primakov skulle även ingå i den ryska delegationen, varför det fanns extra möjligheter till olika kontakter.

von Dardel undrade vilka förberedelser som förestod Jeltsins besök.

Kabinettssekreteraren framhöll att man i första hand borde koncentrera sig på arbetsgruppmötet i Moskva i november.

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Hallqvist tillade att man på svensk sida kunde ställa "tuffa" krav under detta besök.

von Dardel föreslog att man skulle ta upp de problem man mött i Ryssland och se hur man skulle kunna lösa dessa.

Kabinettssekreteraren menade att dessa frågor kunde diskuteras med Hallqvist och Olson.

von Dardel tog även upp frågan om medelsbehov.

Kabinettssekreteraren svarade att departementet gjorde så gott det kunde för att bistå, framför allt vid efterforskningarna av RW.

Berger undrade om det fanns någon särskild budget för forskningsändamål.

Olson genmälde att de inte fanns någon budget med denna beteckning.

Hallqvist menade att det kanske vore bättre om man anslog ett fast belopp för detta ändamål.

Matilda von Dardel nämnde att det nu aktuella besöket i Sverige fick bekostas ur egen ficka.

von Dardel tillade att "de andra bidragskällorna" inte ville bekosta forskningsuppdrag.

Kabinettssekreteraren tillade att man skulle undersöka vad man kunde göra i framtiden på budgetsidan.

Berger upprepade att en publicering nu av vitboken skulle komma olägligt, när man höll på att transformera Ryssland. I och för sig kunde det vara en fördel att tala om för utomstående vad arbetsgruppen sysslade med. På längre sikt vore det troligen en fördel att avvakta och se tiden an.

Kabinettssekreteraren berättade att man givit ut RW-dokument för tiden 1945-1970 på tre CD-ROM-skivor. Materialet omfattade 1 200 nya sidor (jämfört med blåböckerna från 1980 resp. 1982). En ny omgång omfattande åren 1971-1991 skulle släppas senare. Endast några mindre

1997-09-22

problem hade uppkommit i samband med frisläppandet av det första materialet.

Hallqvist tillade att Pelkonens (i Helsingfors) dotter först hade motsatt sig publicering men senare ändrat sig.

Efter samtalet med kabinetssekreteraren fortsatte Hallqvist och Olson att samtala med makarna von Dardel och Berger i ytterligare en halvtimme. Under detta samtal framkom bl.a. följande.

Olson nämnde att man på svensk sida avsåg visa ryssarna vad man tänkte skriva i vitboken.

Berger undrade om ryssarna skulle ge tillstånd till fotografering av registreringskorten i Vladimir.

Hallqvist framhöll att enligt ambassaden i Moskva gav tjänstemän på olika nivåer samma svar på ställda frågor om RW. Dessa hamnade alltid hos den andra europeiska avdelningen på utrikesministeriet.

Berger undrade om ryssarna var rädda för att för mycket skulle komma ut eller om deras motvilja berodde på byråkratisk leda, alternativt trötthet.

Hallqvist inflikade att det skulle bli intressant att se hur de reagerade på Makinens alternativa förslag beträffande Vladimir.

Berger undrade hur medveten man var på rysk sida beträffande eventuella skadeverkningar.

Hallqvist trodde att vi kunde nå vissa framgångar, om man kände sig pressad på rysk sida. (We are blaming you because of your non-cooperation).

Berger tillade att ryssarna också kunde tänkas strunta i eventuell kritik utifrån.

1997-09-22

Berger tog vidare upp frågan om ett förberedande möte inför arbetsgruppmötet i november. Det förra borde eventuellt förläggas i Stockholm någon dag före avresan till Moskva.

Berger nämnde ett ärende (för arkivet) avseende två förstörda svenska dokument.

Berger erinrade också om dokumt som skulle ha överlämnats till UD av svenska Röda korset och författaren Kenne Fant men sedan inte kunnat återfinnas.


Olson genmälde att man var väl medveten om detta, men att ingenting nytt framkommit som kunnat kasta ljus över dessa frågor.

von Dardel talade om en eventuell intervju med ambassadör Sven Dahlman och Berger om förnyade samtal med Per Anger.

Berger undrade också om Röda korschefen Valdemar Langlets verksamhet i Budapest och varför denne uppenbarligen avskedats av svenska Röda korsets ledning.

Berger efterlyste vidare dokument, som skulle saknas, rörande den svenska B-avdelningen i Budapest under kriget.

Berger uttryckte slutligen sin uppskattning över de tre CD-ROM-skivor som utgivits den 19 juni i år med dokument från UD:s RW-arkiv för tiden 1945-1970. De hade varit "most helpful" i hennes arbete.


Lage Olson

REGERINGSKANSLIET
Utrikesdepartementet

266/004
PROMEMORIA

§ 2 EU¹

1997-09-23

EI/ESEK
Lage Olson
Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Delges:
Kabs
Elm, UMK
Magnusson, Riga
Hallqvist, EC 2
Julin, GAT, EXP
Fredriksson, A/DOK
Foyer, EC 4
Olson, EI/ESEK
Amb Moskva

Exp. 97-09-29
HEMLIG



Möte hos kabinetssekreteraren den 17 september 1997 i Raoul
Wallenberg-ärendet

Ett möte hölls den 17 september 1997 hos kabinetssekreteraren i Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet. I mötet deltog Lars Fredén från ambassaden i Moskva och från Utrikesdepartementet Martin Hallqvist, EC 2, Berndt Fredriksson, A-DOK, Christer Elm, UMK, Mats Foyer, EC 4 och Lage Olson, EI-ESEK.

Hallqvist framhöll att budskapet i RW-ärendet till president Jeltsin under dennes statsbesök i Sverige i början av december stod i fokus för intresset. Fredén hade vid ett möte den 5 dennes på departementet betonat att budskapet till ryssarna borde skärpas. Skarpare skrivningar i vitboken borde dessutom föreläggas ryssarna, om de ej gick oss till mötes.

Kabinetssekreteraren menade att man hamnat i ett dilemma. De utomstående amerikanska experterna hade i en telefonkonferens den 22 augusti motsatt sig publicering av vitboken i nuläget. Det var viktigt att undvika en blockering av ärendet.

Hallqvist medgav att man mött svårigheter i vissa frågor. Tillstånd hade ej givits för att fotografera 6 000 registreringskort i Vladimir. I ett försök att lösa denna fråga hade professor Marvin Makinen utarbetat ett alternativt tillvägagångssätt utan krav på fotografering.

no

1997-09-23

Det återstod därutöver för Susan Mesinai att gå igenom ett antal persondossierer i Moskva. Av ryssarna ytterligare begärd information i detta ärende skulle överlämnas snarast till berörda myndigheter.

Beträffande genomgång av arkiv på några mentalsjukhus hade Sven Hirdman nyligen träffat hälsovårdsministern, som hade gått igenom arkivet på Serbskijinstitutet fram till 1947 utan att finna något om RW. Mesinai önskade kontrollera uppgifter i arkivet efter 1947.

Till detta kom ett antal smärre önskemål som intervjuer med ett par KGB-medarbetare.

En aide-mémoire borde snarast överlämnas till den ryske ordföranden i arbetsgruppen och ett arbetsgruppmöte hållas i Moskva i november. Under detta kunde man förelägga ryssarna vissa förslag till skrivningar i vitboken och lägga skulden på de ryska myndigheterna, om dessa inte gick oss till mötes. Utfallet av detta möte i Moskva skulle bli av avgörande betydelse för hur budskapet till Jeltsin formulerades.

Vitboken skulle därefter kunna publiceras våren 1998. Publiceringen brådskade knappast.

Kabinettssekreteraren konstaterade att de f.n. inte fanns något politiskt tryck att publicera vitboken.

Fredriksson erinrade om att det förelåg en formell begäran om utlämnande av RW-dokument från den kanadensiske advokaten David Matas i Winnipeg. Man hade talat om publicering före Jeltsinbesöket, alternativt före vitboken. Man kunde dock utan problem försvara att publicera dokumenten först efter Jeltsins besök.

Fredén menade att man borde utforma ett skarpt utkast till vitbok och förelägga ryssarna detta. Dessutom borde RW-ärendet tas upp under Jeltsins besök och vitboken publiceras först efter detta.

På kabinettssekreterarens fråga förklarade Hallqvist att förslaget om en vitbok gick tillbaka till år 1991, då Bakatin var chef för säkerhetstjänsten och den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen tillsattes. Det rädde då en anda av eufori. Man beslöt att samarbeta och försöka nå fram till en samsyn i

1997-09-23

ärendet. Utvecklingen av RW-ärendet har sedan dess varit en barometer på den politiska utvecklingen i Ryssland.

Fredén betonade att utvecklingen av RW-ärendet nått en lågvattennivå och att det fanns risk att detta kunde negativt påverka andra ärenden. På rysk sida framstod det som självklart att man skulle avsluta ärendet och därmed "överlämna det till historikerna".

Det gällde att formulera en lämplig strategi för att avsluta arbetsgruppens arbete samt fortsätta bistå de fristående experterna.

Kabinettssekreteraren undrade om det ryska ointresset berodde på utmattning eller på att man hade något att dölja. Kunde det finnas någon som ville hålla igen?

Fredén trodde att man ville dölja att Ryssland fortfarande på sitt sätt var en gammaldags regim med ett mörkt förflutet. Man kunde inte gå och fråga säkerhetstjänsten. Om utrikesministeriet frågade denna fick man en utskällning. När man i början av kommissionens arbete kunde verka fritt, utgjorde detta ett undantag. Denna tid skulle säkerligen inte komma tillbaka.

Kabinettssekreteraren poängterade att man i aide-mémoiret i hovsam ton borde ta upp de tre-fyra viktigaste ärendena på agendan i syfte att nå framgång. Man borde låta detta verka och fundera vidare på rapporten utan att göra detta till ett hot. Därefter följde arbetsgruppmötet i november och Jeltsins besök i december.

Fredén framhöll att Jeltsin knappast kunde "leverera".

Kabinettssekreteraren tillade att man skulle göra en utvärdering efter presidentens besök. Man kunde avvakta med publicering av rapporten.

Beträffande frisläppandet av RW-dokument från 1971-1991 borde prövningen av dessa fortgå oberoende av vitboken. Man borde eftersträva maximal öppenhet. Föredragningar för kabinettssekreteraren måste dock ske i de fall prövningen lett till att publicering inte borde ske.

1997-09-23

Fredriksson konstaterade att detta betydde att publicering av denna andra omgång av RW-dokument kunde ske först efter Jeltsins besök i början av december i år.

Kabinettssekreteraren kunde inte se att publiceringen skulle innebära några problem gentemot Ryssland.

Fredén menade dock att man inte kunde bortse från eventuella problem.

Kabinettssekreteraren förklarade att man således skulle uppskjuta publiceringen till efter Jeltsins besök.

Foyer omtalade på fråga från kabinettssekreteraren att RW-ärendet inte tagits upp under enhetschefen Titovs besök nyligen.

Kabinettssekreteraren menade att de kunde ha varit intressant att få veta vad Titov skulle ha sagt om RW-ärendet. Det kunde förefalla underligt att ärendet tagits upp på ärendelistan men ej i själva samtalen. Frågan var om det kunde bli besvärande att ta upp ärendet med Jeltsin.

Hallqvist erinrade om att detta hade varit fallet i samband med Chrustjovs besök 1964 - fast det då förstås var andra tider. Man fick dock inte heller förbise att Jeltsin t.ex. släppt dokumenten om Katyn i samband med en politisk strid med Gorbatsjov, alltså inte i första hand för sakens egen skull.

Fredén upprepade att skälet till rysk motvilja troligen var utmattning, men det fanns även en möjlighet att ryssarna ville dölja något. Det skulle kosta att driva ärendet vidare, som någon gång måste avvecklas. Det gällde att vi inte förlorade kontrollen över "landningen". På svensk sida borde vi kunna ta emot eventuell kritik och hänvisa till att aldrig hade så många arbetat så länge och så helhjärtat som med detta ärende.

Beträffande bidrag till von Dardel m.fl., som skulle träffa kabinettssekreteraren senare samma dag, föreslog Hallqvist att man kunde göra en utfästelse om ett bidrag på 10 000 USD men ingenting efter detta.


Kabinettssekreteraren nämnde att han tänkte ta upp Primakovs brev i RW-ärendet den 17 juli i år till utrikesministern under samtalet med von

1997-09-23

Dardel och säga att man kanske inte utnyttjat detta till fullo. Samtidigt välkomnade vi detta intresse för RW.

Kabinettsskreteraren upprepade att man inte fick skapa polarisering i våra relationer med Moskva. Aide-mémoiret borde formuleras med bistånd av Magnusson i Riga och ambassaden i Moskva. Därefter följde alltså arbetsgruppmötet i november och Jeltsins besök i december. Efter detta skulle man ta ställning till vitboken och publiceringen av RW-dokumenterna 1971-1991.

Fredén tillade att Jeltsin under sitt besök i Sverige troligen skulle säga att man var villig att bistå med efterforskningar i ärendet. Det skulle därefter dröja till mars-april 1998 innan man erhöll officiellt svar i frågan.


Lage Olson

1997-09-24

Aambs Stefan Gullgren

aa/R

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: EI (Olson),

amb Riga

(EC)

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu'

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Magnusson-Hallqvist 970917

I anledning av ovancit samt mot bakgrund av diskussionen i Stockholm 17 sep under ledning av Kabsek, i vilken Fredén deltog, vill vi inkomma med följande förslag.

1. Vi förmodar att Magnussons planerade Moskva-besök 9-10 oktober bl a syftar till att inhämta ytterligare underlag om den ryska inställningen i de utestående frågorna samt att med den ryska sidan diskutera föreberedelserna av nästa arbetsgruppsmöte. Det är ju av yttersta vikt att detta möte verkligen leder till konkreta resultat.

Därutöver bör vi väl på svensk sida fortsätta processen att förbereda en väl genomarbetad och tydlig strategi i RW-ärendet inför det jeltsinska statsbesöket, bl a i ljuset av de interna diskussionerna i Stockholm 17 september. Det torde finnas anledning att med den ryska sidan även dryfta just dessa mer principiella aspekter av RW-ärendet inför de viktiga policyavgöranden som förestår på svensk sida i detta ärende. Det vore självfallet en fördel om även den ytterst ansvarige i departementet för RW-ärendet kunde delta i en sådan diskussion.

Ambassaden vill därför föreslå att även amb Hallqvist om möjligt medverkar i besöket 9-10 oktober.

2. För att förbereda den ryska sidan på de kommande diskussionerna borde kanske den aide mémoire om den svenska ståndpunkten i RW-ärendet som nu förbereds i departementet ligga färdig för överlämnande till den ryska sidan redan före ett besök av Magnusson och (ev) Hallqvist i Moskva. Vi utgår ifrån att detta dokument kan överlämnas allra senast i samband med ett sådant besök.

3. Tacksam Er snara reaktion på vårt förslag så att vi kan börja förbereda besöksprogrammet.

HIRDMAN

To: Lage Olson 011 46 8 723 1176 (Fax)
405 3280 (Tel)
UD/EI/ESEK x

-09-24

From: Susanne Berger
(703) 237 0946 (Tel + Fax)

P2EU'

Delges:

Fredriksson, A-Doiz
Backman, A-Doiz-ARK
Tejler, Washington

September 22, 1997Nr. of Pages: 2 + Cover

exp. 97-09-23

L

a.a. / L

Dear Mr Olson,

Thank you for a very nice lunch -

I have enclosed the letter you had requested.

One quick question: Is there an archive at all
for the Embassy Moscow in the time of 1945-195?
Or are just the binder papers not there? The CD-Rom
states that the archives themselves are missing.

Best wishes, Susanne

1/2

20 SEP 1996

Professor Guy von Dardel
45 Route de Poney-Dessus
CH-1242 Satigny
SWITZERLAND

References: F96-0262
F96-1596

Dear Professor von Dardel:

This is in response to your letter dated 22 February 1996 pertaining to material previously provided you in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request numbered F96-0262 concerning Raoul Wallenberg. We note that your letter was postmarked 24 August 1996 and was received in this office on 28 August 1996. Since all action on your request numbered F96-0262 was considered to be complete as a result of our 10 June 1996 letter (enclosed), we have assigned the new number F96-1596 to your 22 February letter. Please refer to this number in all subsequent correspondence.

Specifically, your 22 February letter provided MORI ID numbers for 40 previously released documents provided you as a result of your request numbered F96-0262. You note that those documents "contain...linked over sections or individual words, presumably containing information which is still classified." You then ask for "[our] assistance to get them declassified as quickly as possible." You also note that MORI ID documents numbered 14348 and 6857 "are entirely unreadable," and ask for better copies.

With respect to documents numbered 14348 and 6857, the copies provided are the best copies available and, regretfully, we are unable to provide you with more readable copies. With respect to the remaining documents, we note that the MORI documents numbered 6859 and 14381 were released in unredacted form and, therefore, do not require further review. You also list a document numbered 14627 which was not provided to you in your request numbered F96-0262 and which does not bear on the subject of your request. Therefore, this brings the number of documents which you are requesting we re-review for possible release of redacted portions to 37.

2/2


We can conduct a review of the redacted portions of the remaining 37 documents for possible release of additional information. Accordingly, we have accepted your request; it will be processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431. Our search will be for full text copies of the 37 documents listed below, in existence as of and through the date of this acceptance letter.

Documents

6699, 6707, 6736, 6737, 6916, 7077, 7085, 14268, 14269,
14288, 14305, 14306, 14307, 14308, 14309, 14327, 14333,-
14334, 14340, 14345, 14350, 14360, 14391, 14392, 14396,
14399, 14400, 14404, 14405, 14407, 14408, 14409, 14416,
14419, 14430, 20528, 20536

The heavy volume of FOIA requests received by the Agency has created delays in processing. Since we cannot respond within the 10 working days stipulated by the FOIA, you have the right to consider this a denial and may appeal to the CIA Information Review Committee. It would seem more reasonable, however, to have us continue processing your request and respond to you as soon as we can. You can appeal any denial of records at that time. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that you agree, and we will proceed on this basis.

Sincerely,


Lee S. Strickland
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

1997-09-24

Ambassadrådet Lage Olson

Delges (jakter bilaga):

Kabs.

von Dardel

Carl Persson

Ånger

Magnusson, Riga

Hallqvist, Ec 2

Olson, EI-ESEK Broder,

Amb. Moskva

Amb. Washington

Exp. 97-09-30

UD/EI

ESEK

(EI)

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ES 22-23

P 2 Eu'

Raoul Wallenberg och den ungerska motståndsrörelsen

Hbr Lundvik-Olson 1997-09-16

1 bil

P 2 Eu'

Härmed översändes det ur Rådagsamlingens årsbok 1984-85 hämtade materialet om den ungerska motståndsrörelsen MFM, vari dess genom Géza Sóos förmedlade kontakter med svenska legationen hösten 1944 omnämnes. Det består av två delar, vardera bestående av en kommentar på ungerska samt en engelsk text som uppges vara hämtad ur en av den amerikanska underrättelsetjänsten sammanställd rapport. Omnämmandet av kontakten med svenska legationen återfinnes på sid. 271-272. I den ungerska texten har jag vid hastig genomläsning inte hittat någon hänvisning till legationen.

Det är intressant att notera att detta material kunnat publiceras redan 1986.

Rådagsamlingen är den ungerska reformerta kyrkans historiska bibliotek och arkiv, och jag har bett en historiker jag känner (dock inte Péter Bajtay) att för ambassadens räkning undersöka om samlingen eventuellt innehåller ytterligare något material av intresse i sammanhanget.

Hjärtliga hälsningar

Jan Lundvik

Lundvik/Olson, Lajc
And Budapest 97-09-24

A RÁDAY GYŰJTEMÉNY ÉVKÖNYVE

IV-V.
1984-85

Budapest, 1986

JEAN

St

Szerkesztő bizottság

BENDA KÁLMÁN
BELICZAY ANGÉLA ERDŐS GYÖRGY
NAGY EDIT SZABÓ JULIANNA

ISSN 0237—0921

Megjelent
a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia — Soros Foundation Bizottság
anyagi támogatásával

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Soos Géza és Hadnagy Domokos tájékoztatása a magyarországi helyzetről és a Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalomról 1944 decemberében

(Az amerikai központi hírszerző hivatal által készített összefoglaló jelentés.)

Közli: Karsai Elek

Bevezetés

1944. december 11-én a spanyolországi San Severóban állomásozó brit politikai tanácsadó az alábbi jelentést küldte Casertába, az angolszász főparancsnokságnak és Londonba, a Foreign Office-nak, a külügyminisztériumnak:

„1944. december 9-én egy Heinkel III. típusú repülőgép szállt le egy, az amerikaiak által ellenőrzött repülőtéren, San Severóban, a repülőgép a magyarországi Pápa városából indult.

A repülőgép fedélzetén érkezett csoport jelenleg biztonsági szerveink felügyelete alatt van, a csoport tagjai azt állítják, hogy őket a magyar ellenállási mozgalom (magyar nevén: Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom — MFM) küldte, az a mozgalom, melyet Horthy¹ szervezett 1944 márciusában.

A csoport az alábbi személyekből áll:

a) Dr. Soos Géza, akiről azt állítják, hogy a MFM főtitkára.²

b) Hadnagy Domokos őrnagy, aki a magyar légierő vezérkari főnöksége műszaki részlegében teljesít szolgálatot. Ő vezette a repülőgépet, magával hozta feleségét és gyermekét, továbbá egy rádiót és egy szerelőt. Tagja az MFM-nek.

c) Bentinek báró, a holland hadsereg századosa, aki megszökött a német fogságból és együttműködött az MFM-mel. Rokona a kairói holland követnek.

Az MFM-et Horthy utasítása alapján Szentiványi³ szervezte meg, aki Moszkvába ment szeptember végén. Az itteni delegációt Budapesten az MFM azzal bízta meg, hogy létesítsen kapcsolatot a szövetséges tényezőkkel Apor báró révén, ki Rómában van, és összehangolja az MFM-erőfeszítéseit a Budapest ellen indított orosz támadással.⁴

Dr. Soos magával hozott egy számjelszót, amellyel érintkezésbe tud léni Budapesttel: azt állítja, hogy amint Budapesten megkapták az üzenetet, attól számított hat órán belül az MFM elküld bármiféle információt a fővárosi közintézmények és a kormányhivatalok tevékenységéről.

Hadnagy őrnagy is kapott utasítást arra, hogy lépjen kapcsolatba Apor báróval. Őt Horthy már felhasználta arra, hogy hasonló küldetéseket előkészítsen, beleértve Náday tábornok olaszországi útját⁵ és néhány más utat, legújabbán Tóth Ernő őrnagy⁶ és Vörös tábornok fia⁷ oroszországi útját 1944 szeptemberében.

Tekintettel arra, hogy e küldöttség bizonyos mértékig értékes lehet hadműveleti szempontból, megbeszélést folytatott a Balkáni Légierő parancsnokló tisztjével arról, hogy a társaságot légiúton azonnal szállítsák át Casertába.”

Casertában székelt ugyanis az Office of Strategic Service, az OSS, a Stratégiai Szolgálatok Hivatala. Ezt a szervezetet 1942-ben hozták létre Rooseveltnél elnök utasítására, vezetője Donovan New York-i ügyvéd volt. Az OSS volt a II. világháború alatt az amerikai központi hírszerző hivatal, mely a három katonai fegyvernem, a szárazföldi, a haditengerészeti és a légierő hírszerző szervezeteitől függetlenül működött. (1947-ben az OSS helyébe a CIA — Central Intelligence Agency — lépett.)

Soóst és Hadnagyot feltűnő gyorsasággal átvitték Casertába, ahol őket az OSS emberei rendkívül alapos kihallgatássorozaton kérdezték ki. Az 1944. december 13-tól december 31-ig lefolytatott kihallgatás után az OSS különleges részlege, a Research and Analysis Branch (Kutatási és Elemző Csoport), a kihallgatások alapján 1945. január 27-én részletes tanulmányt készített a magyarországi helyzetről, ennek első része az 1944. március 19-től 1944. október 15-ig tartó időszak eseményeit tárgyalja, míg a második rész az 1944. október 15-től 1944. december 9-ig történeteket foglalja össze.

A jelentés tartalmi áttekintése

Bevezetés és összegzés

A Kutatási és Elemző Csoport szükségesnek tartja megemlíteni, hogy Soos sok eredeti dokumentumot hozott magával, ezeket egy későbbi időpontban, megfelelő helyen meg fogják vizsgálni. Az elmondottakat két fejezetbe foglalták: az október 15-e előtti és utáni eseményekre; mivel Soos és Hadnagy közlései nem voltak mindenben egybehangzók, az elbeszélte eseményekben sok az űr, a hézag, a történet egyébiránt is nagyon bonyolult, ezért szükségesnek látszott, hogy kiegészítésül egy időrendi áttekintést és az említett személyekről rövid tájékoztatót készítsenek.

Az MFM — meghatározások szerint — jellegében magyar és kálvinista, tagjai kizárólag értelmiségi, a katonai és a hivatalnoki rétegekből valók, szoros kapcsolatban voltak Teleki Pállal és környezetével. Az 1944. március 19-i német megszállás és annak súlyos következményei balfelé tolták a mozgalmat, amely most „kiáll a magyar társadalom szerkezetének drasztikus és demokratikus átalakítása mellett, mint olyan követelés mellett, ami a magyar probléma bármiféle megoldásának elengedhetetlen előfeltétele.” Ezen az alapon csatlakozott a MFM a Magyar Fronthoz, az ellenállás átfogó szervezetéhez.

Konklúziók:

a) Az MFM teljesen azonosult a Horthy-rendszerrel; vezetői azon az állásponton voltak, hogy Horthyt csak úgy lehet megmenteni, ha szembefordul a németekkel. Horthy legszűkebb körzetéből több személyt az MFM felelős vezetői között találunk, Horthytól kapták az utasításokat és jóideig nem keresték a szövetséget a népi alapon álló Magyar Fronttal, amelyet olyan pártok alkotnak, melyek már a német megszállás előtt szembenálltak a Horthy-rendszerrel.

b) 1944. október 15-e kudarcának okai: szervezeti elégtelenség, a rossz titoktartás, mely egyaránt jellemezte az MFM-et és a Magyar Frontot.

Végül: 1944. október 15-e előtt az oroszok hajlandók voltak tárgyalni Horthyval vagy az ellenállási mozgalommal, hogy biztosítsák katonai együttműködésüket a németek ellen. Soos és Hadnagy szerint még ahhoz is jözzájárultak volna, hogy a végleges békeszerződésig a magyarok megtartsák Erdély azon részeit, amelyeket a fegyverszünet megkötése idején megszállva tartottak, továbbá azon más területeket, amelyek nem tartoznak a trianoni Magyarországhoz, de amelyek lakóinak többsége magyar.

Az események időrendi áttekintése: 1944. március 1. és október 15. között.

Ezután következik a részletes tárgyalás. Az első rész, amely október 15-ig hozza az eseményeket, 8 fejezetre oszlik. Ezek: [I.] A márciusi válság; [II.] Az ellenállás szervezete; [III.] Az egyházak és a zsidódeportálás; [IV.] A júliusi válság; [V.] A németek forradalmi átalakulást készítenek elő; [VI.] Horthy fegyverszüneti előkészületei; [VII.] A Horthy—MFM terv kudarca; [VIII.] Horthy „mártíromsága”. Ezt követik a szöveghez fűzött jegyzetek, majd a névmutató.

[I.] *A márciusi válság.* A németek a Magyarország megszállását célzó előkészületekhez — Soos és Hadnagy közlése szerint — március eleje körül kezdtek hozzá, amikor a budapesti Németbirodalmi Gimnázium hetedik és nyolcadikos diákjai abbahagyták az iskolába járást. Ha megkérdezték őket, azt válaszolták: „Mi a haza szolgálatára, a Hitlerjugendbe vagyunk beosztva.” A német gimnázium diákjai állították össze azoknak a jelentős németellenes személyeknek a listáját, akiket a Gestapo célszerűnek vélt letartóztatni. A megszálláskor a Gestapo embereit ők kalauzolták a megadott címekre.

A továbbiakban Soos és Hadnagy részletesen előadták Horthy kormányzó március 18-i klessheimi tárgyalását Hitlerrel. Forrásukat is megnevezték: Csatay honvédelmi miniszter titkárának személyében. Elbeszélésük ismeretlen momentumot nem tartalmaz, igyekeztek Horthyra semmi terhelőt nem mondani. Így nem beszéltek arról, hogy a tárgyalás végül is azzal végződött, hogy Horthy, hosszas vonakodás után és némi fenyegetés hatására, de végülis elfogadta Hitler minden lényeges követelését, elsősorban azt, hogy Magyarország nem lép ki a háborúból, sőt ellenkezőleg, minden személyi és anyagi erőforrását harcbarati Németország oldalán, azután azt, hogy felszá-

molják a németellenes politikai erőket, és végül, de nem utolsó sorban azt, hogy radikálisan megoldják a zsidókérdést.

Ami az OSS tanulmány e részében új és figyelemre méltó, az egy lapalji jegyzetben található. Ebből megtudjuk, hogy az egyik fontos dokumentum, amellyel Hitler bizonyította Horthynak a magyar diplomácia béketaogatóságait, a stockholmi magyar katonai attasé jelentése volt, mely Ullein-Revicky Antal, svédországi magyar követ titkos tárgyalásait foglalta össze. Ez a rész a következőkkel fejeződik be: „A kormányzó magatartása a válság egész ideje alatt az, hogy nagyon silány, gyenge értesülései voltak a németek terveiről, továbbá az, hogy rosszul időzítette saját fenyegető lépéseit, és hogy csak akkor gondolt ellenállásra, amikor a játszma már elveszett, — meg kellett hogy ismétlődjen októberben.” (Ti. az 1944. október 15-i fegyverszünet megkötésekor.)

[II.] Az ellenállás szervezete. Az OSS dokumentum szerint a Magyar Ellenállási Mozgalom 1944-ben két különálló és egymástól élesen különböző csoportra oszlott, a két csoport csak a nyár végén egyesítette erőit. „Az egyik csoportot a baloldal pártjai alkották, amelyek mögött tömegek állottak és amely pártok 25 éven át szembenálltak a Horthy-rendszerrel. A másik csoport tisztviselőkből, katonatisztekből és értelmiségiekből tevődött össze, jóformán mind dzsentri származásúak voltak. E második csoport jellegében nagymértékben magyar volt, és tagjai között, ha egyáltalán voltak, nagyon kevés volt a sváb, a zsidó vagy a szláv. A csoport tagjainak nagy hányada erdélyi és kálvinista volt, és szorosan kötődött a kormányzóhoz.”

Soos és Hadnagy tájékoztatásából az OSS szakértői azt a következtetést vonták le, hogy a második csoport fő célja október 15-én a Horthy-rendszer megmentése volt.

1944 március végén a Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom Százak Tanácsa lerakta a Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom alapjait. Az MFM megalakulásánál a vezető szerepet Szent Iványi Domokos, ifjabb Horthy Miklós személyes jóbarátja játszotta. Az alapító tagok között említik Kovács Andrást, ifj. Horthy Miklós egyik titkárát, Soos Gézát, aki a „Soli Deo Gloria” elnevezésű kálvinista ifjúsági mozgalom szellemi vezére volt, Boér Eleket, a budapesti kálvinista egyház világi vezetőjét, Faragho Gábor altábornagyot, a csendőrség főfelügyelőjét, Kudar Lajos csendőrezredest,¹³ dálnoki Veress Lajost, a 2. hadsereg parancsnokát, Horváth Ferenc tábornokot és Szent-Miklóssy István őrnagyot.

Az MFM katonai osztályát csak július végén állították fel, mivel e részleg kiszemelt vezetőjét, Szent-Iványit a frontra vezényelték és csak a nyár végén tért haza. A politikai osztály vezetője maga Soos volt, az MFM főtitkári tisztét Szent-Iványi vállalta. Horthy kormányzó csak a megalakulás után szerzett tudomást az MFM létrejöttéről, de attól kezdve teljes mértékben helyeselte tevékenységét.

[III.] Az egyházak és a zsidódeportálás. Soos és Hadnagy e téma bevezetőjében hivatkozott arra a röpiratra, amelyet 1944. október 30-a után adtak ki „Igaz szó az igaz magyarokhoz” címen. E röpirat azzal vádolta a németeket, hogy „a zsidók üldözésével el akarták terelni a közvélemény figyelmét az ország szerencsétlen helyzetéről.”

Világnézetüknek megfelelően azt igyekeztek bizonygatni, hogy a náci célkitűzésekkel szemben a kálvinista egyház tanúsította a legnagyobb ellenállást, amelyet támogatott a luteránus egyház és a katolikus papság. Majd így folytatták: „Ami a nácizmust és a német hódító törekvéseket illeti, általánosságban, az egyházak mind többé-kevésbé ugyanazt az álláspontot vallották: hírdesd az evangéliumot és ne avatkozzál a politikába. Bár a papság nem imádkozott a nácizmus üdvéért, de nem is mondott imát ellene.”

Az egyházi ellenállás „motorja” az 1942-ben alapított „Jó Pásztor Misszió” volt, vezéralakja pedig Éliás József, a zsidó származású kálvinista pap, aki egyúttal az MFM zsidó szekciójának vezetője is volt.

1944. május 19-én a protestáns püspökök közös memorandumban tiltakoztak a középkori gettórendszer felélesztése ellen; a katolikus egyház hivatalosan nem tiltakozott, ez föltehetően Serédi hercegprímáson múltott, mivel a katolikus alsópapság szorosan együttműködött a protestáns vezetőkkel. A Szent Kereszt Egyesület elnöke, Cavalier József és elnökhelyettese, a jezsuita Jánosi páter, Éliással szoros kapcsolatot tartott.

Az összeállítás rögzíti Ravasz püspök látogatását Horthy kormányzónál 1944 május végén. Az OSS-nak adott információ szerint Ravasz püspök már beteg volt, fölkelte betegágyából, Horthy kormányzóhoz ment, akitől megkérdezte, „vajon tudja-e, milyen bűnöket követnek el nevében?” A kormányzó azt válaszolta, hogy a németek félmillió magyar munkást kértek német hadiüzemekbe és Sztójay miniszterelnök arra kérte a németeket, hogy a magyarok helyett fogadjanak el zsidókat. Mind Sztójay, mind Veesenmayer kijelentette: Hitler megígérte, hogy ezeket a zsidókat épp olyan bánásmódban részesítik, mint amilyenben a magyarok részesülnének. A kormányzó megkérdezte, mennyi ideig szándékoznak dolgoztatni e munkásokat Németországban, és hozzátette: nem okos dolog, hogy elválasztják a családfenntartókat családjaiktól. Sztójay azt felelte, hogy a németek ezt megértették és azt kérték, hogy a munkásokkal együtt családjaikat is küldjék ki.

Amikor Ravasz továbbra is kitartott azon állítása mellett, hogy a zsidókkal kegyetlenül bánnak, a kormányzó ingerült lett és közölte a püspökkel, hogy nincs hozzászokva, hogy kételkedjenek a szavában. A kormányzó azzal fejezte be a beszélgetést, hogy Ravasz beszéljen Sztójayval."

Sztójay a püspököt Jaross belügyminiszterhez utasította, aki mindent megígért, de semmit nem váltott be ígéreteiből.

Ezután a tanulmány részletesen ismerteti a protestáns egyházak tervezett tiltakozó akcióit a zsidókérdésben, majd Serédi hercegprímás elutasító álláspontját a közös fellépés ügyében.

[IV.] *A júliusi válság.* Elmondja a Bárczy István elleni merényletet, azt, hogy miként sikerült megakadályozni a Baky-féle csendőrpuccsot és ezzel egyidejűleg a budapesti zsidók deportálását.

[V.] *A németek forradalmi átalakulást készítenek elő* c. fejezet a magyarországi német politikai irányvonalról szól, arról, hogy 1944 július közepe után a Ribbentropp—Veessenmayer vonalat a Himmler—Winkelmann vonal váltotta fel.

[VI.] *Horthy fegyverszüneti előkészületei.* E részben néhány figyelemre méltó megjegyzést találunk. Az első: „A németellenes csoportok soha nem dolgozták ki rendszeresen terveiket, de az mindenestre ott volt terveik között, hogy annyi katonai egységet vonjanak közvetlen ellenőrzésük alá, amennyit csak lehet, hogy az ellenállási mozgalom embereit annyi kormányzati kulcspozícióba helyezték, amennyibe csak tudják, hogy kedvező egyezményt kössenek a szövetségesekkel és hogy rávegyék arra az angolszász hatalmakat, hogy szállják meg részben az országot.”

A második: „Ambrózy, a kormányzó magántitkára [helyesen: a kabinetiroda főnöke] is tagja lett az MFM-nek. A németek tudomást szereztek az MFM terveiről, ugyanakkor az Horthy—MFM csoportok értesültek a német tervekről, augusztustól a német előkészületek a nyilasok hatalomrsegítésére és Horthy előkészületei a katonai szembefordulásra párhuzamosan futottak. De a német hírszerzés magasabb színvonalúnak bizonyult az MFM hírszerzésénél és ez volt a döntő tényező a Horthy-kísérlet kudarcánál.”

Lakatost 1944. augusztus 29-én nevezte ki Horthy miniszterelnökké, „Lakatos visszautasította, hogy csatlakozzék az MFM-hez, állásfoglalását azzal indokolta, hogy szavát adta a németeknek, hogy nem vesz részt semmiféle ellenük irányuló akcióban; de minden fontosabb kérdést megbeszélte Szent-Iványival.”

Azután egy érdekes alkuról: „Sajnálatos módon Bethlen ragaszkodott ahhoz, hogy Rakovszky Ivánt, egyik emberét, vegyék be a Lakatos-kormányba. Az MFM vezetői között ez nagy nyugtalanságot keltett, minthogy Rakovsky szövetségesbarát nézetei közismertek voltak. A németek készségesen beleegyeztek ebbe, de azt követelték, hogy — valamit valamiért — Reményi-Schnellernek is adjanak egy miniszteri tárcát. Ez az ember mindenestül benne volt a német tervekben, főkéjmje lett a németeknek a következő hetekben, és minden kormánydöntésről értesítette a németeket.”

Soos és Hadnagy tájékoztatása szerint a Magyar Front és az MFM között a komoly együttműködés csak 1944 augusztus első felében alakult ki; szeptember elején az MFM formálisan csatlakozott a Magyar Fronthoz. Az ok: Az MFM katonai vezetőinek fel kellett ismerniük, hogy „a magyar kommunista munkások jelentős szerepet játszhatnak Budapesten az irányváltkozás idején. Soos szerint az a döntés, hogy a munkásokat nem fegyverzik fel, október 17-e előtt, csak három nappal az irányváltkozásra megjelölt időpont előtt, végzetes tévedésnek bizonyult.”

Azután: Mialatt az ellenállási mozgalom folytatta előkészületeit Budapest ellenőrzésének biztosítására, Horthy kormányzó megkezdte tárgyalásait a fegyverszünet megkötésére; azt tervezte, hogy a honvédség erőit úgy helyezi el, hogy megtámadhassák a németeket. „Szerencsétlen módon a legmegbízhatóbb csapatokat, a stockholmi magyar követség sugallmazására, a déli frontszakaszon helyezték el, abban a reményben, hogy e térségben közvetlenül érintkezést tudnak létesíteni az angolszászokkal.”

A tanulmány leírja az első magyar küldöttek — Aczél, Faust, Dudás — moszkvai útjának megszervezését, azután arról is kapunk tájékoztatást, hogy Horthy a delegáció kedvező fogadtatásának hatására szánta el magát arra, hogy újabb, most már hivatalos megbízatással ellátott delegációt küld Moszkvába. Ennek tagjai Faragho Gábor, Szent-Iványi Domokos (mindketten az MFM vezető személyiségei) és Teleki Géza voltak.

Ezzel egyidőben Horthy Náday tábornokot Olaszországba küldte, hogy létesítsen kapcsolatot az angolszászokkal. Toszt, Horthy szárnysegédje úgy tájékoztatta az MFM vezetőit, hogy Horthy azt remélte: „Náday ki tudja eszközölni, hogy ledobjanak néhány ezer ejtőernyőst az 1. hadsereg vonalai mögött, ... így az angol—amerikai csapatok meg tudják előzni az orosz csapatokat az ország megszállásában.”

[VII.] *A Horthy—MFM terv kudarca.* Ebben a fejezetben az számít új ténynek, hogy a fegyverszünetet bejelentő kormányzói kiáltvány gondolata Ullein-Reviczky stockholmi magyar követtől

eredt. A terv az volt, hogy Horthy a harcoló csapatok parancsnokságára megy, de ő kijelentette, nem hagyja el a várat. Ez az elhatározása végzetesnek bizonyult.

[VIII.] Horthy „mártírsága”. Soos és Hadnagy az 1944. október 15–16-i eseményekről nyújtott tájékoztatást így fejezték be: „Horthy a válságból igaz hősként került ki, minden igaz magyar szemében népszerűbb, mint azelőtt.” Lemondása törvénytelen — a németek azzal kényszerítették rá, hogy négyéves unokájára pisztolyt szegeztek —, következésképpen „az első magyar demokratikus kormány” [idézőjelben az eredetiben], melynek megalakítására Horthy Tildy Zoltánnak adott megbízatást, Magyarország törvényes kormánya.

A jelentés 2. részének bevezetője (*Bevezetés és összegzés*) megismétli az MFM létrejöttéről, jellegéről szükséges tudnivalókat, s megállapítja, hogy „a két forrás [Soos és Hadnagy] természetesen arra törekszik, hogy felnagyítsa a csoportjuk által kifejtett tevékenységet”.

A Soos és Hadnagy által közölték lényegét a jelentés szerzői az alábbiakban összegezték: 1. A Szálasi-rendszer törvénytelen és így nekik, az MFM tagjainak van igényük arra, hogy törvényesen kormányozzanak, mint a régi kormány utódai. „Egy ellenállási kormány figyelemre méltó hasonlatosságot mutatna a Debrecenben megalakított kormánnyal.” 2. Az ellenállási mozgalom katonai téren kudarcot vallott. „Ez nem jelenti azt, hogy a felszabadulás után az ellenállás nem játszik majd vezetőszerepet a magyar politikai életben. A debreceni kormány megalakítása és jellege az ellenkezőjét sugallja.”

Ezt a bevezető részt ezúttal is egy kronológiai áttekintés követi.

A jelentés a továbbiakban tizenegy fejezetben tárgyalja a dolgokat. Ezek: [I.] A Szálasi-kormány legalizálása. [II.] Az ellenállási mozgalom ismételt kísérletei az oroszokkal történő kapcsolat-felvételre. [III.] A magyar hadsereg magatartása. [IV.] A szegedi misszió és az „orosz” összekötő tiszt. [V.] A Felszabadítási Bizottság. [VI.] Az MFM titkársága. [VII.] Az MFM katonai és a pénzügyi szekciója. [VIII.] Az MFM politikai szekciója. [IX.] Az MFM politikai jellege. [X.] A kommunista pártok és frakciók. [XI.] Kisgazdák, radikális parasztok és szociáldemokraták.

[I.] *A Szálasi-kormány legalizálása.* Leírja a kormány részéről fogantatottakat és a vele szemben megnyilvánuló ellenzést. Taglalja Szálasi nemzetvezetővé történt választásának körülményeit, hangsúlyozván Törek Gézának, a Kúria elnökének pozitív — nyilasellenes — magatartását. Kiemeli Tasnádi-Nagy Andrásnak, a Képviselőház elnökének Szálasi támogató szerepét, s azt, hogy emiatt nyíltan követelték: mondjon le a református egyházban betöltött főgondnoki tisztségéről. Tasnádi-Nagy álláspontját Serédi hercegprímás támogatta, aki úgy tájékoztatta az Országgyűlést, hogy Horthy kormányzó Tóth atyán keresztül azt üzenté neki: önként mondott le kormányzó tisztségéről. (Ahogy a jelentés írja zárójelben: „Valójában a kormányzó arra kérte Tóthot, hogy ennek éppen az ellenkezőjéről tájékoztassa Serédit.”) Soos ezt azzal magyarázta, hogy „a hercegprímás soha nem békült meg azzal a ténnyel, hogy Magyarország államfője egy protestáns.”

[II.] *Az ellenállási mozgalom ismételt kísérletei az oroszokkal történő kapcsolat felvételére c.* fejezet elmondja, hogy Soos személyesen adott át egy jegyzéket az oroszokhoz való továbbításra, melyben — hivatkozva arra, hogy Horthyt erőszakkal mondták le — az általa kijelölt Tildy miniszterelnöki elismerését kérték. Tildy biztonsági okokból ellenezte a „földalatti” (underground) kormány megalakítását, és meghatározott nevekből álló lista összeállítását. Soos úgy tudja, hogy a Kisgazdapártot Nagy Ferenc, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky és Dessewffy gróf, a Szociáldemokrata Pártot Szakasits Árpád képviselte volna a kormányban, az „ortodox” kommunisták három tárcát kaptak volna, Veress Lajos, a 2. hadsereg parancsnoka volt kiszemelve a honvédelmi miniszteri vagy a vezérkari főnöki posztra, míg Dudás és Kovács Imre államtitkárok lettek volna.

Soos említést tett egy második jegyzékről, amelyet szintén a svéd követségen keresztül küldtek el és amely azt tudakolta, hogy a magukat megadó, átálló magyar katonai egységek, tisztek és köz-katonák milyen fogadtatásra számíthatnak? Egyik jegyzékre sem kaptak választ.

[III.] *A magyar hadsereg magatartása.* A tanulmány szerzői arra a megállapításra jutnak, hogy a közkatonák zöme még nem jutott el odáig, hogy felvegye a kapcsolatot az oroszokkal; szószerint közlik a szövegét annak a röpiratnak, amely megfelelő bánásmódot helyezett kilátásba az oroszokhoz átálló katonáknak. „A két MFM vezető állandóan visszatér arra a témára, hogy az amerikai és a brit csapatok jelenléte, függetlenül attól, mily kevesen vannak, létfontosságú a magyar hadseregnek a szövetségesek oldalán történő átcsoportosításához.”

[IV.] *A szegedi misszió és az „orosz” összekötőtiszt.* Soos szerint Simonffy-Tóth Ernő őrnagy és Vörös Tibor százados Szegedre küldése volt a harmadik kísérlet, hogy az orosz parancsnokkal felvegyék a kapcsolatot. Simonffy-Tóth magával vitte Tildy levelét, mely hangsúlyozta, hogy az ellenállási mozgalom továbbra is Horthyt tekinti kormányzónak és a fegyverszüneti szerződést hatályban levőnek tartja, kéri az oroszokat, hogy küldjenek egy összekötő tisztet, akinek segít-

le ő kijelentette,

nyényekről nyúj-
len igaz magyar
kényszerítették
magyar demok-
Tildy Zoltánnak

M létrejöttéről,
[Hadnagy] termé-

szegtek: 1. A
gy törvényesen
e méltó hason-
galom katonai
és nem játszik
a és jellege az

ála ormány
nő csolat-
sz" összekötő
mai és a pénz-
[X.] A kom-
utak.

s a szem-
környéményeit,
tatartását. Ki-
ét, s azt, hogy
ti tiszttségéről.
rszágtanácsot,
e kormányzóit
t, hogy ennek
hercegprímás

lére c. fejezet
usra, melyben
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nd) kormány
hogy a Kis-
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aptak volna,
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ültek el
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utnak, hogy
l; szószert
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az rikai
magyar had-

ő őrnagy és
ancsnokkal
a, hogy az
szerződést
kinek segít-

ségével az ellenállási mozgalom katonai akciót tud végrehajtani. Simonffy-Tóth utasítást kapott, hogy javasolja az oroszoknak: frontális támadás helyett szárnytámadással próbálkozzanak Budapesten térségében.

November 2-án vagy 3-án meg is jelent egy orosz összekötőtiszt, aki Váry őrnagy néven mutatkozott be és azt állította, hogy magyar és kommunista és hogy az oroszok képezték ki partizánparancsnoknak. Péntes-Fekete Géza — a SZUMBE vagy másnéven a Szovjetunió Magyar Barátságainak Egyesülete vezetője vezette be a Felszabadítási Bizottságba.

Dudás, aki tagja volt az első nem-hivatalos moszkvai delegációnak, teljesen bizonyos volt abban, hogy az összekötőtiszt megbízható és nagyon rossznéven vette, hogy Soos és Hadnagy ebben kételkedett. Gyanújuk alátámasztására elősorolták, Váry néhány tervezett akcióját, és azt, hogy amikor a Felszabadítási Bizottság vezetőit a nyomozók letartóztatták, Váry eltűnt.

[V.] *A Felszabadítási Bizottság* (ez nyilván azonos a Magyar Nemzeti Felkelés Felszabadítási Bizottságával, rövidítve: MNFFB). Soos és Hadnagy tájékoztatása szerint a bizottság 1944. október 25-e körül alakult, mint az ellenállási mozgalom mindent átfogó végrehajtó szerve. Ezzel kapcsolatban külön, hosszasan kitérnek Dudás szerepére, különös tekintettel viszonyára az „ortodox” kommunistákhoz.

Tildy ellenezte az új bizottság létrehozását, mivel a Magyar Frontot megfelelő hatékony végrehajtó szervnek tartotta és attól félt, hogy az új szervezet veszélyezteti a földalatti mozgalom biztonságát; másrészt Soosék szerint, el akarta kerülni, hogy egy kommunista többségű bizottság irányítsa az ellenállási mozgalmat. Az új szervezet vezetője Bajcsy-Zsilinszky lett, Tildy visszautasította a részvételt. Minthogy Bajcsy-Zsilinszky ritkán tudott résztvenni a tárgyalásokon, őt Csorba helyettesítette. Soos képviselte az MFM-et, Kovács a parasztság radikális szárnyát és Szakasits, ki egyetlen alkalommal sem jelent meg az üléseken, a szociáldemokratákat. Az „ortodox” kommunistákat Kállay Gyula képviselte. Részt vett a bizottságban Fekete-Péntes Géza és Gyenes József, a Magyar Diákok Szabadságfrontja képviselője. A szervezet katonai bizottságának vezetőjét Kiss János altábornagy és Nagy Jenő ezredes vállalta.

Az MFM élesen bírálta az MNFFB-t részben a ki nem elégítő biztonsági rendszabályok, részben a bizottság határozatlansága miatt.

A következő négy fejezet az MFM jellegével, személyi összetételével, a katonai, pénzügyi és politikai szekcióinak felépítésével foglalkozik.

[VI.] *Az MFM titkársága.* Soos és Hadnagy az MFM-et az ellenállás valamifajta vezérkarának tartja, amely ellátja a mozgalmat azzal a katonai és technikai „know-how-val”, melynek a politikai pártok általában híjával vannak. A szervezetnek 2700 embere van, közülük 600 Budapesten található, „a tagok 90%-a hivatásos katona, polgári tisztviselő és értelmiségi. Soos és Hadnagy úgy tudja, hogy lényegében a vezérkar minden magyar etnikai származású tagja és Magyarország legtehetségesebb mérnökei, orvosai az MFM-hez tartoznak.”

A titkárság, a mozgalom irányító szerve, 50–60 személyből áll. 1944. szeptember 26-ig, moszkvai elutasításig a főtitkár Szent-Iványi Domokos volt. A jelentés leírja Szent-Iványi pályafutását; 1942-ben Kállay miniszterelnök bevonta a békeelőkészítő bizottság munkálataiba, „ebben a minőségben Szent-Iványi kapcsolatokat épített ki a fináncok, a nehézipar és a protestáns egyházak németellenes elemeivel. Bár nem dinamikus egyéniség, nemsokára ő lett annak a németellenes csoportnak a vezetője, amelyik még 1942-ben számításba vette, hogy Németország végül is megszállja Magyarországot és nyílt konfliktusra kerül sor a két ország között. E csoport élén betöltött vezető szerepe az MFM létrehozásában csúcsonyosodott ki. A végsőkéig németellenes és elvakultan angolszász—brit barát Szent-Iványi fél az oroszoktól és gyűlöli őket. Szociális kérdésekben végsőfokon progresszív és úgy jellemezték őt, hogy egyike azoknak, aki kész minden olyan szociális reformra, amely megmenti a reakciót.”

Szent-Iványi kivonása után Soos lett az MFM főtitkára, ő a Soli Deo Gloria elnöke volt, nem tartozott egyetlen politikai párthoz sem, de nézetei nagyon közel álltak a Kiszármazás balszárnyához tartozókéhoz. A második és harmadik titkári tisztséget Arany Bálint és Bognár István viselték, utóbbi a Soli Deo Gloria alelnöke.

[VII.] *A katonai szekció.* Első vezetője Szent-Miklós István őrnagy volt, ki szorosan együttműködött a kommunista Somogyi Miklóssal és Faust Imrével. E szekcióban tevékenykedett Arany Bálint, Hadnagy Domokos és Kupa László, — ez utóbbi vezetés szerepét töltött be a Soli Deo Gloria-ban és Soos távozása után átvette az MFM adminisztratív irányítását.

A pénzügyi szekció vezetője Darányi György, a Magyar Malomipari Üzemek ügyvezető igazgatója volt. E szekció legkiemelkedőbb tagjai Zerkovitz Péter és Oszkár voltak, gazdag zsidó borkereskedők.

[VIII.] *A politikai szekció* három csoportra oszlott: propaganda, elvesztett területek és külügyi kapcsolatok. Az első volt a legjelentősebb, ennek élén Mészáros István állt, ki közeli munkatársa volt Ullein-Reviczky Antalnak és Antall Józsefnek. „Abból a tényből, hogy az MFM-nek volt erdélyi, észak- és dél-magyarországi csoportja, következik, hogy a szervezetet a területi revízióra való törekvések jellemezték.” Soos és Hadnagy részletes felvilágosítást nyújtott e három csoport felépítéséről, személyi viszonyairól, valamint az angolszász és a jugoszláv kapcsolatokat ápoló csoportokról. Az MFM és a zsidók között a kapcsolat fenntartásáról az a külön szekció gondoskodott, melyet Éliás József tiszteletes vezetett; ő volt a vezetője a Jó Pásztor Misszióknak is, amelyet a zsidó menekültek gondozására hoztak létre.

[IX.] *Az MFM politikai jellege.* Ez a fejezet megállapítja, hogy „e mozgalom a magyar uralkodó osztályok leginkább liberális szárnyát képviseli”. Soos és Hadnagy több ízben is úgy utalt az MFM-re, mint „a Teleki-párt”-ra. Következik Teleki jellemzése: „Teleki, persze elsődlegesen reakciós volt. Teljességgel hitt a magyar arisztokrácia és a dzsentri vezetőszerében. Ellenzett minden agrárreformot. Közéleti pályafutását az a vágy vezette, hogy visszaszerezze a Trianonban elvesztett területeket. De Teleki németellenes volt és drámai öngyilkossága, mely tiltakozás volt Magyarország németbarát külpolitikája ellen, legendás alakká tette és most az új németellenes érzelmek szimbólumává lett.”

Az MFM-nek jelenleg nincs tömegháttere, ismerte el Soos és Hadnagy, de úgy vélik, hogy később, ha politikai párttá szerveződnek, a különböző árnyalatú politikai csoportokból számosan csatlakoznak hozzá.

[X.] *A kommunista pártok és frakciók.* Soos és Hadnagy szerint jelenleg a kommunisták a legerősebbek, a tömegek támogatják őket, az ő vezető garnitúrájuk rendelkezik tapasztalatokkal az illegális harcokban. A három kommunista irányzat Dudás, Csomoss és Kállai vezetése alatt működik. Az „ortodox” kommunisták valódi vezetői Rákosi Mátyás, Madzsar József és Somogyi Miklós.

[XI.] *A Kisgazdapárt, a radikális parasztok és szociáldemokraták.* E három párt vezetői a nyílt politikai harchoz szoktak hozzá és nincs tapasztalatuk az illegális mozgalomban, ezért gyakorlatilag kisebb volt a hozzájárulásuk az ellenállási mozgalomhoz, mint a kommunistáké vagy az MFM-é. „Általánosságban e vezető garnitúra egy demokratikus Magyarország mellett tör lándzsát, helyesli a földreformot és a Szovjetunióval való jó kapcsolatokat. Ellene van a magyar gazdaság kommunizálásának vagy Magyarország bekebelezésének a Szovjetunióba.” A Kisgazdapárt vezetői között a fő helyre Tildyt teszik, akit a kormányzó megbízott, amint lehetséges, „az első magyar demokratikus kormány megalakításával”. A radikális parasztfrakció vezetőiként Soos és Hadnagy Kovács Imrét és Szabó Pált jelölik meg, részletesen jellemezve Kovács irodalmi munkásságát. „A néma forradalom” című könyvéért két hónapi felfüggesztett börtönbüntetést kapott és kizárták volna a budapesti egyetemről, ha Teleki nem lépett volna közbe.” A szociáldemokraták nagyon keveset tettek az ellenállási mozgalomban. Passzív politikájuk miatt tagjaik nagy részét elvesztették, ezek a kommunistákhoz mentek át. Megemlíti a Malasits Géza vezette szárnyat, mely nem volt hajlandó részt venni a Magyar Frontban, szemben a Szakasits Árpád irányítása alatt tevékenykedő csoporttal; ez utóbbinak sikerült számos munkásszervezetét megőriznie.

A forrásközlés szempontjai

A washingtoni Állami Levéltárban található irat szövegét angol nyelven, teljes terjedelemben, az eredeti jegyzetekkel és az életrajzi függelékkel együtt közöljük. Megtartottuk az eredeti helyesírást (pl. a kezdő nagybetűk használatában). Jegyzeteket csak a legszükségesebb esetben fűztünk a szöveghez, illetve az angol jegyzetekhez.

Nem tartottuk feladatunknak, hogy vitába szálljunk Soos és Hadnagy információival, vagy hogy cáfoljuk a jelentés egyes állításait, értékeit.

A jelentés közreadását indokolja, hogy bővíti a magyar ellenállási mozgalomról való ismereteinket és hogy részletesen tájékoztat a Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalomról, szervezeti felépítéséről, tevékenységéről; minderről eddig meglehetősen kevés adat került nyilvánosságra. Már pedig nyilvánvaló, hogy az MFM hozzátartozott a magyar ellenállási mozgalomhoz és tevékenységének ismerete nélkül jó néhány fontos esemény háttere, mozgató rugói homályban maradnának. Így többek közt az egyházak magatartása a zsidókérdésben, a július 6-i puccs megghiúsítása, az első és a második moszkvai delegáció kiküldése. Végül, de nem utolsósorban, érdekes az 1944. évi magyar politikai helyzet képe, az MFM két vezetőjének szemszögéből nézve.

JEGY

- 1 Nem vezet papír való való
- 2 Soos 22—menny első
- 3 Szent kivéte adják
- 4 Apor vezetői viselő
- 5 Náda gépen
- 6 Simon MFM
- 7 Vörös

JEGYZETEK

- 1 Nem a kormányzóról, hanem a fiáról, ifj. Horthy Miklósról van szó, aki az ún. Kiugrási Irodát vezette — így emlegette a közvélemény azt a budai Várban működő szervet, melynek feladata, papíron, a külföldi magyarok gondozása volt, valójában azonban Magyarországnak a háborúból való kilépése, kiugrása előkészítésén dolgozott, meglehetősen amatőr, primitív módon rejtve valódi tevékenységét.
- 2 Soos Géza életrajza: GERGELY Ferenc: *A házigazda. Soos Géza emlékére*. Confessio 1983. 1. sz. 22—28. Részletesen elmondja Soos Géza és Hadnagy Domokos december 9-i útjának hazai előzményeit, de ahogy írja: „Soos Géza küldetése végrehajtásának részleteit ma sem ismerjük. Ha elsősorban Budapest megmentése érdekében kellett volna eredményt elérniük, küldetésük nem érte el, már nem érhetne el célját.”
- 3 Szent-Iványi Domokos. A szövegben előkerülő nevekhez életrajzi jegyzeteket egyébként csak kivételes esetben írtunk, mert az első jelentés végén közölt életrajzok a kellő tájékoztatást megadják.
- 4 Apor Gábor báró, vatikáni magyar követ (előzőleg a külügyminisztérium politikai osztályát vezette) 1944. március 19-e után nem volt hajlandó vállalni a Sztójay-kormány diplomáciai képviselőt és csatlakozott a nyolc másik disszidens követhoz.
- 5 Náday István tábornok 1944. szeptember 22-én — Horthy kormányzó megbízásából — repülőgépen Dél-Olaszországba ment, hogy felvegye a kapcsolatot az angolszászokkal.
- 6 Simonffy-Tóth Ernő őrnagy, aki 1944. november 16-án érkezett repülőgépen Moszkvába, az MFM megbízásából.
- 7 Vörös Tibor százados.

I.

Some Aspects of the History of the Hungarian Resistance Movement (19 March-15 October 1944)

Introduction and Conclusions

The following pages represent an attempt to organize and evaluate the information provided by the Soos party concerning the development of the Hungarian resistance movement. The party consists of Dr. Géza Soos, first secretary of the MFM, Air Force Major Domokos Hadnagy, military delegate of the MFM, 1st Lt. Johannes Adolf Bentinck of the Dutch Army, formerly a German prisoner of war, and four other persons. The party flew to Italy on 9 December in order to contact Allied authorities on behalf of the resistance movement. Besides the interrogation which was carried on at irregular intervals during the period 13-31 December, this analysis is based on a number of documents which the Soos party brought with them. These documents will be identified at the appropriate places in the analysis.¹

Because of the quantity of information provided by the Soos party, and because of the new light it sheds on recent Hungarian developments, it has seemed advisable to break the account short at 15 October, and to present the story of the resistance between that date and 9 December in a second paper. Soos and Hadnagy have not always been consistent, and there are significant gaps in their information. Moreover, their story is highly complicated if not confused. An appendix has therefore been added in order to identify the individual actors in greater detail. Furthermore, a chronological summary has been introduced before the main body of the text.

The reader should constantly keep in mind the fact that Soos and Hadnagy represent a particular resistance group, predominantly Magyar and Calvinist in character, whose membership comes almost exclusively from the professional, military, and administrative classes of Hungary. The two sources regard the MFM as the spiritual descendant of Count Paul Teleki and his circle, although it seems that the experience of German occupation has caused the MFM to move leftwards, until now it apparently stands for a drastic and democratic reorganization of Hungary's social structure as the necessary prerequisite to any solution of the Hungarian problem. This outlook is the basis of the MFM's membership in the Hungarian Front, the overall organization of the resistance.

Certain tentative conclusions may be reached on the basis of the evidence provided by the Soos party. First of all, the MFM was closely identified with the Horthy regime and felt that Horthy could be saved only by turning against the Germans. Many people close to Horthy were responsible leaders in the MFM. They took orders from Horthy, and did not seek an alliance with the popularly based Hungarian Front, composed of parties long in opposition to the regime, until too late in the game. Secondly, the failure of the resistance on 15 October 1944 seems to

have been due in large measure to the organizational incapacity and bad security of the MFM and the Horthy group itself. A major part of the blame for the failure must fall on Horthy himself, since he did not finally decide to break with the Germans until late in July, continually made irresponsible decisions in matters both of personnel and action, and, at the decisive moment, acted without consulting either the MFM or the Hungarian Front. Finally, it may tentatively be concluded that on 15 October, before the German coup, the Russians were willing to deal with Horthy and/or the resistance movement; and, in order to secure their military collaboration against the Germans, even to permit the Hungarians to hold until the definitive peace those areas of Transylvania which they occupied at the time of the armistice, in addition to other territories not included in Trianon Hungary which were in majority Hungarian.

Chronological Summary

March crisis

1 March	German pupils in Budapest check addresses of persons to be arrested.
7 March	German troop concentration begin.
15-16 March	Von Jagow invites Horthy to Berchtesgaden.
18 March	Two Hitler-Horthy meetings without agreement. Budapest cabinet unable to decide on course of action.
19 March	Germans cross frontier, meet sporadic resistance. Horthy returns to find capital occupied. Cabinet resigns, arrests begin.
19-22 March	Crisis continues. Horthy submits to threats and stays on, but has difficulty forming a cabinet.
22 March	Horthy accepts Sztójay.

Organization of resistance

24-31 March	Foundation of the MFM.
Early April	Political and propaganda sections of the MFM created.
Early April	Formation of the Hungarian Front, consisting of Small Holders, Social Democrats, Communists, and Double Cross Association.

The churches and the persecution of the Jews

5-6 April	Protestant clergymen of Jewish origin exempted from order requiring Jews to wear Star of David.
19 May	Protestant memorandum protests against the establishment of ghettos.
25 May	Deportation of the Jews begins.
23 June	Serédi refuses to cooperate with the Protestants in opposing the deportations.
26 June	King of Sweden protests against deportations.
27 June	Sztójay sends Antal to Serédi to forestall Catholic protests.
28 June	Pope protests. Germans propose to remove Sztójay in favor of Imrédy. Imrédy attempts to have Bárczy assassinated.
29 June	Serédi issues statement reviewing Catholic opposition to anti-Semitism.
2 July	Scheduled reading in churches of joint Protestant-Catholic protest against deportations postponed by air raids.
9 July	Protest read in churches. Deportations stop until October. By this date 400,000 Jews outside Budapest have already been deported.

July crisis

Late July-early August	Endre, Secretary of State for Jewish affairs, brings two gendarme battalions to Budapest to continue deportations. In reply MFM member of General Staff summons loyal panzer units. Horthy reshuffles cabinet drastically and announces that deportations must stop. Germans caught off balance by speed of Horthy's action.
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German preparations for revolution; Horthy-MFM preparations for armistice.

Early August	Germans drop Ribbentrop-Wesenmeyer line and prepare to replace Horthy with Arrow Cross regime. Bring two panzer divisions into the Budapest area.
Early August	Hungarian Communist party founded. MFM begins to collaborate with Hungarian Front.
Mid August	Horthy and MFM become aware of German plans, decide definitely on armistice with Allies. Germans learn of Horthy plan.
23 August	Rumanian surrender convinces Horthy that he must deal with Russians as well as with Western Allies.
29 August	Lakatos cabinet installed for purpose of negotiating armistice. Insistence on Bethlen man leads to inclusion in cabinet of German agent as well.
Early September	MFM joins the Hungarian Front, lays plans for control of Budapest; postpones arming or workers until 17 October. Horthy takes first military measures for eventual attack on Germans.
9 September	Preventive measures taken to stop Arrow Cross coup allegedly scheduled for this day.
10 September	Decision taken to send an official delegation to Moscow.
13-20 September	Mission from Horthy and the resistance goes to Moscow, where it is well-received. Russians surprised to find that Hungarian Communist want frontier revision, Horthy pleased with results.

Failure of the Horthy-MFM plans.

26 September	Official delegation sent to Moscow, apparently reaches armistice agreement by 15 October. Náday sent to Italy to contact Western Allies. 20 October set for change-over. In absence of Farago, Germans bring back to Budapest the two gendarme battalions.
11 October	Germans kidnap General Bakay to foil his plan of arresting pro-Nazi Hungarians. Two SS divisions arrive and loyal Hungarian troops sent to the front. Horthy shaken.
15 October	Germans kidnap Nicholas Horthy, Jr. In expectation of Arrow Cross putsch Horthy prepares to announce armistice five days early. Informs German ambassador, who alerts Arrow Cross. The Horthy-MFM effort is a total failure by evening, owing partly to the cooperation of Swabian elements in the Hungarian General Staff with the Germans.

[I.] *The March Crisis*

The Germans apparently began to prepare for the occupation of Hungary about 1 March, when the pupils of the 7th and 8th classes of the *Reichsdeutsches Gymnasium* of Budapest ceased to attend school. When asked for an explanation, they replied: "*Wir sind im Vaterlands Dienst bei Hitlerjugend*". Actually they were personally checking lists of prominent Hungarians whom the Gestapo intended to arrest. During the crisis they guided Gestapomen to the pertinent residences.

Troop concentrations began about 7 March. Foreign Minister Ghyczy asked the Germans what the purpose of these concentrations might be. The foreign office in Berlin replied that, owing to the breakdown of the rail lines through Galicia, it was necessary to increase the transit of German troops through Hungary to the Russian front.² In fact, of course, the occupation was provoked by the efforts of the Kállay government to negotiate armistice terms with the Allied powers. [1.]

On 15 March, von Jagow transmitted to Horthy, while both were attending the opera, an invitation to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Horthy gave an evasive answer. Next day von Jagow repeated the invitation, pointing out that recently the chiefs of Germany's various allies had conferred with the *Führer*. He also suggested that arrangements for the final withdrawal of the Hungarian troops from Russia could be made. Kállay and the cabinet still opposed Horthy's going, but the Regent said

he had nothing to fear from Hitler and that the importance of the Hungarian withdrawal was such as to make it imperative for him to go.³ The Regent and his party, including Csatay, Szombathelyi and Ghyczy, left by train on the afternoon of 17 March.

The first Hitler—Horthy meeting took place the following morning. [2] Hitler began the conference by reading the Regent a lecture on Hungary's misdoings. He made four accusations. First, Hungary intended to "double-cross" Germany and get out of the war. Secondly, Hungary had been seeking to evade full participation in the war. Thirdly, Hungary's economic effort was not sufficient. Compared with the Germans, the Hungarians were living in luxury. Finally, Hungary was sabotaging Germany's continental Jewish policy and assuming a provocative attitude on this question. In turn, Hungarian Jewry was sabotaging the government's actions and breaking down Hungarian morals. Hitler therefore demanded:

1. general Hungarian mobilization,
2. complete military cooperation between the Hungarian and German armies, the former to be placed under the command of the latter,
3. a series of measures which would amount to complete economic fusion between the two countries,
4. definitive solution of the Jewish question.

Horthy refused to accept any of the four points. He pointed out that the Hungarian army was so lacking in equipment that general mobilization was physically impossible. He said also that general mobilization was not in Hungary's interest. The demand for complete military cooperation he characterized as unacceptable on the ground that it affected Hungary's sovereignty. As to economic cooperation, he had no experts with him and, without consultation with his own people, could not venture to accept any suggestion in this field. The Jewish question he regarded as a purely Hungarian affair.

At this Hitler produced documents showing that the German foreign office was fully aware of the peace negotiations in which Hungary was involved. [3] The Regent replied that he knew of no such negotiations and that he never undertook any action which was not fair and honest. Hitler pounded on the table and shouted that he knew Hungary was attempting "to jump out" (*herauszuspringen*). In turn, Horthy pounded the table and declared that if the German leader knew his own intentions better than he himself there was nothing further to talk about. The conference broke up in an atmosphere of great excitement.

The afternoon of the eighteenth Csatay came of the Regent saying that the Germans desired a second conference. When the Regent declared that he had nothing further to say, the Germans gave him to understand that the *Reichkanzler* personally desired a second meeting. Horthy agreed. Hitler merely repeated his four demands and, when the Regent proved adamant, declared that German forces would occupy Hungary in order to carry out "these measures of security". The Regent retorted that in that case he would resist. The *Führer* suggested that he would not be in a position to offer resistance. Horthy said he wanted to leave at once.

The Germans sought to delay his departure. When they held up his car, the Regent approached Keitel and asked, "*Bin ich schon ein Gefangener, oder bin ich noch frei?*" At the station, the railway authorities would not permit the train to leave, saying that the lines were already overburdened. When the train did start, it was put on the siding every second or third station, its speed being regulated by an armored train some fifty kilometers ahead. It was not until the nineteenth at 10 a.m. that the

Regent reached Budapest, to find that German troops had already occupied the capital and other vital strategic points throughout the country. There was even a German guard at the royal palace.

Meantime in Budapest the cabinet had met on the afternoon of 18 March. Keresztes-Fischer and Zsindely advocated resistance if the Germans should resort to force, but no decision was reached as there was no contact with Horthy. As Minister of Interior, however, Keresztes-Fischer ordered the gendarmerie, the police, and the customs guard to resist. When the Germans crossed the frontier at 2 a.m. 19 March they were met with sporadic resistance.

At 3 p.m. on 19 March the cabinet met again. Count Bethlen was also called to the meeting. On the question of resistance or non-resistance the cabinet was divided but was finally won over to the latter course by Csatay, who reported that all key points, barracks, and lines of communication were already in German hands and that any action would be hopeless. The cabinet resigned. The Gestapo arrested Keresztes-Fischer as he left the Prime Minister's Office. Bethlen and Kállay found asylum in the royal castle for a time, Kállay later escaping to the Turkish legation. In the next three days the Germans arrested most of the men they wanted but removed only a small number to Germany, the rest being placed in Hungarian prisons.⁴

Soos and Hadnagy do not know what point in the crisis the Regent gave in, but they insist that he was brought round only by the use of drastic threats. They state that he threatened to abdicate or commit suicide and that the Germans informed him that in either event they would 1. permit the Croatian, Rumanian and Slovak armies to enter the country and plunder it for two weeks. The Croatian army actually crossed the Hungarian frontier on 19 March; 2. shoot every prominent Hungarian they could lay their hands on. The Germans showed Horthy lists of 2,000 Hungarian leaders in every walk of life—physicians and artists as well as politicians; 3. liquidate Hungarian Jewry in two weeks. If, on the other hand, the Regent kept his post, the Germans would permit him to continue as the effective ruler of the country.

Once Horthy had given in, he found difficulty in forming a cabinet. No one except Sztójay wanted to accept the responsibilities if the premiership and the Regent did not want Sztójay. Hóman and Bárdossy, who were considered pro-German and whose presence in the cabinet was desired by the Germans, were also unwilling to enter. Rumor has it that this was the case with Imrédy. There was considerable confusion until 4 p.m. of 22 March, when Horthy received an ultimatum from Ribbentrop to the effect that if a government had not been formed within two hours the three German threats would be carried out at once. At 5:55 p.m. the Regent accepted the Sztójay cabinet.

He signed only the documents of appointment and declared that he did not wish to see any member of the new cabinet. When Sztójay presented a communique covering the development of the crisis and stating that the German occupation took place by mutual agreement, the Regent pushed the paper away in a rage, declaring that such a shameful lie could not be told the Hungarian people. The communique had to be published without the Regent's signature, but Sztójay released it before the document announcing his own appointment, which Horthy had signed, thus creating the impression that both documents had the Regent's approval. This so outraged Horthy that he demanded Sztójay's immediate resignation. Weesenmeyer intervened and persuaded the prime minister to write the offended ruler a letter admitting his own responsibility for the phrase "with mutual understanding" and declaring that that phrase had been inserted in the interest of the German—Hun-

garian *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*. For some time after this Horthy kept to the palace, saying repeatedly that he felt himself a prisoner. The Regent's behaviour throughout the crisis—poor intelligence as to the plans of the Germans, inept timing of his own *demarches*, resistance after the game was already lost—was to be repeated in October.

[II.] Organization of the resistance

It may be said that the March crisis brought the Hungarian resistance movement into existence. There had been some underground activity before 19 March but this had resulted in few if any overt acts, such as sabotage. It would seem that no social group felt strongly enough about collaboration with the Germans to assume the risks of underground warfare. This fact stands in contrast to the present bitterly anti-German orientation of the resistance. When finally organized in April 1944, Hungarian resistance consisted of two separate and disparate groups which did not join forces until late summer. One group was constituted by the parties of the left, which represented the masses and for twenty years had been in opposition to the Horthy regime. The other group was made up of bureaucrats, army officers, and intellectuals, virtually all of whom stemmed from the gentry. This second group was largely Magyar in character, containing few if any Swabians, Jews, or Slavs. It also contained a high proportion of Transylvanians and Calvinists and was closely connected with the Regent. From the following paragraphs it will become clear that, until 15 October, the prime purpose of the second group was to save the Horthy regime.

During the last week in March the Council of One Hundred of the Hungarian Independence Movement (*Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom*) was founded. The leading role in the foundation of the MFM was played by Domokos Szentiványi, a personal friend of Horthy, later sent by him to Moscow to conduct armistice negotiations. One of the secretaries of Nicholas Horthy jr., Andreas Kovács, was also a charter member. Soos himself was among the founders and it is important to note that he is the spiritual leader of *Soli Deo Gloria*, the Calvinist youth movement. Elek Bocs, lay leader of the Calvinist church of Budapest and for some years in Geneva on church matters, was an original member. So were General Gábor Faragho, commander-in-chief of the Gendarmerie, Col. Lajos Kudar of the Gendarmerie, General Lajos Veress, commander of the Second Army, General Ferenc Horváth, and Major István Szentmiklósi. Many of the founders had been associates of the late Count Paul Teleki who, according to Soos, had in his later years developed plans for the gradual reconstruction of the Hungarian social structure in a democratic sense. Teleki's schemes allegedly envisaged land reform and cultural autonomy for the minorities. The Teleki group was gravely disturbed by the fact that so many of the key positions in the Hungarian state and armed forces had come to be held by Swabians, whom they distrusted.

In the early days of April the MFM created a political and a propaganda section. The military section, however, was not organized until the middle of July because its appointed leader, Szentmiklósi, was sent off to the front and did not return until then. The secretary of the political section was Soos himself. Szentiványi was general secretary of the organization. The Regent did not know of the establishment of the MFM until after the event, but gave his full approval and, from April onward, the new movement played an increasingly important role in his efforts to desengage Hungary from the German alliance.

It was also in early April that the political parties began to recover from the blow struck them on 19 March. In the first weeks it was difficult to know who had been arrested and who had not. The first sign of life was an appeal issued by the Small Holders and the Szakasits wing of the Social Democrats, asking opposition elements to join the Hungarian Front (*Magyar Front*). This appeal was issued on the basis of the pre-Sztójay agreement between Small Holders and Social Democrats for safeguarding the independence of Hungary.⁵ The Malasits fraction of the Social Democratic party had already renounced this agreement. This faction adopted an attitude of complete passivity. Malasits said that he had been ready to cooperate with the *Herren* until they had betrayed the common people on 19 March. He felt that now there was no reason for the workers to risk themselves. What with German purges and the ultimate victory of Allied arms the ruling classes would be destroyed by other forces and the workers would then be able to step into their heritage.

Upon the issuance of the Hungarian Front appeal, the Communists and the Association of the Double Cross (legitimists) immediately joined. Before 19 March the Communist party had not existed as an organized body. Many Communists began to return from Moscow; Rákosi sent some of his friends, as did Madzsar, and in the same month Madzsar himself arrived. It appeared as though the Moscow affiliation would become the controlling factor in the reconstituted party. A university students' resistance movement, organized by Vilmos Fitos, and the Communist Gyórfy studnet group,⁶ led by Imre Kovács, joined the Front sometime in the spring or early summer.

[III.] *The churches and the deportation of the Jews*

The struggle over the solution of the Jewish problem began in April. Hitler had made decisive action in this sphere one of his four principal demands on 18 March and the clandestine circular, "True words to true Hungarians", accused the Germans of having sought to divert public attention from the unhappy position of the country by persecuting the Jews. The major opposition to the Nazi program came from the Calvinist Church, which was given some support by the Lutheran and Catholic clergy, and this opposition led directly to the July crisis.

With regard to Nazism and German domination in general, the churches had all taken more or less the same stand: preach the evangel and do not mix in politics. Thus while the clergy did not preach in favour of Nazism, neither did they preach against it. The Protestant bishops were "nice fellows", without the courage of their convictions. Of the Protestant clergy, Soos estimates that between 50 and 60 percent were anti-German, 10 to 20 percent—those who had studied in the *Reich*—pro-German, and the rest indifferent.

On the specific question of anti-Semitism, however, the churches finally took a stand. The "motor" of the churches' opposition was the Good Samaritan Mission, founded in 1942 by the chief Calvinist Bishop Ravasz, which had helped as much as it could the 200,000—300,000 Jewish refugees who had fled to Hungary by 19 March.⁷ The principal figure in the Mission was József Éliás, a Calvinist pastor of Jewish origin, who also became the leader of the Jewish section of the MFM.

When the order that all Jews must wear the Star of David was issued, Bishop Ravasz, who was seriously ill all during the struggle, asked his subordinates to protest. The objective seems to have been to relieve Calvinist ministers of Jewish origin of the obligation of wearing the star. A total of perhaps 150 men, Lutherans as well

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as Calvinists, would have been affected by the order. As his subordinates were unsuccessful, Ravasz left his sick bed and protested personally to the state authorities. The Lutheran Bishop Radvánszky undertook a similar action and on 5 or 6 April, Protestant clergymen of Jewish origin were exempted from the new regulation.

Over a month later, 19 May, the Protestant bishops sent a common memorandum to the Prime Minister protesting, on principle, against the reestablishment of the ghetto system. The Catholic church did not make an official protest, presumably because of the attitude of the Prince Primate, Cardinal Serédi, although important Catholics lower in the hierarchy worked very closely with the Protestant leaders. The president and vice-president of the Holy Cross Association, József Cavallier and the Jesuit Father János,⁹ worked in close connection with Elias. When the Protestant memorandum on ghettos proved fruitless, Bishop Vilmos Apor of Győr resolved to visit weekly the Győr ghetto as a measure of protest and obtained permission from the government. The German captain in charge of the ghetto, however, would not let him enter, whereupon the bishop wired Sztójay demanding that the government insist on the point. [4] When the government did, the Germans in one night removed the ghetto from Győr.

On 25 May the deportation began.¹⁰ No word of these appeared in the Budapest newspapers and it was not until the end of the month that the good Samaritan Mission had definite evidence of what was happening. Ravasz got out of bed again and went directly to the Regent. He asked Horthy if he knew what crimes were being committed in his name. [5] The Regent replied that the Germans had asked for a half a million Hungarian workers to be sent to German war plants and that Sztójay had asked the Germans to take Jews instead of Hungarians. Both Sztójay and Weesenmeyer had stated that Hitler promised that these Jews would be treated exactly as Hungarian workers. The Regent had asked how long it was intended to keep these workers in Germany, adding that it was not wise to separate providers from their families. Sztójay replied that the Germans understood this and had asked that only entire families should be sent there.

When Ravasz insisted that the Jews were being mistreated, the Regent became angry and informed the Bishop that he was not accustomed to having his word questioned. [6] The Regent ended the interview by suggesting to Ravasz that he see Sztójay.

The Prime Minister referred the Bishop to the Minister of the Interior, who let Ravasz, sick as he was, cool his heels in the anteroom the whole of an afternoon. When the Minister did admit the Bishop he promised everything but subsequently did nothing.¹¹ Ravasz determined upon a major protest, drew up a sharp memorandum on the subject and sent it to all bishops, Catholic as well as Protestant. The only bishop who refused to sign was the Catholic Petery. Cavallier carried the protest, with all his signatures, to Prince Primate Serédi. He carried also a letter from Ravasz asking Serédi, if he felt unable to sign the protest because of its Protestant origin, to draw up one of his own, which Ravasz promised all the Protestant bishops would sign. The Primate refused.¹² Afterwards he rebuked Bishop Apor for the role he had played in the Jewish question.

On 23 June an official Protestant delegation called on Serédi. It was composed of Baron Radvánszky, president of the Hungarian Lutheran synod, and Jenő Balogh, president of the Calvinist synod. Ravasz was too ill to leave his bed. The delegation asked for the Primate's collaboration in opposing the deportations. The Primate replied that he could not take joint action with the Protestants. They should do as they wished; he, in his turn, would do what he could. At this the delegation went

to Sztójay, declared that unless something were done a pastoral letter on the subject would be read in all the Protestant churches in Hungary. Sztójay promised to "do something".

He sent Propaganda Minister Antal to Esztergom on 27 June. Antal asked Serédi not to participate in any action against the government, since it was intended to stop the deportations.¹³ Later Antal visited Ravasz, stating that Serédi insisted no protest should be made that the government intended to stop deportations. On 26 June the protest of the Swedish king arrived, on 28 June the protest of the Pope, and on the twenty-ninth Serédi himself gave an account in a circular on the various steps which the Catholic Church had taken. An agreement was reached between the Protestant and Catholic authorities whereby an official statement declared that the church was aware of its duties as these emanated from the evangel, that in the Jewish question all possible steps had been taken, and that if no improvement in the situation was observed further action would be undertaken. The statement was to have been read on 2 July, but air raids on that Sunday postponed the reading until the ninth.

The action of the churches and the foreign powers brought the deportations to a halt. Between 9 July and 15 October probably not more than 2,000 Jews were deported, and these by the use of various legal tricks. But in a sense the victory of the churches was meaningless, as, by the end of June, 400,000 Jews living outside Budapest had already been deported. As it turned out, the Jews of Budapest were saved only until the advent of the Szálasi regime.

[IV.] *The July crisis*

The protests of the Hungarian churches, together with those of the Swedish king and the Papacy, disturbed the Regent. As if to make sure of the facts in the case, he sent his daughter-in-law, in company with Elias, to visit the ghettos and observe with her own eyes. She reported that what Ravasz had said was perfectly true, that the deportations from the provinces were continuing, and that preparations were being made to remove the Jews of Budapest. Horthy called in first Sztójay and then Weesenmeyer. He told each of them that he had been cheated and betrayed. Hitler had given his word that the Hungarian Jews were not to be treated as their Polish coreligionists had been. It was shortly after these interviews that the deportations were stopped.

Immediately the Germans began to prepare for the elimination of Sztójay and for the installation of an Imrédy regime. These plans were not well considered, however. As the first step, it was decided by Imrédy that István Bárczy, Secretary of State in the Office of Prime Minister, would have to be liquidated. This man was the Regent's most intimate advisor and it was presumed that he advised Horthy in an anti-German and anti-Imrédy sense and was largely responsible for the Regent's intervention in the Jewish deportations. With an automobile belonging to Vince Görgey, a member of Imrédy's group, three Hungarian soldiers proceeded to Bárczy's villa in Szent-Endre on 28 June. The leader as Aspirant Lang. He had recruited the other two, one a Swabian like himself, for "a patriotic act". Outside Bárczy's villa he informed his fellows that the patriotic act was the assassination of Bárczy—"because he is a man of the Regent". The Magyar member of the trio promptly drew his revolver and killed Lang; the other two were arrested by the police, as was Vince Görgey. In Görgey's flat the police found a list of Hungarians who were to be assassinated, together with a supply of hand grenades and ammunition.¹⁴

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Some few days after the attempt on Bárczy two battalions of gendarmerie, normally stationed at Nagyvárad and Galánta, were called to Budapest by Endre, Secretary of State for the Jewish Question in the Ministry of Interior, without the knowledge of General Faraghó, commander-in-chief of the gendarmerie, or of the Regent.¹⁵ The commander of the battalions, Swabian col. Galántai, when drunk, declared that it was ridiculous for an 86 year-old lunatic (king of Sweden) to give advice to a 75 year-old nut (Horthy), that they were only fooling themselves if they believed they had stopped the deportations, and that if necessary his two battalions would take away the Jews together with "their Regent". Upon hearing of Galántai's statements, Lt. col. Ferencz Koszorús of the general staff, a member of the MFM, ordered to Budapest units of the Hungarian panzer school at Esztergom, which arrived within a few hours.

Koszorús then reported to the Regent that these units would be able to cope with any forces the Germans and Hungarian Nazis might be able to collect. Horthy called General Faragho and General Lázár, commander of the bodyguard, and, in a highly dramatic manner, put to them a series of questions. Had the officers taken a military oath of allegiance? To whom? Were they willing to live up to their oaths? On receiving affirmative answers, the Regent ordered the two gendarme battalions returned to their stations, appointed Faragho commander-in-chief of all forces in Budapest, and instructed him to take all measures necessary to prevent the deportation of the Budapest Jews and to protect the security of the country. All Hungarian forces in the capital were alerted and, along with the panzer units, posted at strategic positions. This caused great excitement the next day as no one—including the Germans, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff and the Minister of War—knew what was up. The German units in and around Budapest were prepared for action.

Horthy sent for the cabinet, and informed them that he himself had alerted the armed forces. Anyone who attempted to continue the deportation of the Jews would be shot. He forbade once and for all that gendarme units should turn up in Budapest without his knowledge. He demanded that Andor Jaross, Imrédyst Minister of Interior, and Secretaries of State Endre and Baky, be immediately dismissed.¹⁶ At this Imrédy, Rátz, and Anton Kunder declared their solidarity with Jaross. The Regent retorted that in that case he accepted their resignations too. Horthy named Miklós Bonczos as Jaross' successor and gave the Commerce portfolio to Szász. No one was appointed to succeed Imrédy as Minister of War Economy. Horthy took the oath of allegiance from the new ministers. All this was accomplished in less than an hour. Sztójay was worried about the German reaction when they found themselves presented with a *fait accompli*. The Regent said that he himself was not in the least alarmed.

Weesenmeyer was then called in by Horthy, and informed of what had taken place. The envoy's only response was to inquire after the Regent's state of health. The Germans apparently were prepared to admit that this time the Regent had had the best of it. Some weeks later Weesenmeyer tried to insist that Endre and Baky be retained, but Endre was dismissed nonetheless.

[V.] *The Germans prepare a revolution*

The July crisis had a decisive effect on German policy. Heretofore this policy had been dominated by Ribbentrop and Weesenmeyer, who apparently believed that, by saving legal appearances and by cooperating with the Horthy group and the MEP,

they might secure the collaboration of the Hungarian people. It is true that the Ribbentrop policy planned to replace the Sztójay group by the Imrédy group, but this change was to be effected within the existing constitutional framework. After the July crisis the Germans seem to have decided that this policy was no longer feasible. This decision was the more logical for them because the Imrédy party had begun to change its line, and was no longer to be counted upon.

Imrédy and Rátz had indeed declared their solidarity with Jaross, but this had apparently been a tactical action not based on principle. Imrédy had changed his ideas about solving the Jewish problem. The successful Allied invasion of France, the effect produced upon important Catholic sections of his following by the protests of the Catholic leaders, the propaganda campaign against Imrédy himself undertaken by the Arrow Cross and the Hungarian Nazis who brought up again the question of his own ancestry, all help to motivate this change. When Imrédy began to change his position on the Jewish question, the Arrow Cross sneered that his Jewish blood was coming to the fore. As a result of all these factors Berlin apparently decided to drop the Ribbentrop line.

The new policy was that allegedly advocated by Himmler and Winkelmann (Commander of the German SS in Hungary): the complete destruction of the old political regime and the replacement of the constitutional organs with a true Nazi dictatorship under the Arrow Cross and affiliated groups. Himmler and Winkelmann were prepared to make two concessions: to accept Bárdossy in place of Szálasi, since they realized how corrupt and intellectually weak the Arrow Cross was; and to retain Horthy himself, because of his popularity, though not the group around him.

Almost immediately after the July crisis the Germans began to make their preparations. They managed to have the Hungarian armored units returned to Esztergom, from where they were eventually dispatched to the front. Two German panzer divisions were brought into the Budapest area. One of them was stationed at Esztergom, the other at Örkény. They remained there even when the Russian armies advanced into Hungarian territory. In August the Germans began a series of secret conversations with the Swabian elements in the Hungarian general staff. [8] The Swabian in turn contacted other staff and line officers, asking them if they were ready to promote a complete fusion of the Hungarian with the German war effort even against the will of the Regent. At the same time pro-German Hungarian officers began to organize *Sturmabteilungen* within the ranks of the army, who were to arrest all undesirable army officers on a given signal. Arrow Cross arm bands were distributed to these *Sturmabteilungen*, which they later wore during the October crisis. The guiding spirits in these preparations were Beregfy, Bárdossy, Reményi-Schneller and Winkelmann.

From the middle of August Horthy and the MFM were aware that the Germans were planning a revolution. The MFM had "trusties" in many key spots. [9] These even procured a German document entitled: "How to solve the Hungarian problem", which portrayed Horthy as a senile old man who could be "handled", once the clique which surrounded him was eliminated. The document further explained that the Hungarian race consisted of two elements, the Finno-Ugrian and the Turco-Tataric. The Finno-Ugrians were by nature calm, subservient, without ambition, and easily managed. The Turco-Tataric group, on the other hand, was dynamic, militant, obstinate, and desirous of dominating. The Hungarian problem could be solved by eliminating the Turco-Tataric group.¹⁷

[VI.] *Horthy's preparations for an armistice*

Meantime Horthy, his circle, and the MFM, with some assistance from the *Magyar Front*, were preparing to disengage Hungary from the German alliance and cross over into the Allied camp. Horthy had wavered a good deal and it was not until after the July crisis that he definitely made up his mind to take this step. Even then he thought in terms of a separate agreement with the Anglo-Saxon powers. It was the coup d'état and surrender of Rumania (23 August) which brought him to realize that he would have to deal directly with the Russians.¹⁸ The plans of the anti-German groups were never systematically formulated, but their objectives were to get direct control of as many military units as possible, to locate resistance personnel in as many key governmental positions as possible, to reach a favorable agreement with the Allies, and to induce the Anglo-Saxon powers to occupy parts of the country. The planning was carried on in the castle and at the residences of Tildy, Csomóss, István Bárczy, István Fáy and Lakatos. Szentiványi played a leading role and Bethlen and Kánya were brought into the group. MFM leaders conferred with Horthy almost daily. Ambrózy, the Regent's private secretary,¹⁹ was now a member of the MFM. The Germans became aware of this planning about the same time the Horthy-MFM groups learned of the German schemes; from August German preparations for the Arrow Cross revolution and Horthy's preparations for the military *volte face* ran parallel. The Germans intelligence system, however, proved far superior to that of the MFM, and this was a decisive factor in the failure of the Horthy effort.

As a result of the July crisis, Horthy had been able to place the Budapest police under the control of General Faragho, already chief of the gendarmerie. Horthy also sought to eliminate János Vörös, chief of the General Staff, whom he did not trust. He proposed Lakatos as a replacement but the German vetoed the suggestion. The capitulation of Rumania so weakened their position as to permit Horthy on 29 August to dismiss the Sztójay cabinet and to replace it with one headed by Lakatos.

The purpose of the new government was to arrange an armistice; its few pro-German members owed their positions to Horthy's hope of confusing the Germans. Lakatos refused to join the MFM, on the ground that he had given his word to the Germans that he would not undertake any action against them, but he consulted with Szentiványi on every major point. Unfortunately, Bethlen insisted on the inclusion of Iván Rakovszky, one of his men, in the new cabinet. The MFM leaders were perturbed at this, as Rakovszky's pro-Allied sentiments were too wellknown. The Germans readily agreed to Rakovszky's inclusion, demanding as a *quid pro quo* that Reményi-Schneller be given a post. This man was deeply involved in the German plans, and served as a key spy throughout the next few weeks, reporting all cabinet transactions to the Germans.

In his first speech to parliament, on 21 September, Lakatos did not mention the Allies. Opposition deputies not under arrest attended and openly criticized the Sztójay government. They protested against the abolition of the opposition parties and the arrest of members of parliament. They demanded a free debate of the Prime Minister's speech. One of the deputies was Csorba of the Small Holders, later vice-president of the Committee of Liberation. These speeches were not published in the Hungarian press, but are recorded in the registers of the lower house.

Lakatos' first step was to place sage men in key positions. He appointed General Szilárd Bakay commander-in-chief of all the armed forces in Budapest—army, police, and gendarmerie. Bakay prepared the military strategy of the decisive moment

to come. At the same time, Vörös was won over to the resistance. Capt. István Tóth and Col. Alexander András, both members of the General Staff Corps and of the MFM, laid the plans of the Swabian element of the general staff before Vörös and asked him to transfer, at the appropriate moment, the general staff, the military cabinet of the Regent, and the Regent himself to eastern Hungary, to the fighting troops, Vörös consented and later, dressed in mufti and accompanied by Dudás, Csomóss, and Somogyi, attended a secret meeting of the resistance movement. Lakatos also appointed István Fáy Secretary of State and Andre Hlatky Chief of the Press Department in the Prime Minister's Office. Since Hlatky was likewise made chief of the Hungarian Radio and News Agency, this put him in virtual control of all propaganda organs, and eliminated the pro-Nazi Kolozsváry-Borcsa from the Radio and News Agency. An attempt to remove Zilahy-Sebess, chief of the Press Section of the Foreign Office, was given up in the face of German protests.

With Bakay in control of all forces in Budapest, Faragho in charge of the gendarmerie, and the censorship and radio in the hands of Hlatky, the next step was to secure armed mass support. To this end the Lakatos government created the National Guard, an organization by means of which it was hoped to arm the peasants of each village, but particularly those in the neighbourhood of Budapest.²⁰ To provide the National Guard with equipment an effort was made to unit it with the National Rifle Association. The resistance asked Vörös and Csatay to remove the pro-German Col. Kálmán Verbőczy, president of the Rifle Association, and to appoint Col. Árpád Kaszás, a good friend of Csomóss. It was also proposed to install Baron Ede Atzél, member of the MFM, as civilian leader of the Association. While unable to prevent the removal of Verbőczy, the Swabians in the General Staff succeeded in securing the appointment of General Béldy, whose position was equivocal. Béldy had been pro-German but, at the time of his appointment, had, in the words of Soos, "begun to adapt himself". Béldy was also appointed commander of the National Guard. [10]

Since the resistance could not surely count upon control of the National Guard, it became more important than ever to arm the workers of Budapest. This was a delicate problem, inasmuch as the Hungarian Front, which controlled the workingmen's movement, was comprised of elements which for years had opposed the Horthy regime, whereas the MFM represented the interests of that regime. In August a basic realignment of forces had taken place within the Hungarian Front. The active sections of the working class had transferred their allegiance from the Social Democrats to the newly founded Hungarian Communist party, whose leaders were: József Dudás, a Transylvanian who had spent several years in a Rumanian prison in company with Titu Petrescu, leader of the Rumanian Social Democratic Party; Miklós Csomóss, physician with a long political career; Géza Rubletzky, formerly secretary of the Hungarian Revisionist League; Gyula Ortutay, an ethnographer; Lajos Toscsik,²¹ formerly member of the Czechoslovak Young Communist movement; Gábor Bíró; and a certain Bakony. Their party stood for a "nationalist communism", and, according to Soos, it had come into being for two reasons. The regular Communist party, he says, was entirely controlled by a clique which accepted Moscow's orders without question, while the Social Democratic leaders, even the Malasits faction, showed themselves unwilling to take active measures. The Hungarian Communist party thus consisted of a leading group which had seceded from the orthodox Communist party because it could not accept the third international, together with a rank and file of industrial workers, who were not content with the passive policy of the Social Democrats.

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The Hungarian Front and the MFM had begun serious collaboration only in the first half of August. At the beginning of September the MFM formally joined the Hungarian Front. In the minds of Soos and Hadnagy this was not the act of a political party but solely a device for linking the general staff of the resistance (MFM) with the political parties. It must have been obvious to the MFM that the Hungarian Communist workers could play an important role in Budapest at the time of the change-over. In fact the decision not to arm the workers before 17 October, only three days before the date selected for the change-over itself, proved to be a fatal error, as Soos admits.

As for future MFM-Hungarian Front collaboration, it is significant that in August, Csomóss after consultation with other resistance leaders, presented the Regent with two lists of men who might compose the new Hungarian government after the change-over had been accomplished. One of these lists was headed by Tildy, the other by Bethlen. The Bethlen proposal was distinctly a Hungarian Communist idea, with which the Front as a whole did not agree. Apparently the Hungarian Communists wanted Bethlen because they felt he would be acceptable to the Anglo-Saxons. The orthodox Communists were not pleased with either list, but after 15 October demanded and were granted the right to three cabinet posts. In any case, after talking with Csomóss, Horthy dictated a letter to Ambrózy stating that, if anything happened to him, he wished Tildy to form the first democratic Hungarian government whenever that should be possible. The letter, addressed to Tildy, was signed by Ambrózy, not by Horthy himself.

While the resistance was making preparations for the control of Budapest, the Regent undertook to negotiate and armistice and work the *Honvéd* army into a position from which it could attack the Germans. Early in September, Generals Miklós and Veress, commanders of the First and Second Armies respectively, were called to Budapest and instructed by Horthy to disengage their troops from the Russian front and march on Budapest at a given signal. It was unfortunate that the most reliable troops, in accordance with suggestions coming from the Hungarian legation in Stockholm, had been placed on the southern frontier in the hope that direct contact with the Anglo-Saxons could be made at that point.

On 10 September Horthy and Lakatos decided to send an unofficial delegation to Moscow. This decision was in line with advice sent by Bakacs-Bessenyei, dissident Hungarian Minister in Berne. As delegates, the MFM suggested Dudás, leader of the Hungarian Communist party; Faust, a leader of the Orthodox Communists; and Baron Atzél of the MFM. The Social Democrats were not informed of the proposed mission, and, although the members of the Kovács wing of the Small Holders were aware that the mission was going, Soos does not know whether they approved. Horthy and Lakatos agreed to the personnel recommendations of the MFM. Col. Kudar of the Gendarmerie and Col. Kuthy, chief of the Second Bureau of the General Staff, provided the party with papers indicating that they were charged with an intelligence mission. The group was then sent to Gen. Ferencz Farkas, a member of Miklós' staff, who on 13 or 14 September personally guided them through the lines at Kőrösmező. About a week later the mission was back. Soos spoke with two of the delegates on 25 September.

The Russians accorded the mission a very favorable reception. They were taken first to Malinowsky, then to the Russian commander-in-chief for the Balkan area, and finally to Moscow, where they spent two days. The Russians prefaced everything with the remark that, before a definitive agreement was reached, they would have to consult their Allies. For their part, however, they were anxious to receive

an official delegation, would permit the Hungarian army to fight as such against the Germans, and wanted a pro-Russian but democratic Hungarian government. While the Soviet authorities demanded that criminals be handed over to them, they stated repeatedly that they had no intention of interfering in Hungarian domestic affairs. They asked many questions about Horthy, about the group which surrounded the Regent, and about the resistance movement.

The delegates brought up the question of the Trianon frontiers, asking that they be modified on a purely ethnographic basis. The Russians seemed surprised to hear such a request from Faust and Dudás and specifically asked them if, as Communists, they believed that modification of these frontiers was necessary. Faust and Dudás said yes. The Russians thereupon took the position that, provided their Allies agreed, the Transylvanian frontier until the definitive peace would be identical with the front on the day the armistice came into effect. As for other borders, those areas the majority of whose population was Hungarian would remain under Hungarian administration until final peace arrangements were made.²²

Horthy was highly pleased with these results. About 26 September he dispatched an official delegation consisting of Faragho and Szentiványi by the same route. The mission was in contact with the Regent by radio. While Soos, who took Szentiványi's place as first secretary of the MFM, does not know the specific contents of the messages exchanged, he asserts that they were favorable. He believes also that armistice terms were decided upon before 15 October.²³ While Faragho and Szentiványi were on their way to Moscow, Horthy sent Col. Gen. Náday to Italy to contact the Anglo-Saxons.²⁴ It appears that Toszt, Horthy's aide-de-camp, hoped that Náday could arrange for the dropping of several thousand Allied parachutists in the rear of the First Army. This was regarded as advisable both because the disengagement of the Hungarian armies would be made psychologically easier and because the Anglo-American troops would offset the occupation of the country by Russian forces. Horthy and the MFM now waited only for the day on which the forces they could mobilize in Budapest would roughly equal those at the disposal of the Germans. The date for the change-over was fixed for 20 October.

[VII.] *Failure of the Horthy—MFM plan*

The failure of the Horthy—MFM effort to cross over into the Allied camp was partly, if not largely due to bad security. Aside from Reményi-Schneller, who reported all cabinet transactions, the Germans had a spy in the Military Cabinet of the Regent, and one of Nicholas Horthy Jr.'s secretaries was also working for them. [11] A Dutch lieutenant, who escaped with the Soos party after having spent some time in the Hungarian underground, feels that underground personnel had only very vague notions of security, and that the loose talk of some of the principals accounted for their own arrest. The Germans were thus aware of what was intended and were able to take preventive measures and even to force Horthy's hand.

In September the resistance was provoked into taking serious preventive measures of its own. Soos received word from Szentiványi's private secretary that the German *putsch* was scheduled for 4 o'clock 9 September. This information had been let slip by an Arrow Cross army officer at a social gathering. Soos at once found means to inform the Regent, the Supreme *Honvéd* Council, and the workers' representatives. General Bakay alerted the capital's garrisons at 4:30 p.m. and issued an order of the day instructing the troops to shoot at once if trouble began and to strive for

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the complete annihilation of the enemy. From the style of the order it was apparent to everyone that Bakay referred to the Germans and the Arrow Cross. That same night thousands of workers, many of them with small arms and hand grenades, assembled at their factories, though these were shut down for the week-end. Soos believes that the Germans called off their *putsch* as a consequence of these measures.

As soon as Faragho, commander of the Gendarmerie, left for Moscow, the two gendarmerie battalions which had played a role in the July crisis, returned to the capital. On 11 October the Germans took advantage of a foggy evening to kidnap Gen. Bakay. Bakay had determined to arrest about 1,200 unreliable Hungarians, mostly soldiers and members of the Arrow Cross, on the night of 12 or 13 October. Shortly after Bakay's abduction, two SS divisions arrived and, through the offices of Gen. László, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Hungarian units in the vicinity of Budapest were transferred to the front at Kecskemét and Cegléd.

These events shook Horthy and the MFM. The leaders of this organization urged the Regent to eliminate some 40 members of the General Staff and again suggested that he go to the east and join the fighting troops. But Horthy was adamant; he would not desert his post, he said and his post was the castle.²⁵ To replace Bakay, Horthy ordered Farkas back from the First Army. But since Farkas could not reach the capital before 14 October, Gen. Aggteleky was made interim chief of all armed forces in Budapest. The Swabian Hindy was appointed Aggteleky's second in command. Just why Hindy should have relieved Gen. Kálmán Hardy, Bakay's second, is not clear. The date for the armistice (20 October) was not changed, as it was still believed that by that time the anti-German Hungarian forces would be sufficiently strong.

Another German preventive measure, the kidnapping of Nicholas Horthy Jr., caused the Regent to precipitate action.²⁶ The Regent's son was lured into Gestapo hands with the story that a representative of Tito wanted to speak with him. He and his four guards put up a fight, but the guards were killed and "Nicky" himself, seriously wounded, was carried off, reportedly to Vienna. The kidnapping occurred at 9 a.m. 15 October. The Regent learned of the fact at eleven, was shortly thereafter informed that the Germans planned to seize his wife as she went to church. A few minutes later he was informed that the Arrow Cross *putsch* was scheduled for 6 p.m. and that the Germans intended to kidnap him. Soos believes that the Arrow Cross action was scheduled for six, but he can supply non concrete evidence to support his belief.

At noon the Regent called a conference of his closest advisors. Among those present were Lt. Gen. Brunswick, the Regent's travel master, Gen. Lázár, Aggteleki, Vattay, Toszt, and Csatay. [14] Despite the fact that German strength was greater than that which the Horthy group could organize, immediate action was decided upon. The MFM was not consulted but an order was given out instructing the resistance to stand by for action. The Regent's proclamation was drawn up for broadcast. This means of announcing the armistice had been suggested by Ullein-Reviczky in a letter written to the Regent in September. Finally, an order to the troops, countersigned by Csatay, was prepared for broadcast. This done, the Regent called in Weesenmeyer and informed him that Hungary was going to ask for an armistice. The envoy stated that he took notice of the Regent's declaration and would pack at once. Instead of packing, he alerted the Szálasi group which, since Bakay's intentions had become known, were living under protective guard in a villa at Szent Miklós út 5 or 7.

Meantime Hlatky, accompanied by 30 soldiers, had been dispatched to the studios

of Radio Budapest. A further 300 soldiers were sent to guard the transmitter at Lakihegy. The Regent's proclamation was read by Hlatky himself at 1 p.m. Simultaneously Aggteleki ordered the barracks alerted and himself went to the barracks in Veres Pálné utca where he began to dictate orders for transmission by telephone to the various units.

Hindy overheard Aggteleki, and with their assistance he overpowered the switchboard operators and issued orders in Aggteleki's name. He instructed the anti-aircraft units of Budapest, which were supposed to block the city's entrances to the German panzer divisions at Örkény and Esztergom, to await further orders. He ordered the National Guard units arriving in the capital to hold their fire.

The Germans lost no time in mobilizing their own forces. At 3 p.m. the SS divisions moved into the city and began occupying bridges and barracks and setting up machine guns at strategic points. The panzer divisions moved in from Örkény and Esztergom. Twenty thousand rifles, 1,000 machine pistols, and hand grenades were distributed to members of the Arrow Cross from depots in Pasaréti út. The two gendarme battalions took over the barracks in Böszörményi út, thus placing the command controls of the gendarmerie in German hands.

When all this had happened, the pro-German elements of the general staff held a conference, agreed that any effort at resistance was already too late and that, in order to avoid bloodshed, they must declare for Szálasi. They wrote up Vörös' order to the troops to continue fighting. The actual author of the order was at his villa outside Budapest and played no role in the crisis. The false order was sent to Gen. Justi, commanding officer of the *Felsenzentral*.²⁷

The *Felsenzentral* contained the central signal sections of the Hungarian army. As an emergency measure a duplicate studio for Radio Budapest had also been installed. When the Regent's proclamation had come over the radio, Justi, a Swabian and rival of Vörös, held a conference with Gen. Kesseö,²⁸ Col. Kozma, and Col. Baly. The three officers decided to disobey the Regent and work for Szálasi. Justi sent out orders to Hungarian units not to oppose the German forces. Upon the arrival of Vörös' false order, Justi cut the regular studio off and had the order broadcast from the substitute studio in the *Felsenzentral*. Justi also dispatched Capt. Dénes, GSC, to Lakihegy to seize control of the transmitter. On the pretense of bringing reinforcements, Dénes and his men got on the site and succeeded in disarming the 300 men sent by the Regent. By evening the only force still at the disposition of the Regent was the body guard.

The one remaining hope was that Miklós and Veres would succeed in disengaging their armies and march on the capital. Their efforts to do so were also foiled by pro-German elements within their staffs. Veres unwisely left his army on 13 October and started for Budapest to have one last consultation with the Regent before the change-over; the Germans seized him on the fifteenth. Miklós could do no more than surrender to the Russians with several thousand of his men.²⁹ When at 6 p.m. German units began to attack the castle, the Horthy cause was beyond all hope. It may be said that the Germans and their Hungarian allies were able to wreck the Horthy effort in about 6 hours.

[VIII.] Horthy's "martyrdom"

While the castle was being besieged the cabinet met in the Prime Minister's office, which is directly across the way, and resigned in order to give the Regent a free hand. The bodyguard fought bravely, but their casualties were heavy—about one-

third of them were killed—and the Germans brought up armored units. By morning the ammunition of the defenders was giving out. Seeing this, Horthy sent his family to the Papal Nuncio, who shortly turned them over to the Germans with the statement that he did not want to mix in politics. About 11 a.m. 16 October, the bodyguard surrendered. The Germans entered the castle and Weesenmeyer arrested the Regent. At 4 p.m. the Regent was taken to Gestapo headquarters in the Schwabenberg. In order to get him to sign his abdication—which had already been published by the German radio—his captors held a machine pistol to the head of his four-year-old grandchild. Before he left for Germany, the Regent spoke with a Catholic priest, János K. Tóth, and he asked the priest to inform the Prince Primate of the circumstances under which he had abdicated. Together with his family and some members of his personal entourage, he was loaded on a train and, apparently, taken to a small castle about 15 miles outside of Munich. The MFM has received a message from the prisoners. "Sometimes we are allowed outside in the garden", the message said, and closed with a request for warm clothes, for "Nicky" as well as the others, as he "may be able to wear them some day again". Soos and Hadnagy feel that Horthy emerged from the crisis a true Hungarian hero, more popular than ever with all real Hungarians. They emphasize the illegal character of the Regent's abdication and the consequent legality of the "first democratic Hungarian government" which the Regent enjoined Tildy to form.

NOTES

[1] The clandestine circular "True words to true Hungarians" („Igaz szó az igaz magyarokhoz", published after 30 Oct. and brought out by the Soos party) states that in February 1943 the Hungarian government ordered its troops in Russia to maintain position not less than 50 kilometres behind the fighting line, that this decision was communicated to the Allied governments, and that consequently Hungary was not subjected to air attack until after the advent of the Sztójay cabinet.

[2] Soos states that he learned the details of the Hitler-Horthy meetings from the secretaries of Csatay and Ghyczy. The secretaries were not present during the actual conversations.

[3] Soos heard that one of the documents which Hitler produced was a report written by the Hungarian military attache in Stockholm which discussed the "peace feelers" undertaken by Ullein-Revitzy.

[4] Soos states that the Sztójay-Apor correspondence on this subject is among his papers in Budapest.

[5] According to Soos the Jews were placed in cattle cars and the doors sealed with lead. The cars were so full that no one could sit or lie down the thousands perished before they reached their destination. When the trains arrived in Slovakia, the doors were thrown open by SS men and a number of German nurses and attendants exclaimed with horror at the mistreatment the Jews had suffered at the hands of the "Hungarians". The survivors were then given food and medical attention and were reassured that all would be well with them now that they were out of the hands of the Hungarian fanatics. They were even supplied with postcards to be sent to their families informing them that they were well and safe. Soos has a number of such cards in his possession. Within a day or so after the Jews arrived in Slovakia they were removed to Poland and consigned to the gas wagons. Soos' source was an MFM member who was in Slovakia at the time. He states further that Éliás is in a position to document the whole account.

[6] Soos states that Ravasz recounted this conversation to him shortly after the event and that the Bishop drew up a *pro memoria*, which is now among Soos' papers in Budapest.

[7] Although Soos is not sure of the precise days on which the following events occurred, he is certain of their order.

[8] Soos brought with him an official MFM list of Hungarian General staff officers who are regarded as war criminals.

[9] Soos brought with him a list of MFM members in the Hungarian general staff.

[10] At the time of the October crisis, Beldy was arrested by the Germans and placed under guard in a hotel room. He succeeded in overpowering his guard and escaping in civilian clothes. Nothing has been heard of him since.³⁰

[11] In this connection it is interesting to note that Péter Hain, chief of the Nazi Hungarian Gestapo, served as a German spy in the Regent's bodyguard for some years. The Regent was frequently informed of his activity but always waved the matter aside with the remark that Hain was "a very nice fellow".

[12] Soos at first said that Lakatos was present and opposed action as premature. Later he expressed uncertainty concerning this point.

APPENDIX

Identification of personalities mentioned in the text³¹

AGGTELEKY, Gen. [Béla]: Succeeded Gen. Bakay as commander of all Hungarian armed forces in Budapest on 11 October 1944. Arrested by the Germans on 15 October.

AMBROZY, Gyula: Appointed Chief of the Regence Office in 1943 and given the title of Royal Hungarian Counselor in 1944.

ANDRÁS, Col. Sándor: GSC. Member of the MFM. Discharged from the Aviation Section of the War Ministry after 19 March 1944. He was afterwards appointed to a teaching post in the Ludovica War College, Budapest.

ANTAL, István: Belongs to the extreme right wing of the MEP. Minister of Propaganda in the Kállay government and Minister of Justice and of Education under Sztójay.

APOR, Vilmos: Catholic Bishop of Győr. Brother of the Hungarian Minister to the Holy See.

ATZÉL, Baron Ede: Former Arrow Cross leader and member of the rightist Wesselényi Shooting Club. After 19 March 1944 joined the MFM and was sent to Moscow in September as a member of the unofficial armistice mission.

BAKAY, Gen. Szilárd: Appointed commander-in-chief of all Hungarian armed forces in Budapest after the crisis of July 1944. Kidnapped by the Gestapo on 11 October.

BAKONYI, László: Prominent in the newly founded Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party.

BAKY, László: Leading Hungarian Nazi. Secretary of State in the Ministry of Interior and active in the enforcement of the laws against the Jews.

BALOGH, Jenő: Diocesan Superintendent (Temporal) of the Hungarian Reformed Church.³²

BALY, Col.: Officer assigned to the *Felsenzentral*. Cooperated with the Germans on 15 October 1944.

BÁRDOSSY, Dr. László: Professional diplomat. Foreign Minister under Teleki, whom he succeeded as Prime Minister. Replaced by Kállay in March 1942.

BÁRCZY-BARCSIHÁZI, István: One of Horthy's closest advisors. Under Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office. Arrested by the Arrow Cross regime on 25 October 1944.

BÉLDY, Gen. Alajos: Formerly military attaché in London and Washington. National leader of Military Training and Sports leader of the Levente. Under Lakatos appointed commander of the National Guard and President of the National Rifle Association. Arrested by the Germans on or after 15 October 1944.

BENTINCK, 1st Lt. Johannes Adolf: Professional Dutch soldier who escaped from a German prison camp, lived underground in Hungary for some months, and finally escaped to Italy with Soós and Hadnagy (see first paragraph of the text).

BEREGFY, wén. Károly: GSC. Member of the Executive Council and Minister of Defence under Szálasi.

BETHLEN, Count István: One of Horthy's closest advisors and Prime Minister from 1920 to 1931.

BÍRÓ, Gábor: Prominent member of the newly founded Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party.

BOCS [recte: BOÉR], Elek: Lay leader of the Calvinist church of Budapest and for some years a representative of that church in Geneva. One of the original members of the MFM.

BONCZOS, Dr. Miklós: Member of parliament and of the extreme right wing of the MEP. Appointed Minister of Interior 7 August 1944 and served for a time in that capacity under Lakatos.

BRUNSWICK, Gen. György: The Regent's travel master. Accompanied the Regent on his visit to Hitler in the spring of 1943.

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CAVALLIER, Dr. József: Hungarian journalist and President of the Catholic Holy Cross Association.
CSATAY, Gen. Lajos: Minister of Defence from June 1943 to 15 October 1944. Together with his wife, committed suicide in prison after the overthrow of Horthy.

CSOMÓSS, Miklós: A Budapest surgeon of Transylvanian origin who has devoted most of his energies to politics and is at present one of the leaders of the newly formed Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party.³³

CSORBA, János: Leader of the Small Holders' party and vice-president of the underground Committee of Liberation.

DÉNES, Capt.: Officer assigned to the *Felsenzentral* who cooperated with the Germans on 15 October 1944.

DUDÁS, József: Leader of the newly formed Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party. A Transylvanian, he spent several years in a Rumanian prison in company with Petrescu.³⁴

ÉLIÁS, József: Calvinist minister of Jewish origin. Leader of the Good Samaritan Mission founded by the Calvinists in 1942 to assist Jewish refugees. Chief of the Jewish Section of the MFM.

ENDRE, Dr. László: Secretary of State in the Ministry of Interior and active in the execution of the anti-Semitic measures of the Sztójay government. Magyarized his name from Jancsek.

FARAGHO, Gen. Gábor: Formerly military attache in Moscow. Chief Inspector of the Gendarmerie until his departure for Moscow in September 1944 as a member of the official Hungarian armistice mission. One of the original members of the MFM. At present Minister of Supply in the Debreczen government.

FARKAS, Gen. Ferencz: Chief of the Hungarian Boy Scout movement. Member of the staff of the First Hungarian Army under Miklós. Under Szálasi appointed government commissioner in charge of the evacuation of the Hungarian population from the danger zones.

FAUST, Imre: Leader of the orthodox Communist party and member of the unofficial Hungarian armistice mission.

FÁY, István: Hungarian Privy Councilor and one-time Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Education and Cults. Appointed Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's Office, 20 September 1944; discharged after the coup of 15 October.

FIROS, Vilmos: Engineer and assistant professor in the Budapest Polytechnical Institute. Member of MFM and organizer of a students' resistance movement.

GALÁNTAI, Col.: Swabian commander of the two gendarme battalions whose arrival in Budapest provoked the July crisis.

GHYCY, Jenő: Career diplomat who became permanent Deputy Foreign Minister in 1941 and Minister of Foreign Affairs from 20 July 1943 to 19 March 1944.³⁵

GÖRGEY, Vince: Notorious Nazi journalist, possibly a German agent. Considered by the MFM as a war criminal.

HADNAGY, Major Domokos: GSC Air Force. Chief of the Material Section of the Hungarian Air Force. Member of the MFM; escaped to Italy 9 December 1944 as military delegate of the Hungarian resistance movement.

HARDY, Gen. Kálmán: Former aide-de-camp of the Regent, later military attache at Berlin. On 12 October 1944 removed as second in command of all Hungarian armed forces in Budapest.

HINDY, Iván: Swabian commander of the *Felsenzentral* who cooperated with the Germans on 15 October 1944, was afterwards appointed commander of the Budapest garrison, and has been reported killed in action in the siege of Budapest.³⁶

HLATKY, Dr. André: Chief of the Press Section of the Prime Minister's Office under Bethlen. On 9 September 1944 appointed Government Commissar of the Press, the Hungarian Telegraph Service, the Telephone News Service and the Radio Corporation. Arrested on 15 October.

HÓMAN, Bálint: Extreme right wing member of the MEP. Minister of Education under Gombos and Darányi. Minister without Portfolio under Imrédy and Teleki.

HORTHY, Jr., Miklós: Only surviving son of the Regent. Arrested by the German Gestapo on 15 October 1944.

HORVÁTH, Gen. Ferencz: MEP deputy for re-occupied Yugoslavia. An original member of the MFM.

IMRÉDY, Béla: Leading Hungarian Nazi. Former Prime Minister and Minister of War Economy in the Sztójay government.

JAGOW [Dietrich], von: German envoy in Budapest at the time of the March crisis.

JÁNOS [recte: JÁNOST], Father³⁷: Vice-President of the Catholic Holy Cross Association.

JAROSS, Andor: Minister of Interior in the Sztójay government. Responsible for the execution of the anti-Jewish laws.

JUSTI [JUSTY], Gen. Emil: Appointed commander of the *Felsenzentral* shortly after 19 March 1944. Actively assisted the Germans during the October crisis.

KÁLLAY, Miklós: Prime Minister of Hungary at the time of the March crisis, after which he fled to the Turkish legation for protection.

KÁNYA, Kálmán: Formerly Foreign Minister. Life member of the Upper House and President of the Foreign Relations Committee of that house.

KAPITÁNYFY, Capt.: Swabian GS officer who drew up Vörös' false order of the day on 15 October 1944.

KASZÁS, Col. Árpád: Friend of Csomóss; suggested by the MFM as President of the National Rifle Association.

KERESZTES-FISCHER, dr. Ferenc: Minister of the Interior from December 1943 to 19 March 1944 at which time he was arrested by the Germans. According to Soos he is still alive.³⁸

KESSE [recte: DESEŐ], Gen. László: Officer assigned to the *Felsenzentral*. Cooperated with the Germans on 15 October.

KOLOZSVÁRY-BORCSA, [Mihály]: Pro-Nazi journalist. As of 14 April 1944 appointed President of the Hungarian News Agency, Director of the Hungarian Broadcasting Company and Chief of Censorship with the title of Secretary of State. Relieved of these posts 9 September 1944 and reappointed Chief of Press by Szálasi 31 October 1941.

KOSZORUS, Lt. Col. Ferenc: GSC. Member of the MFM.

KOVÁCS, Andreas: Secretary of Miklós Horthy Jr. and one of the original members of the MFM.

KOVÁCS, Imre: Leader of the radical peasant faction of the Small Holders' party, will organize a separate peasant party as soon as Hungary is liberated. A disciple of Teleki, an important writer on peasant life, he is pro-Russian.

KOZMA, Col. [József]: Officer assigned to the *Felsenzentral*. Cooperated actively with the Germans on 15 October 1944.

KUDAR, Col. Lajos: Gendarme officer and one of the original members of MFM.

KUNDER, Antal: Member of parliament. Held cabinet posts under Gömbös and Imrédy. Active member of the Imrédy party. Minister of Trade and Transportation in the Sztójay cabinet.

KUTHY, Col. László: Chief of the Section GB of the General Staff. Cooperated with the MFM. Badly wounded when arrested for refusing to accept office under the Szálasi regime.

LAKATOS, Gen. Géza: Close friend of Horthy's. Formerly Commander-in-Chief of the First Army. Succeeded Sztójay as Prime Minister on 19 August 1944. Forced out by the Szálasi coup and now in prison at Sopron-Kőhida.

LÁSZLÓ, Gen. Dezső: Deputy chief of the General Staff under Lakatos. Appointed commander of the First Army by Szálasi.

LÁZÁR, Gen. Károly: Commander of the Regent's bodyguard.

MALASITS, Géza: Prominent Social Democrat. Member of parliament until 1938. After 19 March 1944, chief of the Social Democratic faction which refused to cooperate with the resistance.

MIKLÓS DÁLNOKY, Gen. Béla: Commander of the First Army at the time of the abortive Horthy coup. Surrendered to the Russians. At present Prime Minister of the Debrecen government.

NÁDAY, Gen. István: Commander of the First Army until the advent of the Sztójay regime. Sent to Italy by Horthy in September 1944 to negotiate an armistice with Allied authorities.

ORTUTAY, Gyula: Ethnographer. Leader of the newly founded Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party.

PÉTERY, József: Catholic Bishop of Vác.

RADVÁNSKY, Baron Albert: Superintendent of the Lutheran Church.³⁹ Protestant guardian of St. Stephen's crown.

RAKOVSKY, Dr. Iván: Close friend of Bethlen and Minister of Interior in his government. Anti-Nazi member of the MEP. Minister of Religion and Education under Lakatos.

RÁTZ, Gen. Jenő: Of Rumanian origin. Chief of the General Staff in 1937. Minister of War in 1938. Deputy Prime Minister under Sztójay. Leading Hungarian Nazi.

RAVASZ, Dr. László: Calvinist Bishop of Budapest.

REMÉNYI-SCHNELLER, Dr. Lajos: Member of parliament for the MEP. Swabian and pro-Nazi. Minister of Finance almost continuously since 1938, holds that post under Szálasi.

RUBLETSKY [RUBLETZKY], Géza: Formerly secretary of the Hungarian Revisionist League. A leader of the newly founded Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party.

SZAKASITS, Árpád: A leader of the Social Democratic party and one of its representatives in parliament. Until 19 March the editor-in-chief of the party organ *Népszava*. After that time chief of the Social Democratic faction. Official was willing to cooperate with the Hungarian Front in resistance activities.

SERÉDI, Dr. Justinián: Archbishop of Esztergom and Prince Primate of Hungary.

SOMOGYI [Miklós]: One of the leaders of the newly founded Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party.

Soos, Dr. Géza: Official of the Foreign Office division for cultural relations. President of the Calvinist youth organization *Soli Deo Gloria*. One of the original members of the MFM and, from the first, Secretary of the MFM.

SZÁLASI, Major Ferenc: Chief of the Arrow Cross party and Leader of the Nation since 15 October 1944.

SZÁSZ, Dr. Lajos: Friend and protégé of Reményi-Schneller. Member of parliament for the MEP. Actively pro-Nazi. Minister of Supply in the Kállay government; Minister of Trade and later of Commerce and Communications in the Sztójay government; Minister of Commerce and Communications under Szálasi.

SZENTIVÁNYI [SZENT-IVÁNYI], Dr. Domokos: Former chief of Section for Cultural Relations in the Foreign Office, Founder of the MFM and First Secretary of that organization until his departure for Moscow in September 1944 as member of Horthy's official armistice delegation.

SZENTMIKLÓSI [SZENT-MIKLÓSY], Major István: One of the original members of the MFM and chief of its military section. Arrested by the Germans after 15 October 1944.

SZOMBATHELYI, Gen. Ferenc: Chief of Staff at the time of the March crisis. Removed shortly thereafter.

SZTÓJAY, Gen. Döme: Prime Minister from 19 March to 7 August 1944. Of Serb origin, real name Stoyakovich.

TELEKI, Count Pál: Prime Minister from 1939 to 1941.

TILDY, Zoltán: Calvinist minister. One of the founders and at present leader of the Small Holders' party.

TÓTH, Capt. István: GSC. Leader of the Military Section of the MFM.

TÓTH, János K.: Catholic priest through whom Horthy communicated with the resistance movement after his arrest in 16 October 1944.

TOSCSIK [recte: JÓCSIK], Lajos: Formerly member of the Czechoslovak Young Communist movement. Now a leader of the newly founded Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party.

TOSZT, Lt. Col. Gyula: Air Corps officer. Adjutant to Horthy for the past two years. Died during the 15 October crisis.

ULLEIN-REVITSKY [ULLEIN-REVICZKY], Antal: Hungarian Minister to Sweden since September 1943; refused to recognize the Sztójay regime.

VATTAY, Gen. Antal: Inspector of Cavalry. Personal friend of Horthy and chief of his military cabinet.

VERBŐCZY, Col. Kálmán: Pro-German President of the National Rifle Association. Replaced by Gen. Béldy in late summer 1944.

VERESS, Gen. Lajos: Original member of the MFM and Commander of the Second Army at the time of the October crisis.

VÖRÖS, Gen. János: Appointed Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army 19 April 1944. Arrested after 15 October but managed to cross over to the Russians. At present Minister of Defense in the Debrecen government.

WEESENMEYER [VEESENMAYER], Dr. Edmund: After April 1944 German envoy to Hungary. Directed all activities of the German occupation forces.

WINKELMANN, Gen. Otto: *Obergruppenführer der Polizei*. Chief of the German SS in Hungary.

ZILAHY-SEBESS, Jenő: Pro-Nazi career diplomat. Appointed by Sztójay as chief of the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry.

ZSINDELY, Dr. Ferenc: Minister of Commerce and Communications from March 1943 until 19 March 1944.

II.

Further Aspects of the History of the Hungarian Resistance Movement (15 October-9 December 1944)

Introduction and Conclusions

This paper is a continuation of R and A Hungarian Report No. 11 which dealt with the history of the resistance movement from 19 March to 15 October 1944. It attempts to organize and evaluate the information provided by the Soos mission concerning resistance activity between the Szálasi coup and the departure of that mission for Italy. The mission consists of Dr. Géza Soos and Major Domokos Hadnagy, respectively first secretary and military delegate of the MFM (*Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom*). [1] To clarify the complicated picture which the sources present, a chronological summary has been introduced before the main body of the text.

The reader should keep constantly in mind that Soós and Hadnagy represent a particular resistance group, predominantly Magyar and Calvinist in character, whose membership comes almost exclusively from the professional, military, and administrative classes of Hungary. The two sources naturally tend to exaggerate the role played by their own group. They maintain that the MFM is spiritually descended from Count Pál Teleki and his circle, although it seems that the experience of German occupation has caused the MFM to move leftwards, until now it apparently stands for a drastic and democratic reorganization of Hungary's social structure as a prerequisite to any solution of the Hungarian problem. This outlook is the basis of the MFM's membership in the Hungarian Front, the overall organization of the resistance.

On the basis of the evidence presented in this paper certain tentative conclusions may be suggested. First, the resistance emphasizes the illegality of the Szálasi regime and puts forward its own claim to government as the legitimate, if not the legal, successor of the old regime. A resistance government would comprise a coalition of those political parties which, for years, were in opposition to the Horthy regime, together with the MFM, a pro-Horthy resistance group representing the actively anti-German and more liberal sections of the old ruling class. In composition a resistance government would bear a remarkable resemblance to the provisional government formed at Debrecen. The divisions within the ranks of the Communists might well reduce the influence which the Soviets could bring to bear on such a government through party channels.

Secondly, the resistance movement has been a military failure. Its efforts to organize sabotage and armed resistance never achieved tangible results. How far resistance successes in the propaganda field may compensate for its military failure is discussed elsewhere. [2] The military ineffectiveness of the movement may be ascribed to its inability to renew contact with the Russians, the fact that it was penetrated by the

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Gestapo, and to a certain clumsiness and overlapping of organization which, at one point, allowed the Communists to gain a shaky control of resistance activities through the setting up of a Committee of Liberation. The repeated and fruitless efforts of resistance leaders to contact the Russian commanders, together with the contradictory evidence of the state of opinion in the *honvéd* army, suggests that the Russians, after the events of 15—23 October, discounted the military value of the resistance completely. This is not to say, however, that after liberation the resistance will not play the leading role in Hungarian political life. The formation and character of the Debrecen government suggests the contrary. The fact that the resistance achieved what it did achieve in the space of eight months is indicative of considerable vitality. No doubt the great failure of the resistance is that it began only after 19 March.

*Chronological Summary*⁴⁰

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|----------------------|---|
| 17 October | Employees of the Foreign Office take the oath to Szálasi under duress. |
| 18 October | Convocation of the National Council which, owing to the treasonable counsel of Prince-Primate Serédi, declares the Regent's abdication legal. |
| 23 October | Last radio message from Szentiványi; MFM instructed to close the gap between the First and Second Armies preparatory to their moving on Budapest. |
| 23 October | Through Swedish Legation Hungarian Front attempts to transmit note-verbale to the Russians. This note affirms illegality of Regent's abdication and validity of the Hungarian-Russian armistice; it informs the Russians of the existence of an underground government led by Tildy and asks that a Russian liaison officer be sent to Budapest. |
| 25 October | As the result of Communist pressure an overall Committee of Liberation is formed. Tildy refuses to participate on the ground that the new Committee is unnecessary and that it will endanger the security of the resistance. When formed, the Committee contains a majority of Communists. |
| 25 October | Second note-verbale dispatched through the Swedish Legation raises the question of the status of Hungarian troops which surrender to the Russians. |
| 30 October | A new resistance mission leaves by plane for Szeged. It is instructed to inform the Russians that the resistance continues to regard Horthy as chief of the Hungarian state and the armistice as in force. The Russians are to be shown the plans of the Budapest defenses and an effort made to persuade them to give up their frontal attack on the capital in favor of a flanking movement. The Russians are also to be asked for a liaison officer. |
| 2 or 3 November | Resistance plans for a general action against the Germans on this date are postponed, partly in order to await an answer from the Russians and partly because the Committee of Liberation is not yet prepared for action. |
| 2 or 3 November | A Major Váry is brought into the Committee of Liberation by the Communist leader Fekete-Pénzes and presented as the liaison officer awaited from the Russians. |
| 4 November | Illegal convocation of parliament and illegal election of Szálasi as chief of state. |
| 5 or 7 November | Supreme Court declares the abdication of the Regent, and therefore the election of Szálasi, illegal. |
| 20 or 21 November | Resistance plans for a general sabotage action on this date are postponed as the result of Váry's insistence that the Russians do not favor overt action at the moment. |
| 22 November | Gestapo arrests leading members of the Committee of Liberation and the Military Section of the MFM. This proves to be a crippling blow. Váry disappears. |
| About
22 November | Baron Atzél and friends leave on a selfappointed liaison mission to the Russians. |
| 9 December | Since all efforts to contact the Russians have failed, Soos and Hadnagy fly to Italy to effect liaison with all the major Allies. |

[I.] *Legalization of the Szálasi Regime*

Soos and Hadnagy emphasize the illegal character of the Szálasi government. [3] They point out that every step in the process of legalization was illegally accomplished and they provide some hitherto unknown details in support of this thesis. The first step was the convocation, on 18 October, of the National Council to pass on the legality of Horthy's abdication.⁴¹ The opinion of the Council on this point was sharply and evenly divided. The President of the Supreme Court, Dr. Géza Töreký, [4] expressed the opinion that the abdication was illegal and that therefore there was no question of electing a new chief of state. In this view he was supported by the President of the Court of Administration. On the other hand, Dr. András Tasnády-Nagy, [5] president of the lower house of parliament, considered that the abdication was valid. This man had consistently cooperated with the Sztójay government and his "bloody" anti-Semitism had brought him into open conflict with Bishop Ravasz. His resignation as superintendent of the Calvinist church had been openly demanded in Synod.

Tasnády-Nagy's view that the abdication had been legally executed was supported by Prince-Primate Serédi who, as it turned out, cast the deciding vote. The Prince-Primate informed the Council that Horthy had sent him word by means of Father Tóth that his abdication had been voluntary. (Actually the Regent had asked Tóth to inform Serédi of exactly the contrary.) Soos explains that the Prince-Primate had never reconciled himself to the fact that the ruler of Hungary was a protestant. Furthermore, Szálasi himself had gone to Esztergom before the convocation of the Council in order to assure the Primate that the position of the Catholic church would not be affected by the recent political changes. Szálasi specifically promised that the estates of the Church would not be touched. Once the National Council had accepted the Regent's abdication as legally accomplished, the way was open for Szálasi's election as chief of state.

Simultaneously with the meeting of the Council, the civil servants and the army were called upon to take an oath of allegiance to the new ruler. This oath was often administered with the assistance of an open show of force. Thus the employees of the Foreign Office were summoned by radio to appear on the morning of 17 October. The radio gave no explanation. Upon their arrival the staff was brought into a large reception room, where Arrow Cross members with machine guns were stationed, and informed that the oath to Szálasi would be administered. Two men who refused the oath even in these circumstances were arrested. Similar methods were used in other ministries and even with the army. At Decs and Nagykanizsa army units refused to take the oath and had to be replaced with more dependable troops.

Not only was the legalization of Horthy's abdication by the National Council fraudulently accomplished and the oath to Szálasi administered by threat of force, but parliament's election of Szálasi as chief of state was carried out by unconstitutional means.⁴² Instead of a joint session, as required by the law's of the state, separate sessions of the upper and lower houses were held. Furthermore neither house mustered a quorum. The president of the upper house, Baron Sigismund Perényi, was a weak man whom German threats had kept from resigning after 15 October. Under German pressure he convoked the upper house for 4 November. Only 16 members attended, the quorum being 50. These were the same 16 who shortly before and met with the pro-Nazi Archduke József, who, since he regarded Horthy as a userper, had pressed the members to elect Szálasi. The Prince-Primate was one of the sixteen who conferred with the Archduke and voted for the Arrow Cross leader. The

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lower house was convoked by Tasnády-Nagy. Several deputies asked for permission to speak at the session; they were informed through official channels that if they spoke they would not live until the next morning. Only 31 or 32 deputies attended the session.

Even after 4 November the high courts refused to recognize Szálasi's election. On the fifth or seventh of that month a plenary session of the Supreme Court declared that the abdication of the Regent could not be considered legal and that consequently Szálasi's election was not valid. After this Töreký resigned as president of the court. His place was taken by Dr. Jenő Szemák, previously President of the Court of Appeals, but this change did not alter the opinion of the court. A similar position was adopted by the Court of Administration, but it seems improbable that the courts were not later brought into line.

[II.] *Renewed Resistance Efforts to Contact the Russians*

While the new Hungarist regime was being "legalized" the underground reorganized and prepared for new action. The role of the Hungarian Front in the resistance now became much more important than it had been before 15 October. The MFM lost some of its previous importance and, while still pro-Horthy, shifted leftwards. Naturally resistance leaders regarded the reestablishment of contact with the Russians as a prime objective. Without some understanding with the Russian commanders open military action might lead only to the destruction of the resistance itself.

The last message from Szentiványi, chief of the MFM and member of Horthy's official armistice delegation, came from Radio Moscow on 23 October. The text of this message was approximately as follows:

Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom (repeated three times). We have made the necessary contacts. Yellow and blue knights must proceed to carry out their orders. Szerzetes, Péter and Paul should continue with their work. Will report from Moscow every morning at 4:15 and again at 20:15. Kálmán.

According to Soos and Hadnagy, the yellow knight was Gen. Lajos Veress, commander of the Second Army, the blue knight Gen. Ferencz Horváth, [6] commander of a division of Székler troops hastily organized from the remnants of defeated units. Their instruction were to establish contact between the First and Second Armies and, joining these two forces, move toward Budapest. Veress had been arrested on 15 October, and since the Germans had gained effective control of the *honvéd* army by 23 October, Szentiványi's instructions could not be obeyed.

On the same date that Szentiványi's last message was broadcast, the Hungarian Front transmitted a note-verbale to the Swedish legation and asked that it be delivered to the Russians. This note which Soos personally handed to Per Anger, First Secretary of the Swedish legation, explained the position which the resistance had adopted *vis-a-vis* the events of 15 October. It declared that since Horthy had first been forced to abdicate and then abducated, the resistance regarded him as still the Regent of Hungary. In case of such an eventuality, Horthy himself had instructed Tildy, leader of the Small Holders' party, to form a coalition government. This government, composed of representatives of all communist and democratic parties, stood ready to cooperate with the Allied governments. The Hungarian Front, representing 80 percent of the Hungarian people, regarded the Regent's armistice proclamation as still valid and therefore considered that a state of war existed be-

tween Hungary and Germany. The Front therefore asked that concrete arrangements for the surrender of Hungarian units be made. *Honvéd* troops hesitated to give themselves up because of uncertainty as to their treatment. The Front asked also that an Allied liaison officer be sent to the combat zone in order to make possible the regrouping of numerous but scattered elements in preparation for their accession to the Allied cause.

The underground government to which the note referred had never actually been formed. Tildy opposed the drawing up of a definitive list on security grounds and also because it was, in the circumstances, impossible to predict who would be available when the government could be constituted. It was generally understood in inner resistance circles, however, that the Small Holders would be represented by Ferencz Nagy, Bajcsy-Zsilinszky and Count Dessewffy,⁴³ and the Social Democrats by Árpád Szakasits. The orthodox Communists were to be given three posts. Lajos Veress, the commander of the Second Army, was to be Minister of War or Chief of the General Staff, while Dudás, leader of the Hungarian Communists, and Imre Kovács, chief of the radical peasant faction, were to be secretaries of state. Soos knows no other details.

Two days after the transmittal of the first note, the Swedish legation was given a second, which again brought up the question of the treatment which Hungarian military units, as well as individual officers and soldiers, going over to the Russian armies could expect. Were such units and individuals to be considered prisoners of war, or were they to be permitted to fight the Germans as Hungarian units? An immediate reply, possibly by way of radio or pamphlet, was requested. The note added that, on 21 October, a Hungarian unit fighting in the neighborhood of Kassa had, on instructions from MFM representatives, attempted to cross to the Russian lines. Despite the fact that the unit displayed white flags it was fired on by the Russians—there being eight casualties—and was forced to retire to the German side. [7]

[III.] *Attitude of the Hungarian Army*

Soos and Hadnagy state that no reply to these two notes was ever received. They feel that the Russians missed an opportunity to secure large-scale desertion of Hungarian soldiers. The *honvéds* were confused by the failure of their efforts to go over and were anxious as to the fate of several thousand men who crossed over with Miklós and units which had helped the Russians establish their first bridge-head over the Danube near Pécs. [8] The two MFM leaders emphasize that desertions in German-held Hungary had already reached significant proportions. At the time they left Hungary there were 80,000 deserters in Budapest alone.⁴⁴ They tell stories of wounded *honvéds* escaping from hospital trains bound for the Reich. After 15 October the Swabian elements in the ranks began anxiously to remagyarize themselves. Beregfy promised Hitler 300,000 soldiers for the defense of the Vienna line, but Soos doubts that more than 100,000 men can be withdrawn to this position. The Germans had already decided before Soos and Hadnagy left to break the Hungarian army down into isolated units no larger than companies. Hadnagy was authorized by the resistance to ask the Russians, in case no Allied liaison officer could be sent to German-occupied Hungary, to "open a gate" along the Drava where Hungarian units could surrender with or without arms.

Yet there is considerable evidence that the majority of the Hungarian rank and file was not yet willing to deal with the Russians. Apparently the Soviets did give a pamphlet reply to the resistance note of 25 October. The 4 November issue of

the *Struggle for Freedom*, a resistance newspaper which Soos brought out with him, declares:

Ten thousand safe conduct leaflets are in circulation at the front. If a Hungarian *honvéd* produces such a leaflet, he has the choice of being equipped and fighting on, or of being interned as a PW with the understanding that he will be released after the war and can return home.

Furthermore the two MFM leaders constantly return to the theme that the presence of American or British troops, no matter how few, was vital to the regrouping of the Hungarian army on the Allied side. Lt. Col. Pál Németh, Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Air Force, himself an MFM leader, told Soos and Hadnagy that the moment American or British troops arrived, he would "make them a present of the whole air force". Other high-ranking officers were prepared to bring the Hungarian parachute battalions over to American or English troops. Soos and Hadnagy maintain that the mere presence behind the German line of a handful of Anglo-Saxon parachutists might have led so many Hungarian units to join them as to collapse the entire German front in Hungary. Since at one point in the conversations Soos declared that two-thirds of the Hungarian army would deal only with Anglo-Saxons and the other third was prepared to cooperate with the Russians as a last resort, it may be tentatively concluded that, in October and November, the anti-German sentiments of the Hungarian army had not yet become stronger than its fear of the Russians.

The Szeged Mission and the "Russian" Liaison Officer

As no answer was received from the Russians by way of the Swedish legation, and as the necessity for concerting resistance action with the Russian commanders was as imperative as ever, a third delegation, this time to Szeged, was organized. It consisted of Major Ernő Simonffy-Tóth, chief of the staff planning the defences of Budapest, Captain Tibor Vörös, son of the former Chief of the General Staff, and Lt. József Török as pilot. The flight was organized by Hadnagy and left about 30 October. Tóth carried a letter signed by Tildy as chief of the potential underground government. It stated that the resistance continued to regard Horthy as Regent and the armistice he had made as in force. The Russians were asked to send a liaison officer with whose help the resistance might undertake military action. Tóth also carried with him the plans of the capital's defenses. He was instructed to advise the Russians, on the basis of these plans, to break off their frontal attack and resort to a flanking movement. On a given signal the resistance would prepare a bridge-head over the Danube south of Budapest. Nothing was ever heard of the Szeged mission. The only evidence suggesting that it arrived was the fact that, some weeks after its departure, the Russians stopped their frontal attack and began to move forward on the flanks.

About 2 or 3 November, a Russian liaison officer did appear. He presented himself as Major Váry⁴⁵ and claimed to be a Hungarian and a Communist trained by the Russians as a partisan leader. He was introduced in the Committee of Liberation (see below) by Géza Fekete-Pénzes, chief of the *Szumbe*,⁴⁶ or Association of the Hungarian Friends of the Soviet Union, an orthodox Communist resistance group. [9] Dudás, chief of the Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party, was perfectly certain that Váry was a bonafide liaison officer and was even angry with Soos and Hadnagy for harboring doubts. Dudás' assertions were all the more effective

because, as a member of Horthy's unofficial armistice delegation he had radical peasant faction of the Small Holders' party, was also convinced that Váry was genuine.

Soos and Hadnagy, however, had reason to be suspicious. Váry told them that he could get representatives through the German defenses at Szeged with 10,000 French, and that he wanted to lead 100,000 Jews on Vienna, as these people ought to shed some blood in their own cause.

On Váry's insistence, the resistance called off a general sabotage action which had been prepared for 20 or 21 November. Through Dudás, two tons of explosive, packed in one kilo packages, each supplied with a detonator, had been distributed among some 2,000 industrial workers. Hadnagy had furnished the explosives. Váry said that the action would have to be postponed, as he had orders from the Russians to hold up overt action until further instructions. This did not seem unusual, as the orthodox Communist party, according to Soos, had constantly received similar directives from Moscow.

Soos, however, took the precaution of asking resistance agents working in the Hungarian Gestapo to check up on Váry. These reported that he was probably a Gestapo agent. Soos at once warned as many of the resistance leaders whom Váry knew as he could reach. The remainder were arrested about 22 November when they appeared for the next meeting of the Committee of Liberation. The Germans and Hungarians also laid hands on all those military leaders of the resistance to whom Váry had been introduced—about 120 officers virtually the entire membership of the Military Section of the MFM. Needless to say, Váry himself disappeared.

The arrests of 22 November proved to be a crippling blow. All resistance plans for action had to be postponed and revamped. It is significant of the MFM attitude toward the Russians that Soos, in the message which he asked be transmitted to the government of the Soviet Union, implied that Váry was in fact a major in the Soviet army.

About the time of the November arrests, a self-appointed liaison mission left to make contact with the Russians. This was composed of Baron Ede Atzél and one or two of his officer friends. Atzél had been a member of the Regent's unofficial armistice mission of September and seems to have hit it off well with the Russians. [10] He went with the knowledge and approval of the MFM, but carried no special message. As of the time of Soos' departure, Atzél had not returned.

Even though it proved impossible to open up a channel of communications with the Russians after 15 October, Soos and Hadnagy state that the Russians all along were in possession of a signal plan by which they could have called forth a general attack against the Germans in Budapest when the final attack on the capital should be launched. This signal plan was carried to Moscow by Szentiványi and was to be transmitted over Radio Moscow, the rising to take place six hours afterwards, Soos included the plan in his message to the Soviet Union, but it was so badly conceived as to be almost useless. It should be noted that other signal plans which the Soos party brought with them were, from a technical point of view, impracticable. In any case, the purpose of the Soos mission itself, was in part to open a channel of communications with the Russians. The mission left Hungary on 9 December.

[V.] *The Committee of Liberation*

The ill-fated Committee of Liberation was established about 25 October as the overall executive organ of the resistance movement.⁴⁷ It came into existence primarily for political reasons. Previously the Hungarian (nationalist) Communist

party, led by József Dudás, had not been officially recognized by the resistance. The party was not represented as such in the Hungarian Front; all Communists were presumed to be represented by the vote of Gyula Kállay, titular leader of the orthodox Communists. Dudás' group continually pressed for separate recognition and the fact that it had the support of the active sections of the working class—Dudás claimed to have 30,000 followers in Budapest—gave the arguments of the new party considerable force. The Front had always taken the line, however, that it could not recognize Dudás so long as the orthodox Communists did not. These latter based their refusal to do so on a Moscow directive stating that schisms in the Communist ranks were to be avoided at all costs. Thus on two or three occasions the Front had rejected a proposal for the creation of a super-Front committee by means of which Dudás could be recognized.

Suddenly, however, the orthodox Communists reversed their position and reached an agreement with Dudás. The two parties jointly proposed the creation of a Committee of Liberation, in which would represent the Hungarian Communists. Tildy, President of the Front, opposed the idea. He argued that the Front was in itself the effective executive organ of the resistance and that the creation of a new committee would endanger the security of the underground. He may well have had other reasons for opposing the committee, inasmuch as, when organized, it contained a majority of Communists. Just why the Front gave way is not clear. Soos and Hadnagy argue that the Committee was not a Communist effort to secure control of the resistance, but their own evidence makes this assertion doubtful.

When constituted, the Committee of Liberation was headed by Bajcsy-Zsilinszky of the Small Holders. Tildy refused to participate. Since Bajcsy-Zsilinszky rarely attended meetings, these were presided over by the vice-president Csorba, also a Small Holder. Soos represented the MFM, Kovács the radical peasant faction of the Small Holders' party, and Szakasits, who never appeared at the meetings, the Social Democrats. As against Csorba, Soos, and Kovács, the Communists had a working majority. Kállay⁴⁸ represented the orthodox Communists, Dudás the Hungarian Communists, and Péntzes [11] the *Szumbé*. In addition the Student Freedom Movement, which was in majority non-Communist, was represented by József Gyenes.

Tildy's forebodings about security proved, of course, to be true. The Committee of Liberation established a military sub-committee headed by Gen. János Kiss and Lt. Col. Jenő Nagy. Kiss had been placed in retirement because he had opposed Hungary's entrance into the war. He is regarded by Soós and Hadnagy as one of the most pro-Anglo-Saxon officers in the *honvéd* army. Nagy was a member of the General Staff who had been brought into the resistance movement by the two Hungarian Communists Dudás and Csomóss. He had been imprisoned for six months in 1942 or 1943 because of his pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude and then relegated to the reserves. Both men were intimate friends of Bajcsy-Zsilinszky. [12] Kiss and Nagy apparently found themselves unable to undertake effective planning without the assistance of the Military Section of the MFM, so that a liaison arrangement between the sub-committee and the Section was set up. It was into these circles that the "Russian Major" Váry was introduced.

Apparently efforts were made to revive the Committee, as Soos states that Gen. Vásárhelyi⁴⁹ was offered Kiss' place as chief of the military sub-committee. Whether or not Vásárhelyi accepted, Soos does not know. Retired two or three years ago because of his anti-German sentiments, Vásárhelyi was reactivated by Vörös about 1 September after Vörös himself had begun to cooperate with the MFM. [13] The

revival of the Committee of Liberation was sharply criticized by the leadership of the MFM. Besides the security failure, MFM representatives emphasized the fact that the Committee reached decisions only after prolonged deliberations and that this had prevented the execution of resistance plans for a general action on 2 or 3 November. [14] Many MFM leaders had urged action, the opposition of the Committee of Liberation notwithstanding, but others had wanted to do things democratically and cooperate with a body which represented all elements of the resistance.

[VI.] *The Secretariat of the Hungarian Independence Movement (MFM)*

The Hungarian Front, which, so far as is known, continued to be the effective organ of the resistance, is officially composed of the MFM, the Small Holders, the Social Democrats, the Communists, and representatives of the Catholic and Calvinist churches. [15] The MFM, however, occupies a unique position within the Front. It claims not to be a political party, though it has hopes of becoming such in the future. It rather seeks to function as a kind of general staff of the resistance, supplying the military and technical "know-how" which political parties normally lack. [16] The MFM numbers about 2,700 members, of whom roughly 600 live in Budapest. Ninety percent of the members are professional soldiers, civil servants, and intellectuals. Soos and Hadnagy claim that virtually all ethnically Magyar members of the Hungarian General Staff and most of Hungary's able engineers, physicians, and professors belong to the MFM.

The control group in the MFM is the Secretariat which is composed of 50 or 60 persons and headed by three secretaries. [17] Until 26 September, the first secretary was Domokos Szentiványi. A civil servant of gentry origin, now about 50 years of age, Szentiványi was employed in the office of the Prime Minister after 1932 in the section concerned with Hungarians living abroad. He spent several years as vice-consul in Cleveland. Teleki, his friend and leader, had the Cultural Relations Section (3B) of the Foreign Ministry created for him. Because of jurisdictional disputes with Ullein-Reviczky, [18] chief of the Press Section (3) of the Foreign Office, Szentiványi was removed from this post in 1942. In this year he was chosen by Prime Minister Kállay as president of a committee to prepare studies on the approaching peace conference. In this capacity Szentiványi established contact with anti-German elements in high finance, heavy industry, and the Protestant churches. Although not a dynamic individual, he soon found himself the leader of an anti-German group which, even in 1942, assumed that in the end Germany would occupy Hungary and open conflict between the two countries would develop. His leadership of this group culminated in the foundation of the MFM. Bitterly anti-German and blindly pro-Allied, Szentiványi fears and hates the Russians. In social questions he is not in the least progressive and has been characterized as one of those who is prepared for any social reform which will save the reaction. [19]

After Szentiványi's departure with Horthy's official armistice mission to Moscow, Soos took his place as first secretary. The new leader had served as Szentiványi's secretary in the Cultural Relations Section and, moreover, was the president of the *Soli Deo Gloria*, the Calvinist youth organization. Soos has never belonged to a political party, but his outlook is very similar to that of a left-wing Small Holder. Soos was in turn succeeded by Col. Bálint Arany, an SKF engineer.

From the foundation of the MFM, the second and third secretaries were Arany and István Bognár.⁵⁰ Arany's special function was that of liaison officer with the Hungarian Front, while Bognár acted as liaison officer with the Communists, with

whom he is personally on excellent terms, and with the "scientific group" of Prof. Szentgyörgyi. Bognár is vice-president of *Soli Deo Gloria* and teaches in a municipal *Burgerschule*. [20]

[VII.] *Military and Financial Sections of MFM*

Below the Secretariat, the body of the MFM is divided into sections, of which those dealing with military affairs and propaganda are undoubtedly the most important. Other sections may have no more than a nominal existence or may have been organized primarily to provide a prominent personality with a title.

The first chief of the Military Section was Major István Szentmiklósy, a member of the General Staff who served as recorder to the Supreme Council of Defense and first adjutant to General Mészöly, the president of the Council. At one time Szentmiklósy had been attached to the German-Italian committee which was set up to study the Rumanian-Hungarian minorities problem and make recommendations to Berlin and Rome. An anti-German rightist Szentmiklósy worked very closely with Miklós Somogyi and Imre Faust, both members of the international Communist party. After his arrest on 15 October, [21] Szentmiklósy was apparently replaced by Lt. Col. Pál Németh, Chief of staff of the Hungarian Air Force under Szálasi as well as under earlier governments. It may be, however, that Szentmiklósy was succeeded by Capt. István Tóth, who has been especially active in accumulating evidence against those members of the General Staff whom the MFM regards as war criminals. The Secretary of the Military Section is Dr. Géza Kádár, formerly employed in the Cultural Relations Section of the Foreign Office but after 19 March placed in Section VI (intelligence) of the General Staff through the offices of the MFM. Kádár is in touch with Somogyi and Miklós Szigeti, respectively military representatives of the Communists and the Social Democrats.

Other important members of the Military Section are Hadnagy himself, Arany, now also first secretary of the MFM, and László Kupa. [22] Hadnagy, who until his departure, was chief of the Material Section of the Hungarian Air Forces, is responsible for aviation matters. Arany heads a group whose function is both to prevent and repair enemy demolitions and to sabotage enemy installations. [23] Kupa is chief of the code and falsification office. He was formerly employed in the Cultural Relations Section of the Foreign Office. Only 28 years old, Kupa has played a prominent role in *Soli Deo Gloria* and, after Soos' departure, assumed some of his administrative responsibilities in the MFM.

The Financial Section is headed by György Darányi, managing director of the Hungarian Milling Works (*Magyar Malomipari Üzemek*). The most prominent members of the section, however, are the brothers Peter and Oskar Zerkowitz, wealthy Jewish wine merchants. [24] These two provided the MFM with a credit of two million pengős, thus becoming its principal financial backers. They also obtained money by soliciting contributions from industrial firms, the contributors being informed that the money would be used to assist Hungarian refugees. [25]

[VIII.] *Political Sections of the MFM*

The political branches of the MFM are organized partly on a functional, partly on a geographical basis. They fall into three groups concerned, respectively, with propaganda, the lost provinces, and foreign relations. Probably the most important,

and certainly the most successful, of all MFM branches is the Propaganda Section, [26] which is led by István Mészáros, an employee of the Press Section of the Foreign Office. Mészáros is an intimate collaborator of Ullein-Reviczky and József Antal, [27] serving the former as secretary. Strongly anti-German, he assisted the Polish refugees in Hungary. He advocates a serious and honest solution of the Hungarian social question.

The fact that the MFM has Transylvanian, North Hungarian, and South Hungarian sections indicates that the organization has marked revisionist tendencies. The function of all three sections was that of organizing the MFM in their respective territories. Section representatives sought out refugees who were prominent in the area concerned and persuaded them to return to their homes and serve as MFM agents.

The Transylvanian Section has two chiefs, Counts Béla and Ádám Teleki, both of them leaders of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Béla is a conservative aristocrat and a Bethlen man who for many years was president of the Hungarian delegation in the Rumanian parliament. In 1940 he became chief of the Transylvanian group in the Hungarian diet and after the German occupation made speeches urging the Hungarians to keep on fighting against the Bolshevik menace. Count Béla joined the MFM only after 15 October. Great differences of opinion exist between him and Count Ádám, his younger colleague. Ádám played a leading role in the Kolozsvár *Hitel* group, which advocated a serious though not revolutionary solution of the Hungarian social problem, the development of an effective system of cooperatives, and working out of a *modus vivendi* with the Rumanians. After the annexation of the northern Transylvania by Hungary, Ádám Teleki and his group took energetic steps in Budapest to secure better treatment for the Rumanian minority in that area.

The leader of the North Hungarian Section is Count István Révay, a good friend of Szentiványi's and a wellknown ethnographer. He has published a book on the ethnographic frontier between Slovakia and Hungary. Dr. Leó Deák is chief of the South Hungarian Section. A lawyer by profession, Deák represented the Hungarian minority in the Yugoslav parliament until 1929. He is internationally recognized as an expert on minority problems. As *főispán* of Újvidék, Deák attempted to prevent the famous massacres. Placed under house arrest by the local Hungarian military authorities, he escaped two days later and informed the Budapest government of what was taking place.

Foreign relations are handled by the Anglo-Saxon Section and the Yugoslav Liaison Officer. The leader of the Anglo-Saxon Section is Rev. Sándor Szentiványi, a Unitarian minister who spent several years in the United States and married an American. His deputy is László Laký, formerly manager of the Hungarian Steaua Oil Company as well as the secretary of the Y.M.C.A. in Budapest and Springfield. [28] The main objectives of the Section are to care for Anglo-Saxon nationals in Hungary and establish contact with the Anglo-Saxon powers. The Section obtained a house in Budapest and, according to Soos, brought there all Anglo-Saxon nationals living in the capital in order to protect them. Soos does not know if the Section was able to contact the Western Allies, but he states that it possessed some radio sets and that the first contact with Col. Howie [29] was made by the Section.

The Yugoslav Liaison Officer is Lt. Attila Berényi. A good friend of Atzél, Csomóss and Szentmiklósy, Berényi managed to establish contact with Tito, and Soos states positively that several couriers were exchanged. Tito's messages indicated that the Partisan chief was willing to accept any number of Hungarians in his ranks, as those already working and fighting with him had proved very effective. [30]

Relations between the MFM and the Jews are handled by a special section whose chief is rev. József Éliás, a Calvinist minister of Jewish birth. Éliás is also the leader of the Protestant Good Samaritan Mission, established to assist Jewish refugees. Much clandestine distribution of resistance propaganda was accomplished through the members of the Jewish community of Budapest until the community was liquidated.

[IX.] *Political Character of the MFM*

From this review of the key personnel of the MFM it seems clear that, on the whole, the movement represents the most liberal sections of the Hungarian ruling classes. Its present political texture suggests that the group may later play a role as a conscious political party, standing to the right of the already existing parties but far to the left of the MEP. This is in fact the plan. Soos and Hadnagy sometimes refer to the MFM "the Teleki party". Count Pál was, of course, a reactionary of the first order. He believed thoroughly in the leadership role of the Hungarian aristocracy and gentry. He opposed all agrarian reform. His public career was dominated by the desire to recover the territories lost at Trianon. But Count Teleki was also a great anti-German and his dramatic suicide in protest against Hungary's pro-German Foreign policy has made him a legendary figure now, a symbol of the new feeling against the Germans.

The two MFM leaders admit that at present their group has no mass support; they say that at the moment such support would be inconsistent with their function as general staff of the resistance. They claim that, when the MFM does become a party, it will attract a following among the middle and professional classes and the youth organizations, as well as from the anti-German remnants of big business and the gentry. Possible competing rightist parties may be eliminated by the redistribution of political power which would follow throughgoing land reform. Certainly the gentry and the Catholic clergy will lose much of their political influence if a through land reform is adopted. Soos states that all elements of the resistance, from left to right, are bound and determined to effect such reform. It is significant that no great landowner has been identified among the membership of the MFM:

[X.] *Communist Parties and Factions*

The present strength of the MFM lies in its quasimonopoly of technical and professional "know-how" and in the fact that many of its members hold key positions in government, industry, high finance and the press. The strength of the other major resistance elements, however, lies in their mass support, actual or potential. Of these other elements the Communists appear to be the strongest. According to Soos and Hadnagy, they are the only ones who have a leadership experience in underground warfare of "active and effective" masses. It was the so-called Hungarian Communist group which provided the 2,000 workers for the sabotage action planned for 21 or 22 November. It was Dudás, the chief of this group, who called out 10,000 workers for a three-day strike sometime in October. Dudás claims to have control over 30,000 workers in Budapest. The orthodox Communists are strong wherever there are large numbers of industrial workers, in Győr and Kolozsvár as well as Budapest.

According to Soos, the Hungarian Communists are communist only in name;

actually they are radical social democrats and most of the membership comes from the ranks of the Social Democratic party. The term communist has come to mean effective opposition to the Germans and the Arrow Cross. The new party is against dictatorship and although it favors close diplomatic relations with Moscow, opposed, to the incorporation of Hungary in the Soviet Union or the acceptance of party orders from the Russian Communist party.

Csomóss is the only leader of the Hungarian Communist party about whom much is known. A Transylvanian Szekler of peasant stock, he has played a role in the radical left since the early 1920's. He is not a well-educated man and his political views are by no means systematic, but at least until 19 March he stood for a thorough land reform, the preservation of private property, and a radically democratic government dominated by the peasants and industrial workers. He has been much more pro-American and pro-British than Russophile. According to Soos, Péter Veres, the self-educated peasant author who has a tremendous influence among the agricultural workers, should be counted among the Hungarian Communists, in views if not in party membership.

Within the ranks of the orthodox Communists three tendencies—or perhaps factions—are to be discerned. The nominal leader of the party, and its representative in the Hungarian Front, is Gyula Kállay. A journalist by profession, Kállay is described as a silent, modest, an loyal man who belongs to the second or third rank among Communist leaders. He is a second rate figure risked in an exposed position. The real leaders, according to the MFM representatives, are Matthias Rákosi, József Madzsar and Miklós Somogyi.

Before 19 March, Somogyi was president of the mason's trade union of Budapest and a member of the Social Democratic party. His faction is ethnically Magyar in composition and sometimes applies to itself the term "Hungarian Communist". The faction opposes incorporation but, on the other hand, is ready to follow the party line. Somogyi is a member of the Military Section of the MFM, the only instance of a political leader having membership in that organization. He is not too enthusiastic about Rákosi and Madzsar and has frequently neglected the immediate interests of the Communist party in order to promote the interests of the resistance as a whole. Yet he is too orthodox to join Dudás and the Hungarian Communist party.

The difference between the Rákosi and the Madzsar groups is largely one of personalities and ethnic composition. Both believe in a Hungarian Socialist Soviet Republic, though they cannot openly say so. Both appear to believe that Transylvania can be detached from Rumania by making it a soviet republic. In common with the Somogyi faction, both follow Moscow's orders which, according to Soos, enjoin cooperation with the Front and abstinence from overt action. Madzsar's group is ethnically heterogeneous, containing Jews and Germans as well as Magyars. Madzsar himself lived in exile in Moscow, returning to Budapest after 19 March. Rákosi's adherents are mostly non-Magyar Hungarians, Jews, Germans and Slavs. Rákosi a Jew with a Magyarized name who played a role in the Béla Kun regime, is still in Moscow. Since he is the only Hungarian Communist who has been publicized by the Soviets, many people in Budapest regard him as the man of the future.

[XI.] *Small Holders, Radical peasants and Social Democrats*

The other parties belonging to the Hungarian Front do not now have organized mass support. They do possess, however, a leadership of long experience and considerable standing. It would appear that they have not contributed as effectively to

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resistance activities as the Communists or the MFM, owing largely to the fact that their leadership is accustomed to operating openly and not underground. In general, this leadership stands for a democratic Hungary, thorough land reform, and good relations with the Soviet power. It is against the communization of the Hungarian economy or the incorporation of Hungary in the Soviet Union.

The effective leader of the Small Holders' party is Tildy, who is not only president of the Hungarian Front but was also charged by the Regent to form, when feasible, "the first democratic Hungarian government". Among the other chiefs are Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, president of the ill-fated Committee of Liberation, Count Desseffy, a liberal intellectual and journalist,⁵¹ Professor Szigeti⁵² and Csorba.⁵³ As now organized the party includes two elements which will likely assume an independent existence after liberation. One of these is the special section organized for urban middle class elements. In conversation with Soos, Tildy stated that this group should become a separate middle class party.

The other element is the radical peasant faction led by Imre Kovács and Pál Szabó.⁵⁴ While technically a member of the Small Holders' party, Kovács officially represents his faction in the Hungarian Front. Soos and Hadnagy obviously feel that Kovács is a bit dangerous. They characterize him as *ungezahmt*, a *junger Kerl* with only a superficial education. They admit that he possesses marked qualities of leadership and is, perhaps, the most influential peasant orator in Hungary. This mixture of fear and admiration is understandable. Kovács is in his late twenties, a man of peasant stock who belonged to the "menshevik" group of sociologists and writers which, late in the thirties, published a series of courageous books on the peasant question. Kovács' own book, the "Mute Revolution" (*Néma Forradalom*), declared that the Hungarian social revolution was already in existence and awaited only a favorable moment to manifest itself. The book cost him a two month's suspended prison sentence and he would have been expelled from the University of Budapest had it not been for the intervention of Teleki. After a short time as the editor of *Híd* (bridge), organ of the MEFHOSZ (Union of Student Democratic Organizations) and member of the staff of *Szabad Szó* (Free Word), he returned to live again in his unbelievable poverty. [31] Kovács is pro-Slav. Pál Szabó is a shrewd but uneducated peasant who entered public life some years before the war as a protégé of Péter Veres. He founded *Szabad Szó* in 1935.

The Social Democrats have made a very poor showing in the resistance. They have lost a large body of adherents to the Hungarian Communists because of their passive policy. The faction led by Géza Malasits has refused to raise a hand: that led by Árpád Szakasits has joined, but not actively participated in, the Hungarian Front. Szakasits' group has preserved some of its workers' organization within the framework of the state Work Councils created under Sztójay. In some instances the Social Democratic workmen were able to insist on their own leaders as chiefs of the Work Councils.

NOTES

[1] Interrogation took place at irregular intervals between 13 December and 26 January 1945.

[2] For the propaganda of the resistance movement see R and A Hungarian Report No. 12 "Recent propaganda developments in Hungary", 28 January 1945.

[3] The Germans arrested the whole of the Lakatos government, though some of the ministers were allowed to return to their homes "on their word of honor" and under guard. Csatay and his wife committed suicide in prison by taking poison. Lakatos and a few of his colleagues were, after some delay, confined at Sopron-Kőhida.

[4] Although a reactionary and a member of the Double Cross (legitimist) Federation, Toreky is both anti-Nazi and anti-German. His personal friendship with Horthy no doubt influenced his opinion.

[5] Tasnády-Nagy was a leader of the right wing of the MEP, president of the German-Hungarian Society of Budapest, and a prominent pro-Nazi.

[6] Kálmán, Páli and Szerzetes were, respectively, the code name of Szentiványi, Soos and Szentmiklós, the latter having been Chief of the Military Section of the MFM until his arrest about 16 October. Péter was the code name of András Kövess, Szentiványi's secretary.

[7] The content of the two notes is derived largely from a message of 19 December 1944 which Soos drew up and asked to be transmitted to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics through AFH channels. This communication was not complete, and Soos supplied orally those parts of the original notes not included in the communication. Apparently the unit mentioned in the second note was a signal battalion commanded by Teodor Ács.

[8] The number of men who went over with Miklós is given as 80,000. The units which went over Pécs are estimated as about 50,000 strong.

[9] For the *Szombe* see R and A Hungarian Report No. 12. Fekete-Pénzes seems to have used both names individually at different times. Hereafter he will be referred to as Pénzes.

[10] Because of the importance of Atzél's role in the Hungarian underground, a few remarks on his background seem pertinent. An impoverished Transylvanian aristocrat, he is a nationalist fanatic who stands for active minority resistance against Rumanian rule. In 1935-36 he attempted to organize rifle associations among the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and, when the Rumanian authorities refused to permit his, he oriented these associations toward the improvement of the Hungarian peasants' economic status. The associations attempted to develop peasant cooperatives and to teach the peasants improved methods of cultivation. Atzél believes that the basis of Hungarian minority policy in Rumania should be shifted from the aristocratic and middle classes to the peasant masses. After the return of northern Transylvania to Hungary, Atzél armed his associations. This was originally done as a precaution against Rumanian attack, but with time the activity of the associations came to be directed primarily against the Germans. In this connection Atzél began dealing with Csomóss, a leader of the Hungarian (nationalist) Communist party in 1942, and through Csomóss came in contact with Endre Fallás and Gen. Lajos Veress. The latter gave his blessing to Atzél's anti-German plans. Atzél is apparently well-liked by the Communists generally. His fool-hardy courage is illustrated by the fact that, after his return from his first Moscow mission, he moved about the streets of Budapest openly, although the Germans had issued orders authorizing anyone to shoot him on sight.

[11] Soos regards Pénzes with great suspicion. This man is apparently an engineer and spent seven years in the Soviet Union. He was introduced to the resistance by Dudás. Not only did Pénzes bring Váry into the Committee of Liberation, but he was one of the few who knew where Bajcsy-Zsilinszky was hiding and, on 22 November, the Gestapo proceeded directly to this house. Furthermore a group of orthodox Communists, with whom Pénzes on occasion hid, were all apprehended by the Gestapo sometime in the middle of November. Pénzes was the only member of the group who escaped arrest. Soos now remembers that Pénzes was one of those who insisted most strongly on the creation of the Committee of Liberation.

[12] On 9 December 1944 the Hungarian Radio announced that Kiss and Nagy had been hanged for "participation during October and November last in the resistance movement of liberation and the 'Hungarian Front' ..."

[13] Vásárhelyi told Soos that he had accepted reactivation only on condition that Vörös maneuver the Army toward an armistice. Vásárhelyi was appointed government commissioner in charge of billeting refugees in Budapest. He resigned this post on 15 October.

[14] According to Soos, Pénzes always insisted that action should await word from the Russians.

[15] The Catholic representative is Prof. Gyula Szekfű, Hungary's best known historian. He had no authorization from Prince-Primate Serédi to represent the catholic church but acted on his own initiative and kept in touch with the anti-German elements in the church. The Calvinist representative is Rev. Pongrácz Kenessey,⁵⁶ who came into contact with the movement because he offered refuge to Szakasits. Both men were members of the Front from its foundation and regularly attended its secret meetings, but they took no part in making decisions and confined themselves to the role of observers.

[16] It is frequently difficult in talking with sources to determine whether a given action was carried out or a given decision reached by the MFM or by the Front, or by both together.

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[17] Soos makes a distinction between a Secretariat and a Political Section, but detailed examination would indicate that this distinction is largely formal.

[18] Ullein-Reviczky is at present dissident Hungarian Minister to Sweden.

[19] Szentiványi's personal secretary after 19 March was András Kövess, formerly the private secretary of Nicholas Horthy Jr.

[20] Other members of the Secretariat are: Kálmán Saláta⁵⁷ who maintains contact with officers not belonging to the general staff, István Cs. Rónay⁵⁸ in contact with the Polish and French undergrounds, Sándor Németh⁵⁹ (liaison with trade unions), Wilmos Fitos⁶⁰ and Prof. Sándor Kiss⁶¹ (in contact with students' resistance movement), Domokos Torma⁶² (in contact with literary circles and the press), Pál Gaczkó⁶³ (work with the underworld of Angyalföld and Ferencváros and with taxi drivers), István Rácz and Mihály Hőgye.⁶⁴ Most of these men are young and relatively unknown.

[21] On this date Szentmiklósy received an order, issued in the name of Gen. Vörös, to report to Vörös' office. Against the advice of his friends, he obeyed the order and has not been heard from since.

[22] Soos refers to these three men as chiefs of independent sections, but this seems to be an exaggeration.

[23] In this connection it may be mentioned that Lajos Balogh, engineer employed at the municipal electricity works of Budapest, organized the workers of this establishment for the MFM and prepared to prevent German demolition of these works.

[24] In the middle of April, Oskar Zerkowitz was arrested by the Germans and imprisoned for two or three months. In prison he became acquainted with the Communists, and after his release met Faust, who presented him to Szentmiklósy.

[25] Oskar Zerkowitz also worked for the code and falsification office, forging false identity cards and Hungarian party arm bands.

[26] For a detailed study of the activities of the propaganda section see R and A Hungarian Report No. 12.

[27] From 1938 Antal was chief of the section in the Ministry of the Interior which dealt with the refugees coming into Hungary from other countries. He was largely responsible for the fact that 30,000 Poles were permitted to leave Hungary and join the Allies. He has been arrested by the Germans.

[28] Soos does not know which Springfield.

[29] Col. Howie returned to Italy with General Náday in September.

[30] There is also a physicians Section headed by Gyula Nyíró,⁶⁵ a specialist in internal medicine who enjoys great authority in Hungarian medical circles. His secretary is a certain Balogh, brother of Lajos, engineer and MFM representative in the municipal electricity works of Budapest.

[31] In 1941 the General Staff seized upon a convenient excuse—Kovács' name was on an incidental list carried by an English lady suspected of espionage—to imprison the peasant author. He was confined four or five months without trial, finally conducted to the presence of Gen. Szombathelyi, Chief of the General Staff, who stated very dramatically that he knew him (Kovács) to be a good Hungarian, but that he (Szombathelyi) was also a good Hungarian. After declaring that nothing would be permitted to interfere with the prosecution of the war, Szombathelyi snapped: "Mr. Kovács, you are free!"

JEGYZETEK

- 1 Ezeket az iratokat nem mellékeltek az összefoglaló jelentéshez, és másutt sem kerültek elő.
- 2 Erre vonatkozólag l. *A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország. Német diplomáciai iratok Magyarországról. 1933—1944.* Sajtó alá rendezte és bevezette: RÁNKI György, PAMLÉNYI Ervin stb. Bp. Kossuth Kiadó, 1968. Jagow budapesti követ távirati jelentése Ribbentrop külügyminiszternek: 780—781. — Az OKW által nyújtott tájékoztatás szerint, a Bécs térségébe irányított páncélos tankhadosztálynak „az a rendeltetése, hogy az újonnan felállított, vagy felfrissítendő páncélos- és páncélgránátos hadosztályokat a Lajta-menti Bruck térségében kiképezze.”
- 3 A Koronatanácsot megelőzően Szombathelyi vezérkari főnök megkérdezte a vezérkar nyilván-

- tartási osztályát, hogy milyen álláspontot képviseljen Horthy kormányzó előtt. A válasz: „A német kívánságnak, jelen esetben annak, hogy a Kormányzó Úr keresse fel Hitlert a klesssheimi főhadiszálláson, minden körülmények között eleget kell tenni.” („Szálasi naplója”. A nyilas mozgalom a II. világháború idején. Összeállította és kommentálta KARSAI Elek. Kossuth Kiadó, Bp., 1978. 148—150. — Erdemes megemlíteni, hogy a Napló így folytatódik: „A vezértől kéri a PV-t [Pártvezetőt], hogy állandó tartózkodási helyéről tájékoztatást adjon, hogy a várt komoly fordulatot közvetlenül tudomására hozhassák.”
- 4 Az 1944. március 19-ére virradó éjszaka eseményeinek, valamint a március 19-én délelőtt tartott minisztertanácsi és koronatanácsi ülés lefolyásának leírását l. N. KÁLLAY: *Hungarian Premier. A Personal Account of nations struggle in the Second World War*. Columbia University Press. New York, 1954. 427—438.; Percy Ernst SCHRAMM: *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*. Bd. IV. I. Hb. 1944—1945. Frankfurt am Main 1961. 233—234.; KARSAI Elek: *A budai Vártól a Gyepűig. 1941—1945*. Táncsics Kiadó, Budapest, 1965. 436—454.
 - 5 Soosék vagy nem tudták, vagy nem akarták megmondani, hogy Kudar ezredes a magyar elhárítás egyik vezetője volt.
 - 6 „A demokratikus pártok kiáltványa a magyar nemzethez.” (Újra kiadva: *A Magyar Front*. Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1984. 199—195.)
 - 7 Nyilván a Györffy Kollégiumra gondol.
 - 8 A számok erősen túlzottak. Németországból, Ausztriából, valamint a környező, német megszállás alá került országokból (Szlovákiából, Lengyelországból, Cseh- és Morvaországból, Jugoszláviából) Magyarországra menekült és itt védelmet talált zsidók száma mintegy 15 000 lehetett. (Randolph L. BRAHAM: *The Politics of Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary*. Columbia University Press, New York 1981. DUB. Vol. I. 109.)
 - 9 Jánosi Ferenc jezsuita szerzetes.
 - 10 Téves dátum, a deportálás a délnyugati határsávban kezdődött, 1944 április utolsó napjaiban, ezután kéthetes szünet következett, majd a folyamatos, országgrészek szerinti végrehajtás 1944. május 15-én indult meg.
 - 11 Ravasz László püspök az Endre—Baky—Jaross perben, 1945. december 29-én, ezen akciókról az alábbi tanúvallomást tette a népbíróság előtt: „1944, amikor a Sztójay-kormány megalakult, a református egyház a többi egyházakkal egyetemben erős küzdelemben volt a Sztójay-kormány magatartása, elsősorban a zsidókérdésben tanúsított magatartása ellen. Ebben a küzdelemben mint egyházam szolgálatában legidősebb püspöke és elnöke, én is részt vettem. 1944. év március hó végén jelent meg az emlékezetes sárgacsillag-viselési rendelet, amely alapvető rendelkezés volt a zsidók kezelésére nézve. Április 2-án vagy 3-án felmentem a kabinetirodába, hogy kihallgatást kérjek a kormányzótól, néhány lelkipásztornak, egyetemi tanárnak, tudósoknak és íróknak az érdekében. A kabinetirodában azt a felvilágosítást kaptam, hogy a kormányzó magát fogolynak tekinti, és nem kíván az ügyek menetébe beleszólni, s miniszterein kívül senkit sem fogad. A kormányzó ekkor nem is fogadott, hanem csak kb. 10 nap múlva, április 12-én. A zsidókérdésben első találkozásom Jaross Andorral történt meg, akit április 3-án kerestem fel. Jarostól kértem, hogy sürgősen adjon mentesítést a lelkészekre, diakónusokra, diakonisszákra és presbiterekre, azután állítson fel külön tanácsot a keresztyén vallású, de zsidónak minősülő egyénekre nézve. Kértem továbbá, hogy ne bontsa meg a keresztyénné vált családok egységét azokban az esetekben, amikor a nagyszülő még nem tért át, vagy áttérése úgy történt meg, hogy ennek következtében nem esik kivételezés alá. Meg kell mondanom, hogy Jaross ezekben a kérdésekben megértő magatartást tanúsított, és kilátásba helyezte kérelmeim teljesítését. Búcsúzásom alkalmával megkérdeztem tőle, az előttem mutatott megértő magatartására való tekintettel, hogy miért engedi ilyen rendelkezések létrejöttét és miért lépett arra az útra, amelyen most megy. Jaross válasza azóta is a fülemben hangzik: „ha én másként cselekedném, saját pártom szélsőséges szárnya söpörne el innen.”
 - Későbbi idők folyamán valóban jelentek meg bizonyos enyhítést célzó rendeletek, azonban ezek nem voltak olyan teljesek, mint azokat nekem Jaross kilátásba helyezte, különösen nagyon nélkülöztem a presbiterekre vonatkozó kérésem nem teljesítését. Május 16-a táján a két protestáns egyház azonos tartalmú levelet írt a miniszterelnöknek — s elküldte ezt a belügyminiszternek is —, amelyben nagyon élesen elítélte a zsidók elkülönítését. A levél befejezésében megemlítettük azt is, hogy hírek terjednek a deportálásokról eshetőségéről is. A deportálás mindenütt, ahol megtörtént, a legszörnyűbb következményekkel járt. Kértük a miniszterelnököt, hogy a kormány hasson oda, hogy Magyarországottl a rettenetes szegénytől és Isten-ellenes bűntől megmentsék. Erre a beadványunkra nem kaptunk választ, mire azt megismételtük és most már, kb. június hó közepe táján, válasz is érkezett. A miniszterelnökhöz intézett levelünket a miniszterelnök a belügyminisztériumba küldötte át, hogy onnan kapjam meg a levélben foglaltakra a szükséges felvilágosítást. Ez a körülmény abból volt megállapítható, hogy a miniszterelnöktől az egyházak részére érkező válasz mellé egy belügyminisztériumi jelentés másolata volt csatolva, amelyet azonban nem a belügyminiszter, hanem Endre László írt. Endre

a jelentésében kereken tagadja a zsidósággal szembeni atrocitásokat, jó bánásmódot jelent, s egész jelentése tökéletesen ellentétben áll azzal, amiről az Egyház időközben közvetlen tapasztalatokból és benyomásokból meggyőződött.

Miután az Egyház pedig közvetlen benyomásból, tehát emberek személyes tapasztalatából győződött meg, végső lépésre határozta el magát. Megfogalmazott egy nagyon éles tiltakozást, amelyben a zsidósággal szembeni eljárást kárhoztatja. Megállapítja, hogy a zsidósággal szembeni eljárással a nemzet az Isten büntetését idézi fejére, lábbal tiporja az emberiség legemberibb törvényeit és szegényfoltot ejt nemzete nevére, annak a nemzetnek a nevére, amelyet ezer esztendőn át lovagias nemzetnek ismertek. A tiltakozás azzal fejeződött be, hogy ha nem változtatnak a zsidóság elleni eljáráson, úgy a magyar egyház a világ-protestantizmus elé fogja vinni az ügyet. Ezt a tiltakozást a miniszterelnök úrhoz címeztük és június 20-án vagy 21-én egy küldöttség adta át neki. Többszöri levélváltás után végre is értesítést kaptunk a miniszterelnöktől arról, hogy a deportálásokat Budapestre vonatkoztatva megszüntették.

Elő kell adnom, hogy időközben, nevezetesen április 27-e táján, Perényi Zsigmond, a Felsőház elnökének a kérésére, kihallgatást kértem a magam számára a kormányzótól. A kormányzó fogadott, s én elébetartam a gyűjtőtáborokban levő tarthatatlan helyzetet, az atrocitásokat, amelyekből a hozzánk intézett kétségbeesett levelekből is értesültünk. Kértem az államfőt, hogy ezekkel a túlkapasokkal a legerőteljesebben szálljon szembe, s ne engedje saját nevével fedeztetni azokat. A kormányzó közölte velem, hogy a zsidó férfiakat munkaszolgálatra viszik ki, családjukat pedig azért, hogy együtt legyenek a családtagok és a családot ne a nemzet tartsa el akkor, amikor a munkakereső Németországban dolgozik. Az volt az érzésem és a meglátásom, hogy a kormányzó közlése részéről teljes jóhiszemű meggyőződésének felelt meg. Jaross Andorral a már említett találkozón kívül más alkalommal nem találkoztam és nem beszéltem, nem voltam érintkezésben sem Endrével, sem Bakyyal, s így hármójuk működéséről továbbiakat nem tudok mondani." (Belügyminisztériumi Irattár. Nb. 4419/1945. Endre László és társai. V. 79 802/3. 304—307.)

- 12 Raffay Sándor bányakerületi evangélikus püspök 1944. június 27-én levelet intézett Serédi Jusztinián hercegprímáshoz; kérte, hogy a három történelmi keresztény egyház együttesen lépjen fel a megkeresztelkedett zsidók érdekében a miniszterelnöknél vagy a kormányzónál. Serédi hercegprímás 1944. július 8-án adott válaszában elutasította a közös fellépést. (*Vádirat a náciizmus ellen. Dokumentumok a magyarországi zsidóüldözés történetéhez.* III. k. 1944. június 26.—1944. október 15. Szerk. és a bevezető tanulmányt írta: KARSAI Elek. Magyar Izraeliták Országos Képviselője, Bp., 1967. 9—10., 111—112.)
- 13 A Sztójay-kormányzat folytatott tárgyalásokról Serédi hercegprímás 1944. július 9-i körlevelében tájékoztatta a püspöki kar tagjait. (*Vádirat a náciizmus ellen,* i. m. III. k. 115—121.)
- 14 A Bárczy István miniszterelnökségi államtitkár ellen tervezett és kudarcba fulladt akció indítékait elsődleges források hiányában megnyugtató módon eddig nem sikerült tisztázni. Bárczy a különös akcióról 1944. július 9-én tájékoztatta Szálasit. (*Szállasi Naplója* i. m. 258—259.)
- 15 A csendőralakulatokat Bakyy államtitkár parancsára vonták össze Budafokon, — részben a fővárosi zsidóság deportálásának lebonyolítására, részben, ha a kormányzó ezen akciót elellenézne, az ő eltávolítására. A csendőrség megjelenése a fővárosban természetesen nagy riadalmat keltett a deportálástól joggal rettegő zsidók körében, de paradox módon nagy nyugtalan-ságot okozott Szálasinak és híveinek is. (Bakyy intencióira, a július 6-i eseményekre: *Szállasi Naplója* i. m. 251—255.)
- 16 Jaross belügyminiszter Endrét és Bakyyt 1944. június 30-án fölmentette a zsidóügyek intézésétől, de az államtitkári székéből való eltávolításukra csak 1944. szeptember 5-én (Endre) és 1944. szeptember 6-án (Bakyy) került sor.
- 17 Erről a német dokumentumról nem tudunk, föltehető azonban, hogy Soos és Hadnagy egy másik összefoglaló jelentésre gondolt. E jelentést Veesenmayer készítette 1943 őszi magyarországi tapasztalatairól, a jelentés dátuma 1943. december 10. (*A Wilhelmstrasse és Magyarország,* i. m. 742—755.)
- 18 Horthy kormányzó a Románia átállása után Bakách-Bessenyei volt berni követet bízta meg az angolszász diplomatákkal történő kapcsolatfelvétellel, Magyarország háborúból való kiválásának megtárgyalásával. Bakách-Bessenyei 1944. augusztus 29-i titkos táviratában közölte az illetékes magyar tényezőkkel, hogy „a tárgyalásoknak az angolszászokra való korlátozása lehetetlen. Minden kísérlet az oroszok kizárására a tárgyalások azonnali csődjét jelenti.” (OL Film-tár 14 086. sz. doboz. Macartney Papers St. Anthony College Library, Oxford. — Távirat-váltás Bakách-Bessenyei és Budapest között, 1944. augusztus 26-tól 1944. szeptember 21-ig.)
- 19 Helyesen: a kormányzói kabinetiroda főnöke.
- 20 A nemzetőrség feladata a rendelet szerint „a közbiztonsági szervek (a m. kir. csendőrség és m. kir. rendőrség) támogatása az ország rendjének és közbiztonságának fenntartásában: kisebb ellenséges partizán- és ejtőernyős csoportok leküzdése, szabotázscelemeknyek megelőzése és elhárítása; ... szükség esetén a működő seregest parancsnokságok rendelkezései szerint a

hadműveletek hátsó területének biztosítása." (Magyarországi Rendeletek Tára. 1944. 78. évfolyam. Bp., 1948. 529.)

- 21 Helyesen: Jöcsik.
- 22 A delegáció útbaindításának előkészületeiről röviden említést tesz PINTÉR István: *A Magyar Front és az ellenállás*. (Kossuth Kiadó, Bp., 1970. 122.) KOROM Mihály a delegáció útjáról csak annyit ír, hogy a „Magyar Hazafiak Szabadság Szövetsége” élén álló ötös bizottságának tagja volt báró Atzél Ede és Dudás József is, akik „később a Kiugrási Iroda szervezésében — egy felderítő utazásban is részt vettek a Szovjetunióban.” (KOROM Mihály: *Magyarország Ideiglenes Nemzeti Kormánya és a fegyverszünet. 1944—1945*. Akadémiai Kiadó, Bp., 1981. 85.) Részletesen tárgyalja a delegáció útját, moszkvai tárgyalásait BOKOR Péter, jórészt négy évtizeddel az események után felvett visszaemlékezések alapján — anélkül, hogy a Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom nevét leírná. (Zsákutca. *A Századunk sorozat interjúi*. RTV—Minerva, Bp., 1985. 133—180. „Az amatőr delegáció.”)
- 23 A táviratváltás teljes szövegét közzétette KARSAI Elek: Magyar delegáció Moszkvában 1944 őszén. (*História* 1982. IV. évf. 2. sz.)
- 24 A Náday-missziót tárgyalja KOROM Mihály, Náday István 1945-ben készített jelentése, valamint brit külügyi iratok alapján. (I. m. 74—77.)
- 25 Lakatos miniszterelnök azzal vette rá Horthy kormányzót, hogy maradjon Budán a Várban, és ne menjen ki Husztra, az 1. magyar hadsereg parancsnokságára, hogy ott jelentse be a megkötött fegyverszünetet, hogy „a kapitány nem hagyja el a süllyedő hajót.” (Lakatos Géza személyes közlése e publikáció szerzőjének 1964-ben.)
- 26 1944. október 15—16. eseményeit Soos és Hadnagy nem elsődleges források vagy közvetlen személyes tapasztalatok alapján rögzítette; előadásuk lényegében a közszájon forgó hírekre, a történeteket kiszínező mende-mondákra épült. (E két nap eseményeinek részletes leírását I. KARSAI: *A budai Vártól a Gyepűig*, i. m. 546—559.)
- 27 A Gellért hegyi sziklaközpont, Budapesten.
- 28 Helyesen: Deseő.
- 29 Tévedés. Miklós Béla tábornok kíséretében csak vezérkari főnöke, Kéry Kálmán és segéd-tisztje, Csukássy-Hecht volt, amikor átlépte a frontvonalat és jelentkezett a 4. Ukrán Front főparancsnokságán. (KARSAI: i. m. 564.)
- 30 Bélynek ekkor sikerült nyugatra menekülnie. A háború után a magyar népbíróság börtönbüntetésre ítélte. A rabkórházban halt meg 1946. december 22-én.
- 31 A szögletes zárójelbe rakott szavak a sajtó alá rendező kiegészítései.
- 32 Helyesen: A Református Egyetemes Konvent világi elnöke.
- 33 Csomoss Miklós foglalkozására nézve orvos volt.
- 34 Petrescu.
- 35 Ghicz Jenő külügyministerségének pontos dátuma: 1943. augusztus 24.—1944. március 22.
- 36 Téves értesülés. 1946-ban a népbíróság halálra ítélte és kivégezték.
- 37 Jánosi Ferenc jezsuita szerzetes.
- 38 A németek koncentrációs táborba hurcolták. Meghalt: Attersee (Ausztria), 1947. március 3.
- 39 Az evangélikus egyház egyetemes főfelügyelője.
- 40 A kronológia, ahogy az egész összefoglalás kisebb-nagyobb tévedéseit nem javítottuk és nem jegyzeteltük. Az említett nevekhez a jegyzetben csak akkor adunk kiegészítést, ha a szövegből nem derül ki személyazonosságuk.
- 41 Az Országtanács, melynek személyi összetételét az 1937. XIX. tc. 3. §-a írta elő, 1944. október 27-én ült össze, báró Perényi Zsigmondnak, a Felsőház elnökének és Tasnádi Nagy Andrásnak, a képviselőház elnökének elnöklelte alatt. Az ülésen részt vett — a két elnökön kívül — Szálasi Ferenc miniszterelnök, Serédi Jusztinián esztergomi érsek, bíboros hercegprímás, Jakab Mihály, a Kúria másodelnöke, Sipéki Balázs Kornél, a Közigazgatási Bíróság másodelnöke és Beregfy Károly vezérezredes, a honvédség főparancsnoka. Az Országtanács ülését azért hívták össze, mert — a jegyzőkönyv szerint — Horthy kormányzó az országgyűlés két házának elnökéhez intézett kéziratában méltóságáról lemondott, így a kormányzói szék megüresedett. A lemondó irat másolatát — az eredeti felmutatása mellett — Szőlősi miniszterelnök-helyettes október 24-én adta át a két ház elnökének. Tasnádi Nagy és Perényi megállapította, hogy „a kézirat eredeti és valódi”, de szükségesnek tartotta, hogy az Országtanács tagjai is tekintsék meg az eredeti kéziratot. A megjelentek a kézirat megtekintése után kijelentették, hogy „a kézirat valódisága tekintetében nincs aggályuk. Perényi javaslatára az Országtanács felkérte Szálasi, hogy miután a nemzeti összefogás kormányát — a lemondási irat értelmében — már megalakította és a miniszterektől az esküt kivette, ő is tegye le az esküt az Országtanács előtt. Bár az 1937. XIX. tc. 4. §-a értelmében az Országtanácsnak — a kormányzói szék megüresedése esetén — az országgyűlést 8 napon belül össze kell hívni kormányzóválasztás céljából, Szálasi azt javasolta, hogy az országgyűlés „határozza el a kormányzói szék betöltésének elhalasztását, és az államfői hatalom gyakorlását ezúttal csak ideiglenesen rendezze.” Az Országtanács a javas-

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- latot elfogadta és az országgyűlés két házát 1944. november 3-ra, a törvényjavaslat letárgyalására összehívta. (A jegyzőkönyvet teljes terjedelmében közölte dr. FRANK László: *Zöld ár.* Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Bp., 1975. 138—140.)
- 42 A képviselőház november 2-i ülésén mindössze 55 képviselő jelent meg (a 372-ből), akik elfogadták a Szálasi ideiglenes államfői megbízatásáról szóló törvényjavaslatot. A Felsőház november 3-án módosítás nélkül elfogadta a nemzetvezető jogköréről szóló törvényjavaslatot (1944. X. tc.). (Részletesen l. TELEKI Éva: *Nyilasuralom Magyarországon. 1944. október 16.—1945. április 4.* Kossuth Kiadó, Bp., 1974. 96—98.)
- 43 Az említettek: Nagy Ferenc, a későbbi miniszterelnök; Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Endre és Dessewffy Gyula gróf.
- 44 1944. szeptember 30-tól 1945. február 2-ig a honvédsereg létszáma 863 288 fővel apadt — a bevonulási parancsok megtagadása, szökések, átállások, fogságbaesés és harci veszteségek (sebesülés, elhalálozás) következtében. A helyzetet jól jellemzi az az adat, mely szerint 1945. február 2-án egyetlen razzia alkalmával 995 katonaszökevényt, 2325 lézengő katonát és 4125 behívó-parancsot megtagadó személyt állítottak elő. (Bővebben l. TÓTH Sándor: *A Szovjet Hadsereg felszabadító harcai Magyarországon.* Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Bp., 1965. 309—312.)
- 45 Váry őrnagy neve más dokumentumokban nem fordul elő.
- 46 A Szovjetunió Magyar Barátainak Egyesülete.
- 47 A Magyar Nemzeti Felkelés Felszabadító Bizottsága megalakulásával, tevékenységével a magyar történeti szakirodalom behatóan foglalkozott. L. többek közt *Magyar szabadságharcosok a fasizmus ellen. Dokumentumok a magyar antifasiszta ellenállási mozgalom történetéből. 1941—1945.* Szerk.: HARSÁNYI János. Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, Bp., 1966. 567—605.; PINTÉR István: *A Magyar Front és az ellenállás. (1944. március 19.—1945. április 4.)* Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Bp., 1970. 192—214., 220—229.; KÁLLAY Gyula: *A magyar függetlenségi mozgalom. 1939—1945.* 4. átdolgozott kiadás. Szikra Kiadó, Bp., 1955. 269—270.; TÓTH Sándor: i. m. 283—294.
- 48 Kállai Gyulát érti.
- 49 Ilyen nevű tábornok nem ismert.
- 50 Rövid életrajza: GERGELY Ferenc: A nagy szárszói táborok elnöke: Bognár István. *Confessio* 1983. 2. sz. 69—75.
- 51 A már említett Dessewffy Gyula gróf.
- 52 Szigeti. . .
- 53 Csorba János, 1945. január 21-től Budapest polgármestere.
- 54 Szabó Pál, az író.
- 55 Fall Endre, a Revíziós Liga ügyvezető igazgatója.
- 56 Kenessey Pongrác.
- 57 Saláta Kálmán, 1945 után kiscgazdapárti képviselő. 1947 januárjában a köztársaság megdöntésére irányuló szervekedés vádjával bíróság elé állították.
- 58 Csicserei-Rónay István, külügyminisztériumi tisztviselő.
- 59 Németh Sándor.
- 60 Fitos Vilmos, a *Magyar Élet* szerkesztője.
- 61 Kiss Sándor, 1945 után kiscgazdapárti képviselő, 1947 januárjában a köztársaság elleni perben őt is bíróság elé állították.
- 62 Torma Domokos, 1945 után a miniszterelnökség sajtó osztályának a vezetője.
- 63 Gaczkó Pál.
- 64 Rácz István és Högye Mihály, a kiscgazdapárti ellenzékhez tartoztak.
- 65 Nyíró Gyula elmeorvos és pszichopatológus, később egyetemi tanár.

1. Author: INTERNET:makinen@atlantis.Colorado.EDU/ at INTERNET
Date: 1997-09-23 10.04
Priority: Normal
TO: Lage (UD) Olson at (Pk)UD-3
CC: Martin (UD) Hallqvist at (Pk)UD-3
Subject: Swedish-Russian Working Group

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Mr. Lage Olson
Mr. Martin Hallqvist
Swedish Foreign Ministry
Stockholm, Sweden

Dear Lage and Martin:

Below is the letter that you have requested from me to describe the objectives and methodology for further analysis of archival material in our research work on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. I hope that this will be satisfactory to be transmitted as an aide-memoire.

With best wishes,

Marvin W. Makinen

u. u. / h

September 22, 1997

Chairman
Swedish-Russian Working Group
on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
Moscow, Russia

As a permanent consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, I have been requested by Mr. Hans Magnusson to prepare an outline of methodology and purpose to continue the analysis of prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison, No. 2. This letter is to be transmitted to you as an aide-memoire. Thus, this letter is to provide an outline of methods to collect information from the Spetzchast kartoteka in the Vladimir Prison that I have proposed to analyze for the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. There are three parts to this work which are closely interconnected and need to be done as a whole. They are:

(1) the review of the personal files of 99 former prisoners in the Soviet Union which with Susan Mesinai we have established as relevant to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. The files are to be reviewed in Moscow through the office and assistance of Mr. Konstantin Sergeivich Nikishkin, and a list of the names of the individuals and details regarding our objectives have already been transmitted to you. Many of these files have been on request through the Working Group already for a number of years and have been earlier promised for review. In the intervening time, we have added to this list and have now limited it to these 99 prisoners. A handful of these files have been already analyzed, and we have provide that information in our master list transmitted through the Swedish Foreign Ministry, indicating that those files that have been reviewed need not be provided again.

(2) the compilation of date of entry and Case No. (in Russian, Dela No. No.) from the prisoner registration cards in the Vladimir Prison kartoteka for all prisoners having entered the prison in the years 1947, 1954, and 1972. This

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information is restricted only to these two pieces of information on the cards and involves no further form of prisoner identification or personal information. In late February-early March of this year, I brought, as you know, a team of assistants to the Vladimir Prison for carrying out further photography and analysis of prisoner registration cards. During this time Ms. Susan Mesinai, who was one of my assistants then, had received approval from Mr. Yuri Miroshin of the prison administration staff to collect these data. We estimate that we succeeded in collecting only about one-half of the relevant data and need to be able to complete this part in order to finalize our analysis.

(3) the compilation and analysis of cell occupancy data from the Vladimir kartoteka of prisoners who have been kept in Korpus II of the Vladimir Prison over the 1947-1972 period, prisoners who have died in the Prison, and prisoners for whom no cell occupancy data are provided on their cards (a small number) but for which their dates of entry and departure from the prison are recorded. The methodology and reasons for carrying out this analysis are summarized below.

As you will recall, through several visits over the 1993-1997 period to the Vladimir Prison with Professor Guy von Dardel, undertaken within the framework of the Working Group, we uncovered two individuals who have been employed at the Vladimir Prison over a lengthy period of time and who described a foreign prisoner not of German origin who had been held in solitary confinement for a long period of time in cell No. 49 of Korpus II. These individuals were Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, who had worked in the hospital and clinic of the Vladimir Prison in Korpus II, and Kukin, Alexandr Timofeivich, who was at the time of our interview with him, retired but had been a guard and later the head guard in the Vladimir Prison in the 1950's and 1960's.

During our initial first three contacts with Larina, we never informed her of the name or family of the prisoner for whom we were searching, and through our later discussions with her, it was evident that she did not know the name Wallenberg nor was she familiar with newspaper articles that have been published about him. She described the physical characteristics of this prisoner, which were such as to be compatible with those of Raoul Wallenberg, and she stated that she remembered this particular prisoner because of his constant critical comments and complaints about anything that was not suitable to him. For instance, she stated that he would complain if the soup was cold. Since this prisoner was located in Cell 49 on the third floor of the building and the soup was distributed from a large kettle with which they served prisoners on the ground floor, then the second floor, and finally on the third floor, it is to be expected that the soup would have cooled off by the time she got to him. Because of his constant complaints, however, she was ordered to bring the soup first to the third floor. This is of course a vivid reason to recall a prisoner out of many others because he made life unpleasant for her. Larina stated that she did not know the name of this prisoner but she described him as a Westerner of non-German origin. She also stated that at the time of this prisoner's incarceration, a prisoner by the name of Osmak died who was located in a nearby cell. From a group of photographs of men of various ages and appearances, one of which was a side profile of RW not ever used in the international press, she identified this prisoner by picking out the picture of RW. Larina was not certain of the period during which this prisoner had been in Vladimir but thought that it was likely to have been in the mid or late 1950's.

Kukin in our interview with him confirmed that there had been a foreign prisoner held in solitary for a long period of time in Korpus II, but he stated that he did not know the name or origin of the prisoner. He described the prisoner similarly according to physical characteristics and when shown photographs he stated that the photograph of RW (also not one that had been in the international press) was not unlike this prisoner.

There are also, as you are aware, other reports that have been collected in the Swedish Foreign Ministry made by former prisoners who had been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison that they had heard of RW or had heard that he had been incarcerated there. These reports, most of which have been discussed within

the meetings of the Working Group, date from 1947 to 1972. I myself through my own incarceration in the Vladimir Prison have reported about having heard about a Swedish prisoner who had been there sometime in the 1950's or early 1960's. One prisoner named him "van den Berg."

As is known from our first investigation of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in August of 1990, we were not able to locate a registration card with the name of Wallenberg. We cannot be certain that we have missed the card because of a pseudonym used rather than the name of Wallenberg. In addition, there was evidence in the kartoteka for up to 32 numbered prisoners. While most of these have been accounted for, some have not been identified, and cards for some numbered prisoners were not in the kartoteka. For instance, there were cards for numbered prisoners 26, 28, 29, and 32, but as I recall (here in Colorado where I am presently a visiting professor I do not have all of my records and notes on this matter) the cards for numbers 27, 30, and 31 were missing. There also may have been numbered prisoners higher than 32.

This background information thus points to the circumstance that a cell, in particular No. 49 in Korpus II, was occupied for a lengthy period of time and that this occupancy is likely not to be accounted for by the kartoteka if the registration card of this prisoner has been removed by authorities earlier in Soviet times or if the prisoner was numbered but the numbered card has been removed from the kartoteka. Also since prisoners were shifted from cell to cell periodically to hinder paths of communication through knocking, etc., it is probable that this prisoner had been transferred to other cells. Since the registration cards in the kartoteka contain a chronicle of date and cell number each time the given prisoner was transferred to a cell, a simple cell occupancy analysis made by extracting this information from the cards would point to the circumstance either that (1) a cell must be considered as "empty" since no card in the kartoteka can account for a prisoner having been in the cell, (2) a prisoner whose card is in the kartoteka turns out to have been kept in solitary for a long time and therefore the name on the card may be a pseudonym, or (3) it may show that all cells were occupied and thus deny the contention that there was a prisoner there in lengthy solitary confinement.

Furthermore, by identifying cards of prisoners who died while imprisoned in Vladimir, we should be able to determine the details about the prisoner by the name of Osmak and when he died (During our visit to the Vladimir Prison in February-March, 1997, we indeed did determine that there had been a prisoner by that name who died.) Thus by identifying who may have been his cellmates in this period and which prisoners were in other nearby cells during this time, there would be a basis to try to find whether any of them may still be alive and could be interviewed to learn what they knew about special foreign prisoners in Vladimir at that time.

Also since it is possible that this special prisoner may have been in the Vladimir Prison at other times, having been transferred from other prisons, and since other reports place Wallenberg to have been in the Vladimir Prison over the 1947 to 1972 period, by analyzing cell occupancy data from the prisoner registration cards it would be possible to establish whether other cells were ostensibly "empty" at other times over this period and could therefore be considered to have had a prisoner in them that is not accounted for by the cards.

Again, prisoners who could be identified and were located in other nearby cells, if alive, may be able to shed further light on the identity of this special prisoner.

In the end of February-beginning of March of this year, with a team of assistants, I traveled to the Vladimir Prison because through the Working Group and through the Swedish Embassy we had been informed that approval had been granted to our request to select and photograph registration cards of all prisoners who had occupied cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period. As is well known, we were not permitted to photograph or copy any of the cards, although we did select cards of those prisoners who had been in cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period, who had died in the Vladimir Prison, or who had entered the Vladimir Prison during this time but did not have any cell occupancy

information written into their cards. We prepared a list of the names of all of these prisoners which numbered close to 6000. The cards of these approximate 6000 prisoners were identified by being placed into a rotated orientation with respect to the other cards in each drawer of the kartoteka, and we were assured that they would be kept in that state in a storeroom of the prison administration until the matter of copying of the cards would be decided.

Thus, through this background information the objectives of the cell occupancy analysis are evident and it is clear that this analysis could either confirm the reports of a special prisoner held in solitary or deny the statements. The issue to be dealt with is how this information can be collected and analyzed so that Russian authorities can be assured that it will be used only for purposes of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that it will not compromise the privacy of prisoners who are not associated with the case of Raoul Wallenberg. Therefore, I outline below two different methodologies for compiling the cell occupancy data that best preserve the intactness and rigorousness of the analysis of the cell occupancy data from those approximate 6000 cards that have been selected earlier in February-March of this year and that protect the privacy of all prisoners whose cards must be examined. The Russian authorities will then have to decide which method is preferable to them. The two methods for compiling the cell occupancy information needed are as follows:

(1) We photograph the cards as outlined above, carry out the analysis, and after the report has been made to the Working Group upon completion of the analysis, we return the photographic images of the cards to the Russian authorities. Under this condition, we assure the authorities that further copies of the cards will not be made. In this way the Russian authorities can feel assured that all information from their archival documents has been returned to them. This is the most accurate method for the analysis since it allows us to verify during the analysis that all data have been entered accurately. Since we must extract the cell occupancy information from each card to be analyzed by algorithms developed for this purpose, it is likely that some errors in data input are to be expected. This method allows cross-checking of the data and makes for the most accurate analysis possible. I point out that Professor Guy von Dardel and I have worked since 1990 so as to use all archival material only according to the objectives of the Working Group. This method permits complete verification of data input and preserves complete accuracy in data analysis. All other methods, such as the one outlined below, are subject to greater error in the analysis.

(2) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of cell occupancy information in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison by entering into our own laptop computers only the following information from the approximate 6000 cards selected: name of prisoner and date of birth, case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data including cell number and date when transferred, and date of departure from prison. This method allows collection of the data that are necessary for the analysis and does not involve making records of other information about each prisoner that do not serve the objectives of the analysis, such as date of arrest, basis of arrest, statute according to which the prisoner was charged and sentenced, length of sentence, etc. Should certain prisoners need to be contacted or identified further for purposes outlined above, we can then simply provide the name and date of birth, etc. to the Russian authorities. During our work in the Vladimir Prison in February-March of 1997, I discussed this possibility with my assistants. We decided that this method would probably require five assistants each with a personal laptop computer to work in the kartoteka for 7-10 consecutive days to enter just the minimal information from each card described above. We would have to use this period of time to verify accuracy of data input as much as possible, but the method suffers from the possibility that some errors in data input may go through undetected and that after our departure from the Vladimir Prison there would be no opportunity to make corrections. The resultant effect on the analysis may be small but cannot be accurately predicted since it would

depend on the frequency of errors. There would be no information collected by this method that would allow further public identification of prisoners or of their families.

For well over a year I have tried to think of a method of making a permanent copy of just the minimum information needed from each card without recording other data such as length of sentence, etc., that is of no use to us and is of no interest. Unfortunately there is no manner in which only part of each card could be photographed because both sides of each card must be examined to extract the necessary information and the data are not written onto the cards in a uniform manner. Short of this, I have tried to outline above two possible methods to collect the necessary information for the analysis and to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion by ensuring as much as possible accuracy of the data input. I hope that agreement can be reached for implementing one of the above described methods for data input. They are listed in order of decreasing preference to me purely on the basis for verification of data input.

I hope that this description of the goals and objectives of our archival research are clear and understandable. Please do inform me if further information may be required.

Sincerely,

Marvin W. Makinen

Temporary address August 18 - October 18, 1997:

Marvin W. Makinen
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✓ Author: Tonika (UD) Hirdman Sandberg at (Pk)UD-3

Date: 1997-10-03 11.28

Priority: Low

TO: Lage (UD) Olson, Birgitta (UD) Nygren

Subject: Ny version

Obs se ny version av verksamhetspl Stbr med ändring i avsnitt om
ordförandeskapet i Nordiska Rådet.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1997-09-25

sid. 1 (2)

Utrikesdepartementet

EI/ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Ambassaden Moskva Dnr
Ambassaden Riga Dnr

RRÅDSKANDE

Re Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet
(1 bil.)

1. Under ett möte hos kabinetssekreteraren den 17 september 1997 överenskomms att ambassaden i Moskva skulle erhålla instruktioner rörande den fortsatta handläggningen av RW-ärendet enligt vad som anges nedan. Vid ett annat möte hos kabinetssekreteraren samma dag med deltagande av Guy von Dardel och Susanne Berger förklarade sig dessa införstådda med den preliminära uppläggningsplanen av arbetsprogrammet. Uppteckningar från dessa två möten översänds snarast.

2. Förslag till aide-mémoire i RW-ärendet att överlämnas snarast möjligt till ordföranden i den ryska arbetsgruppen bifogas. Vi vore tacksamma erhålla Era eventuella synpunkter före överlämnandet. I aide-mémoire ingår följande huvudpunkter:

a) Marvin Makinens undersökning i Vladimir slutförs med alternativ metod utan fotografering och som ger anonymitet åt de registrerade. Makinens bifogade brev daterat den 22 september om den alternativa metoden närslutes aide-mémoire.

b) Susan Mesinai får slutföra sin genomgång av persondossierer i Moskva. Hennes nyligen översända promemoria i detta ärende överlämnas snarast till vederbörande ryska myndigheter.

1997-09-25

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c) Fortsatt genomgång av kortregister i mentalsjukhus, i första hand i Serbskijinstitutet, efter 1947.

d) Sammanfattande omnämnande av andra utestående ärenden.

e) Ett arbetsgruppmöte föreslås äga rum i Moskva i mitten av november. Närmare datum bör bestämmas efter kontakt med den ryske ordföranden.

f) Under mötet i november föreslås utväxling ske av utkast till resp. vitbok. Texten är dock inte komplett. Resultaten från vissa undersökningar återstår t.ex. att redovisa. Om vi ej får klartecken till de begärda undersökningarna kommer vi att använda oss av möjligheten att påpeka detta i den färdiga rapporten. Ansvar för att undersökningarna genomförs kommer alltså att ligga på den ryska sidan.

3. Susan Mesinai får slutföra sin parallella genomgång av kortregistret i Vladimir. (Detta ärende tas liksom tidigare upp under hand och omnämns ej i aide-mémoire).

4. Det i aide-mémoire föreslagna arbetet bör ha kommit väl igång när arbetsgruppmötet hålles i november.

5. En utvärdering av RW-ärendet görs efter novembermötet inför det ryska statsbesöket i början av december.

6. Efter Jeltsins besök görs en ny utvärdering av läget i RW-ärendet och diskuteras när publicering bör ske av vitboken.

7. Genomgången av RW-dokumenterna från perioden 1971-1991 fortsätter planenligt, men en publicering sker först efter Jeltsins besök.

Cabinet



1997-09-24

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa
Martin Hallqvist
Telefon 405 - 3236

1. Den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppen rörande Raoul Wallenbergs öde har nu varit verksam i nästan sex år. Betydande ansträngningar har lagts ned på att få fram dokumentation och uppgifter ur olika arkiv och på att intervjua personer som har förmodats äga närmare kännedom om en eller annan aspekt av Raoul Wallenbergs öde. Att arbetet dragit ut på tiden och ännu inte kunnat avslutas beror på att arbetsgruppen icke - med någon tillfredsställande grad av säkerhet och bevisning - lyckats slå fast Raoul Wallenbergs öde efter att ha hamnat i sovjetisk fångenskap eller ens varför han arresterades och kvarhölls resp. hur besluten härom fattades. Arbetet har också försenats p.g.a. att de ryska myndigheterna inte godkänt slutförandet av undersökningarna i Vladimirfängelset.

Vi befinner oss i en situation där en rad motstridiga vittnesmål fortfarande inte kunnat definitivt avfärdas eller bekräftas och där följaktligen endast mer eller mindre starkt underbyggda hypoteser om motiven för RW:s arrestering resp om hans öde kan framläggas.

Den svenska sidan noterar att man icke heller från rysk sida hävdar att fullständig bevisning för RW:s död 1947 föreligger. Vi har också med tillfredsställelse noterat att man i flera officiella ryska uttalanden understrukt sin beredskap att fortsätta söka efter alla de fakta och handlingar, vilka hänger samman med RW:s liv och verksamhet, senast i utrikesminister Primakovs brev till Sveriges utrikesminister den 17 juli 1997.

Nedan redovisas de åtgärder som enligt svensk uppfattning är nödvändiga för att en publicering av rapporten skall vara möjlig. De bör vara genomförda under loppet av första halvåret 1998, men redan vid tiden för president Jeltsins besök i Sverige i december bör det kunna slås fast att arbetet på de ännu utestående punkterna är i full gång.

1997-09-24

4

Vi är från svensk sida medvetna om att inte ens nedan föreslagna åtgärder med nödvändighet kommer att leda fram till att fullständig klarhet nås. I så fall bör detta påpekas i rapporten och öppenhet finnas för att göra de ytterligare undersökningar som kan bli nödvändiga i framtiden.

2. Följande åtgärder bör genomföras.

a) Från rysk sida har man avvisat begäran om kopiering av 6.000 registerkort från Vladimirfängelset, trots utförlig motivering för syftet med denna undersökning. Mot bakgrund av de argument som framförts från rysk sida föreslås nu en ny undersökningsmetod, som även om den är mer arbetskrävande, torde ta hänsyn till invändningar föranledda av den ryska informationslagen. I detta sammanhang bör erinras om de åtaganden som de stater, inkl. Ryssland, gjorde när de år 1992 antog "the UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance" bl a när det gäller att tillhandahålla register över alla personer som berövats sin frihet.

Professor Marvin Makinens förslag till åtgärder bifogas.

Det kan tilläggas att det, om denna undersökning inte genomförs, blir omöjligt att en gång för alla fastställa om RW vistats i Vladimirfängelset under annat namn eller nummer.

b) Officiell framställan har överlämnats om genomgång avpersondossierer rörande fångar som på ett eller annat sätt haft anknytning till R Wallenberg. Det är angeläget att Susan Mesinai får arbetsgruppens räkning. Någon kopiering av dokument kommer ej att bli erforderlig.

c) Som bekant finns vittnesuppgifter att RW skulle ha förvarats på en eller flera psykiatriska kliniker. Inom arbetsgruppen finns sedan tidigare en överenskommelse om att stödja ansträngningarna att utröna sanningshalten i dessa uppgifter. Susan Mesinai har redan inlett ett samarbete med Serbskijinstitutet som hittills gällt perioden fram t.o.m. 1947. Det är angeläget att undersökningarna fortsätter samt att även tillträde ges till Kazankliniken. De bör fastställas huruvida detta arbete kan utföras i samarbetet med Presidentens kommission för rehabilitering av repressionens offer.

1997-09-24

- d) Det är angeläget att största möjliga öppenhet framgent visas när det gäller tillträde till relevanta ryska arkiv även för oberoende, seriösa forskare. Som ett exempel kan nämnas op.fond 451 (exakt benämning?).
- e) Från rysk sida har hävdats att de chiffterelegram som förvaras separat i det ryska utrikesministeriets arkiv inte innehåller något av intresse rörande Raoul Wallenberg. Om inte tillträde kan ges till denna del av arkivet krävs en uttrycklig försäkran i rapporten om att inget relevant materiel rörande RW finns i dessa chiffterelegram.
- f) Sedan arbetsgruppen sist sammanträdde har en del nya uppgifter framkommit som behöver verifieras närmare. Det gäller bl a de f d KGB-medarbetarna Igor Prelin och Gennadij Sokolov.
- g) Såsom tidigare föreslagits bör ytterligare ett, väl förberett, samtal föras med D. Kopelanskij och B. Solorov.
- h) I ett svar från MID i januari 1997 på tidigare svenska frågor sägs bl a att Lubjanka-fängelsets särskilda akter från 1947 förstörts 1955, varvid en handling om detta upprättades. Denna uppgift har tidigare inte nämnts för arbetsgruppen och det vore därför värdefullt att erhålla en kopia av den nämnda handlingen.

Om det från rysk sida inte är möjligt att vara tillmötesgående, främst vad gäller punkterna a-d ovan - kommer detta klart att påpekas i rapporten. Ansvaret för undersökningen som inte kan genomföras kommer alltså att helt läggas på den ryska sidan.

3. Från svensk sida vill vi slutligen föreslå att arbetsgruppen har ett möte i Moskva några veckor före president Jeltsins besök i Sverige.

September 22, 1997

1(5)
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Chairman
Swedish-Russian Working Group
on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
Moscow, Russia

As a permanent consultant to the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg, I have been requested by Mr. Hans Magnusson to prepare an outline of methodology and purpose to continue the analysis of prisoner registration cards in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison, No. 2. This letter is to be transmitted to you as an aide-memoire. Thus, this letter is to provide an outline of methods to collect information from the Spetzchast kartoteka in the Vladimir Prison that I have proposed to analyze for the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg. There are three parts to this work which are closely interconnected and need to be done as a whole. They are:

(1) the review of the personal files of 99 former prisoners in the Soviet Union which with Susan Mesinai we have established as relevant to the case of Raoul Wallenberg. The files are to be reviewed in Moscow through the office and assistance of Mr. Konstantin Sergeivich Nikishkin, and a list of the names of the individuals and details regarding our objectives have already been transmitted to you. Many of these files have been on request through the Working Group already for a number of years and have been earlier promised for review. In the intervening time, we have added to this list and have now limited it to these 99 prisoners. A handful of these files have been already analyzed, and we have provide that information in our master list transmitted through the Swedish Foreign Ministry, indicating that those files that have been reviewed need not be provided again.

(2) the compilation of date of entry and Case No. (in Russian, Dela No. No.) from the prisoner registration cards in the Vladimir Prison kartoteka for all prisoners having entered the prison in the years 1947, 1954, and 1972. This

information is restricted only to these two pieces of information on the cards and involves no further form of prisoner identification or personal information. In late February-early March of this year, I brought, as you know, a team of assistants to the Vladimir Prison for carrying out further photography and analysis of prisoner registration cards. During this time Ms. Susan Mesinai, who was one of my assistants then, had received approval from Mr. Yuri Miroshin of the prison administration staff to collect these data. We estimate that we succeeded in collecting only about one-half of the relevant data and need to be able to complete this part in order to finalize our analysis.

(3) the compilation and analysis of cell occupancy data from the Vladimir kartoteka of prisoners who have been kept in Korpus II of the Vladimir Prison over the 1947-1972 period, prisoners who have died in the Prison, and prisoners for whom no cell occupancy data are provided on their cards (a small number) but for which their dates of entry and departure from the prison are recorded. The methodology and reasons for carrying out this analysis are summarized below.

As you will recall, through several visits over the 1993-1997 period to the Vladimir Prison with Professor Guy von Dardel, undertaken within the framework of the Working Group, we uncovered two individuals who have been employed at the Vladimir Prison over a lengthy period of time and who described a foreign prisoner not of German origin who had been held in solitary confinement for a long period of time in cell No. 49 of Korpus II. These individuals were Larina, Varvara Ivanovna, who had worked in the hospital and clinic of the Vladimir Prison in Korpus II, and Kukin, Alexandr Timofeivich, who was at the time of our interview with him, retired but had been a guard and later the head guard in the Vladimir Prison in the 1950's and 1960's.

During our initial first three contacts with Larina, we never informed her of the name or family of the prisoner for whom we were searching, and through our later discussions with her, it was evident that she did not know the name Wallenberg nor was she familiar with newspaper articles that have been published about him. She described the physical characteristics of this prisoner, which were such as to be compatible with those of Raoul Wallenberg, and she stated that she remembered this particular prisoner because of his constant critical comments and complaints about anything that was not suitable to him. For instance, she stated that he would complain if the soup was cold. Since this prisoner was located in Cell 49 on the third floor of the building and the soup was distributed from a large kettle with which they served prisoners on the ground floor, then the second floor, and finally on the third floor, it is to be expected that the soup would have cooled off by the time she got to him. Because of his constant complaints, however, she was ordered to bring the soup first to the third floor. This is of course a vivid reason to recall a prisoner out of many others because he made life unpleasant for her. Larina stated that she did not know the name of this prisoner but she described him as a Westerner of non-German origin. She also stated that at the time of this prisoner's incarceration, a prisoner by the name of Osmak died who was located in a nearby cell. From a group of photographs of men of various ages and appearances, one of which was a side profile of RW not ever used in the international press, she identified this prisoner by picking out the picture of RW. Larina was not certain of the period during which this prisoner had been in Vladimir but thought that it was likely to have been in the mid or late 1950's.

Kukin in our interview with him confirmed that there had been a foreign prisoner held in solitary for a long period of time in Korpus II, but he stated that he did not know the name or origin of the prisoner. He described the prisoner similarly according to physical characteristics and when shown photographs he stated that the photograph of RW (also not one that had been in the international press) was not unlike this prisoner.

There are also, as you are aware, other reports that have been collected in the Swedish Foreign Ministry made by former prisoners who had been incarcerated in the Vladimir Prison that they had heard of RW or had heard that he had been incarcerated there. These reports, most of which have been discussed within

the meetings of the Working Group, date from 1947 to 1972. I myself through my own incarceration in the Vladimir Prison have reported about having heard about a Swedish prisoner who had been there sometime in the 1950's or early 1960's. One prisoner named him "van den Berg."

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As is known from our first investigation of the Vladimir Prison kartoteka in August of 1990, we were not able to locate a registration card with the name of Wallenberg. We cannot be certain that we have missed the card because of a pseudonym used rather than the name of Wallenberg. In addition, there was evidence in the kartoteka for up to 32 numbered prisoners. While most of these have been accounted for, some have not been identified, and cards for some numbered prisoners were not in the kartoteka. For instance, there were cards for numbered prisoners 26, 28, 29, and 32, but as I recall (here in Colorado where I am presently a visiting professor I do not have all of my records and notes on this matter) the cards for numbers 27, 30, and 31 were missing. There also may have been numbered prisoners higher than 32.

This background information thus points to the circumstance that a cell, in particular No. 49 in Korpus II, was occupied for a lengthy period of time and that this occupancy is likely not to be accounted for by the kartoteka if the registration card of this prisoner has been removed by authorities earlier in Soviet times or if the prisoner was numbered but the numbered card has been removed from the kartoteka. Also since prisoners were shifted from cell to cell periodically to hinder paths of communication through knocking, etc., it is probable that this prisoner had been transferred to other cells. Since the registration cards in the kartoteka contain a chronicle of date and cell number each time the given prisoner was transferred to a cell, a simple cell occupancy analysis made by extracting this information from the cards would point to the circumstance either that (1) a cell must be considered as "empty" since no card in the kartoteka can account for a prisoner having been in the cell, (2) a prisoner whose card is in the kartoteka turns out to have been kept in solitary for a long time and therefore the name on the card may be a pseudonym, or (3) it may show that all cells were occupied and thus deny the contention that there was a prisoner there in lengthy solitary confinement.

Furthermore, by identifying cards of prisoners who died while imprisoned in Vladimir, we should be able to determine the details about the prisoner by the name of Osmak and when he died (During our visit to the Vladimir Prison in February-March, 1997, we indeed did determine that there had been a prisoner by that name who died.) Thus by identifying who may have been his cellmates in this period and which prisoners were in other nearby cells during this time, there would be a basis to try to find whether any of them may still be alive and could be interviewed to learn what they knew about special foreign prisoners in Vladimir at that time.

Also since it is possible that this special prisoner may have been in the Vladimir Prison at other times, having been transferred from other prisons, and since other reports place Wallenberg to have been in the Vladimir Prison over the 1947 to 1972 period, by analyzing cell occupancy data from the prisoner registration cards it would be possible to establish whether other cells were ostensibly "empty" at other times over this period and could therefore be considered to have had a prisoner in them that is not accounted for by the cards.

Again, prisoners who could be identified and were located in other nearby cells, if alive, may be able to shed further light on the identity of this special prisoner.

In the end of February-beginning of March of this year, with a team of assistants, I traveled to the Vladimir Prison because through the Working Group and through the Swedish Embassy we had been informed that approval had been granted to our request to select and photograph registration cards of all prisoners who had occupied cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period. As is well known, we were not permitted to photograph or copy any of the cards, although we did select cards of those prisoners who had been in cells in Korpus II over the 1947-1972 period, who had died in the Vladimir Prison, or who had entered the Vladimir Prison during this time but did not have any cell occupancy

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information written into their cards. We prepared a list of the names of all of these prisoners which numbered close to 6000. The cards of these approximate 6000 prisoners were identified by being placed into a rotated orientation with respect to the other cards in each drawer of the kartoteka, and we were assured that they would be kept in that state in a storeroom of the prison

administration

until the matter of copying of the cards would be decided.

Thus, through this background information the objectives of the cell occupancy analysis are evident and it is clear that this analysis could either confirm the reports of a special prisoner held in solitary or deny the statements. The issue to be dealt with is how this information can be collected and analyzed so that Russian authorities can be assured that it will be used only for purposes of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the Fate of Raoul Wallenberg and that it will not compromise the privacy of prisoners who are not associated with the case

of Raoul Wallenberg. Therefore, I outline below two different methodologies for compiling the cell occupancy data that best preserve the intactness and

rigorousness of the analysis of the cell occupancy data from those approximate 6000 cards that have been selected earlier in February-March of this year and that protect the privacy of all prisoners whose cards must be examined. The Russian authorities will then have to decide which method is preferable to them. The two methods for compiling the cell occupancy information needed are as follows:

(1) We photograph the cards as outlined above, carry out the analysis, and after the report has been made to the Working Group upon completion of the analysis, we return the photographic images of the cards to the Russian authorities. Under this condition, we assure the authorities that further copies of the cards will not be made. In this way the Russian authorities can feel assured that all information from their archival documents has been returned to them. This is the most accurate method for the analysis since it allows us to verify during the analysis that all data have been entered accurately. Since we must extract the cell occupancy information from each card to be analyzed by algorithms developed for this purpose, it is likely that some errors in data input are to be expected. This method allows cross-checking of the data and makes for the most accurate analysis possible. I point out that Professor Guy von Dardel and I have worked since 1990 so as to use all archival material only according to the objectives of the Working Group. This method permits complete verification of data input and preserves complete accuracy in data analysis. All other methods, such as the one outlined below, are subject to greater error in the analysis.

(2) With a team of assistants, I be allowed to direct the collection of cell occupancy information in the kartoteka of the Vladimir Prison by entering into our own laptop computers only the following information from the approximate 6000 cards selected: name of prisoner and date of birth, case number, date of entry into the prison, cell occupancy data including cell number and date when transferred, and date of departure from prison. This method allows collection of the data that are necessary for the analysis and does not involve making records of other information about each prisoner that do not serve the objectives of the analysis, such as date of arrest, basis of arrest, statute according to which the prisoner was charged and sentenced, length of sentence, etc. Should certain prisoners need to be contacted or identified further for purposes outlined above, we can then simply provide the name and date of birth, etc. to the Russian authorities. During our work in the Vladimir Prison in February-March of 1997, I discussed this possibility with my assistants. We decided that this method would probably require five assistants each with a personal laptop computer to work in the kartoteka for 7-10 consecutive days to enter just the minimal information from each card described above. We would have to use this period of time to verify accuracy of data input as much as possible, but the method suffers from the possibility that some errors in data input may go through undetected and that after our departure from the Vladimir Prison there would be no opportunity to make corrections. The resultant effect on the analysis may be small but cannot be accurately predicted since it would

*
depend on the frequency of errors. There would be no information collected by this method that would allow further public identification of prisoners or of their families.

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For well over a year I have tried to think of a method of making a permanent copy of just the minimum information needed from each card without recording other data such as length of sentence, etc., that is of no use to us and is of no interest. Unfortunately there is no manner in which only part of each card could be photographed because both sides of each card must be examined to extract the necessary information and the data are not written onto the cards in a uniform manner. Short of this, I have tried to outline above two possible methods to collect the necessary information for the analysis and to arrive at a reasonably satisfactory conclusion by ensuring as much as possible accuracy of the data input. I hope that agreement can be reached for implementing one of the above described methods for data input. They are listed in order of decreasing preference to me purely on the basis for verification of data input.

I hope that this description of the goals and objectives of our archival research

is clear and understandable. Please do inform me if further information may be required.

Sincerely,

Marvin W. Makinen

Temporary address August 18 - October 18, 1997:

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
E-mail can be directed also to my permanent address:

m-makinen@uchicago.edu




SVERIGES AMBASSAD
LONDON

1997-09-19



Ambassadör Sven Julin

Utrikesdepartementet



HEMLIG

Frisläppande av Raoul Wallenberg-dokument;
Gordijevskijs vittnesmål

hbr Julin-Hartelius 970602

Broder,

- besökte mig
igår på ambassaden för att redogöra för sin
organisations - och Gordijevskijs - syn på
frisläppandet av de RW-dokument, som ställts till
deras förfogande för kommentar.

beklagade inledningsvis dröjsmålet med
reaktionen. Det betingades främst av tidsödande
samtal med Gordijevskij, samt även konsultationer med
FCO. Vad man nu hade att ge var en preliminär
reaktion, som man hoppades att den svenska sidan i
sinom tid skulle kommentera.

Från brittisk sida såg man flera problem med en
publicering av de aktuella dokumenten, även maskade
enligt ditt förslag. Sammanfattningsvis anfördes
följande argument:

- Gordijevskij var orolig för att hans källa skulle
kunna ringas in med de uppgifter som gick att utläsa
ur dokumenten. Även om sakuppgifterna sedemera
publicerats i hans böcker, hade källan inte tidigare
exponerats.

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- Gordijevskij hade inledningsvis reagerat mycket negativt på den bild han ansåg tecknades av honom i rapporteringen. Denna emotionella reaktion hade mattats, men det fanns alltså passager i texten han ville stryka. Kommentar: På denna punkt tror jag att både G. vantolkat rapporteringen. Utsagor som uppenbarligen kommer från G. personligen ("hela hans tidigare liv hade varit lögnaktigt", var ett exempel som anfördes ur texten, har uppfattats som ett omdöme från den svenska UD-tjänstemannen)

Option 2: Att helt utelämna materialet från publicering.

--

Jag tackade för synpunkterna och lovade att framföra dem till Stockholm. På några punkter befarade jag att Gordijevskijs reaktioner berodde på feltolkning av en annorlunda rapporteringsstil. Om det kunde underlätta den fortsatta diskussionen var ambassadör Julin beredd att besöka London för samtal och Gordijevskij. välkomnade detta och sade att Gordijevskij uppdragit åt SIS att representera honom i ett sådant samtal.

Tacksam Dina reaktioner på ovanstående. Jag är givetvis beredd att kontakta för att framföra Ditt budskap.

*Med vänlig hälsning,
Björn Lyrvall*

Björn Lyrvall

ext:

Kabs

B Fredriksson, DOK

M Hallqvist, EC

L Olsson, EI/ESEK



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 ()

1997-09-26

Handläggare: Hans Magnusson

aa/p

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

(EC)

Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu

B R Å D S K A N D E

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Till: EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: Ei (Olson), ambassaden Moskva

Moskvaambassadens

P 2 Eu

Mitt Moskvabesök, har, som framgått av framförda önskemål, ett dubbelt syfte, att genomföra samtal dels med angivna personer utanför arbetsgruppen, dels med Vinogradov eller Kosatjev (eller annan tjänsteman i MID) diskutera utestående frågor och strategi. Det vore naturligtvis mycket värdefullt om Hallqvist hade möjlighet att delta. Hursomhelst vore det lämpligt om aide-mémoire kunde överlämnas åtminstone en vecka före samtalen.

Valet av tidpunkt för arbetsgruppmötet kräver noggranna överväganden. Idealet vore om det kunde hållas efter en positiv rysk respons på aide-mémoiren och arbetet redan befann sig en god bit på väg - annars finns det inte tillräckligt mycket att tala om. Slutet av oktober - som Makinen föreslår - torde vara för tidigt. Det är dock en poäng att ha det före Jeltsins besök i Sverige, alltså senast i månadsskiftet november-december. Men detta tål som sagt att diskuteras.

Magnusson

1997-09-29

Aambs Stefan Gullgren

a a / R

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

P L Fu⁺
EC

För: EC (Hallqvist)

Kopia: EI (Olson), rekryfax amb. Riga

h

Re Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bil.)

Närslutet bifogas en PM från middagssamtal Gullgren-
häromdagen om ryska reflektioner beträffande RW-ärendet.

funderingar uppges visserligen enligt honom själv vara
av "personlig natur" men är icke desto mindre tankeväckande.

Fredén och jag vill tillägga att vi inte är förundrade över
reflexion i p. 4 att "de utländska experterna" verkar ha
tagit över RW-utredningen från svenska UD. Det sätt på vilket
nya önskemål förmedlats till Moskva de senaste åren kan nog ha
gett ryssarna det intrycket, även om det i sak skulle vara fel.
Därför kan det nog vara lämpligt att svenska UD inför Jeltsin-
besöket "stärker sin profil" gentemot Moskva. Kanske behöver
ytterligare person-resurser tillföras RW-ärendet.

Hirdman

1997-09-26

Re Ryska reflektioner beträffande RW-ärendet

Under en middag i residenset häromdagen råkade jag hamna bredvid

, som volonterade ett flertal intressanta reflektioner från rysk horisont om Raoul Wallenberg-ärendet. En sammanfattning i punktform av vad hade att förtälja återfinns nedan.

underströk flera gånger med enfass att hans funderingar var strikt personliga och "ej för protokollet". Uttryckliga hänvisningar till dem i kommande samtal med honom och andra företrädare för den ryska sidan i utredningen bör därför undvikas.

1. lät förstå att man från rysk sida var angelägen om att "rensa bordet" i RW-ärendet inför Jeltsins statsbesök i Sverige i december. Mitt intryck efter vårt samtal är att såväl han som MID är under tryck att klara ut så många återstående delfrågor som möjligt avseende de sk historiska frågorna i god tid före statsbesöket. berörde även DC-3-ärendet, se hbrev Gullgren-Foyer 970925 härom).

2. Beträffande Susan Mesinais begäran att granska ett nittiototal persondossierer upplyste jag om att kompletterande underlag från Mesinai skulle komma att vidarebefordras till MID i dagarna (vilket nu har skett). lovade ombesörja att de nya upplysningarna når berörda parter på rysk sida.

3. Beträffande registerkorten i Vladimir frågade närmast ängsligt om några nya initiativ planerades från svensk sida. Jag nämnde att Marvin Mäkinen arbetade på att söka finna en undersökningsmetod som ej förutsatte kopiering och att vi troligen skulle återkomma i frågan inom kort. upprepade den ryska lagstiftningens krav på motivering för att tillstånd skulle kunna meddelas till en sådan undersökning, varpå jag replikerade med kända argument om undersökningsmetodik m m.

redovisade därpå en mer eller mindre personlig förklaring till svårigheterna att komma vidare i Vladimir-spåret. Som svar på min fråga härom förnekade att motståndet mot ytterligare undersökningar i Vladimir emanerade från högre nivå i MVD eller annorstädes (FSB var enligt honom överhuvudtaget inte inblandat). Istället var det så att det bland berörda arkivexperter på rysk sida helt enkelt inte fanns någon som trodde att undersökningarna i Vladimir skulle komma att leda till något resultat av betydelse för RW-utredningen. Allt som kunde göras hade redan gjorts och tyvärr hade arbetet ej lett till några intressanta resultat.

Arkivtjänstemännen i Vladimir var övertygade om att arkivet ej innehöll något av intresse. Det samma gällde en av nyckelpersonerna i MVD i Moskva, överste Tarakanov, som i sin tidigare kapacitet som chef för Vladimir-fängelset personligen deltagit i undersökningarna i fängelsearkivet 1990.

Den ryska sidans experter var således förvissade om att arkivet gått igenom grundligt. När nu den svenska sidan begärde att få göra egna undersökningar var det knappast konstigt om detta väckte irritation.


På min fråga om man kunde tänka sig ett nytt utgångsläge för Vladimir-undersökningarna om ansvaret för fängelser och häkten skulle komma att överföras från MVD till Justitieministeriet svarade nekande. Den ryska positionen var enbart grundad på arkivexperternas professionella bedömning och denna skulle ej komma att förändras av en sådan administrativ åtgärd.

4. Som en generell kommentar till RW-utredningen förklarade (med upprepade erinringar om att detta endast var hans personliga reflektioner som ej fick föras vidare) att den svenska sidan förmodligen gjort ett taktiskt misstag genom att i så hög grad förlita sig på de s k oberoende experterna.

I början av 1990-talet hade den svenska sidan i arbetsgruppen verkligen varit "svensk", med Hans Magnusson och Björn Lyrvall som främsta företrädare. Sedan dess verkade nästan alla frågor från svensk sida härröra från amerikaner, tyskar och nu senast kanadensare. Detta ledde till förundran på rysk sida. Var det i själva verket så att den egentliga "svenska" sidan tappat intresset för RW-utredningen och att frågan inte längre uppfattades som prioriterad?

Jag förklarade att det självfallet inte förhöll sig på det sättet. RW-utredningen var fortfarande prioriterad och vad angick de oberoende experterna var deras medverkan knappast någon nyhet för den ryska sidan. De hade ju deltagit i utredningen redan från första början. Det var dock ett faktum att UD självt saknade kapacitet att utföra omfattande arkivundersökningar, vilket de oberoende experterna, både utländska och ryska, istället förklarar sig villiga till. Det viktiga var nu att slutföra de undersökningar som påbörjats, inte minst för att stärka trovärdigheten hos såväl den svenska som den ryska sidans arbetsrapporter.

5. Vi enades om att ett möte med arbetsgruppen borde äga rum före Jeltsin-besöket. Beträffande lämplig tidpunkt föreslog början av november.



Stefan Gullgren



REGERINGSKANSLIET

1997-09-29

272/001
P 2 Eu

Utrikesdepartementet

E/ESEK

Lage Olson

Telefon 08 - 405 3280

Redaktör

Anita Begmark

Fischer & Co.


Norrlandsgatan 15

111 43 STOCKHOLM

Kära Anita,

Bok om Raoul Wallenbergs verksamhet i Budapest
(1 bil.)

De önskade översättningarna till svenska av sju kortare avsnitt på engelska, tyska resp. franska till "Förintelseboken" är nu färdiga och bifogas härmed jämte kopior av originalen.

Härblyg hälsningar
Din tillgivne

Lage Olson

Exp. 97-09-29

Postadress
103 39 STOCKHOLM

Telefon
08 - 405 10 00

E-post: ud@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE

Besöksadress
Gustav Adolfs Torg 1

Telefax
08 - 723 11 76

Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

Utrikesdepartementet

Stockholm 30.6.44.

Till Svenska beskickningen i Budapest.

Ni beordras snarast till riksföreståndaren Horthy framföra följande telegrafiska meddelande från Hans Majestät Konungen citat *i anledning av att jag har fått reda på Er regerings utomordentligt hårda och stränga åtgärder gentemot den judiska befolkningen i Ungern, tillåter jag mig att personligen vända mig till Er för att be Er att i mänsklighetens namn vidta åtgärder för de som fortfarande återstår att rädda av denna olyckliga ras. Denna vädjan till Ert generösa hjärta förestavas av min gamla vänskap för Ert land och av min uppriktiga oro för Ungerns goda anseende i nationernas gemenskap. Gustaf R. slut citat. Telegraferas.*

Copierat av skrivare
KGL. UTRIKES
DEPARTEMENTET

p till judarna i
nn.

STOCKHOLM

30.6.44.

~~No~~ ~~inlämnat~~ ~~Schiffer~~ ~~Bl~~

~~Inv. D. N:o~~

~~AVD. CR. MAL~~

~~HP 21 22~~

Schwedische Gesandtschaft

Budapest

Ni beordras snarast till riksföreståndaren

x Horthy framföra följande telegrafiska meddelande från

*Översiktligt
författat*

Hans Majestät Konungen citat ayant appris les mesures
extrêmement dures et sévères de votre Gouvernement vis à
vis de la population juive en Hongrie je me permets de
m'adresser personnellement à Votre Altesse pour La prier
au nom de l'humanité de prendre des mesures en faveur de
ceux qui restent encore à sauver de cette race malheureuse.
Cet appel à Votre coeur généreux est dicté par mes vieilles
sentiments d'amitié pour Votre pays et par mes soucis
sincères pour la bonne réputation de la Hongrie dans la
communauté des nations. Gustaf R. slut citat. Telegrafarna

x? Ärtul: + belegend.

S
Miklo Horthy von Nagybánya, ungersk riksföreståndare 1920-44. Konservativ
politiker, hade 1919 störtat Béla Kuns kommunistregering. Stod under andra
världskriget på Tysklands sida men avstttes av tyskarna när han i oktober 1944
sökte separatfred med Sovjetunionen. ?

Till Hans Excellens Christian Günther,
Utrikesminister,
Stockholm.

Stockholm, Sverige den 2 september 1944.

Ers Excellens,

Jag har äran att meddela Ers Excellens att jag av min regering har mottagit instruktion att till Sveriges regering uttrycka Utrikesdepartementets och Krigsflyktingbyråns utomordentliga uppskattning av de ovärderliga humanitära tjänster som Sveriges regering har gjort i samband med den ungerska situationen.

Mottag, Ers Excellens, min förnyade försäkran om min utomordentliga högaktning.

Herschel V. Johnson.

No. 518

Stockholm, Sweden,
September 2, 1944.

INK. EXCHANGES
D. No. 2501445
SEP 1944
HP 21 Lu

Excellency:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that

I have received instructions from my Government to express to the Government of Sweden the utmost appreciation of the Department of State and the War Refugee Board for the invaluable humanitarian services rendered by the Government of Sweden in connection with the Hungarian situation.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Herschel V. Johnson
Herschel V. Johnson. X

His Excellency

Christian Günther,

Royal Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Stockholm.

Fahrt 1. vers. 11-2
+ övers. Fäkte

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Stockholm den 5 september 1944.

Herr Minister,

Ni har i Er skrivelse den 2 september 1944 haft vänligheten att till Sveriges regering framföra Er regerings uppskattning för Sveriges humanitära bistånd till Ungerns judar.

I min regerings namn har jag äran att be Er att till Förenta staternas regering framföra dess mest uppriktiga tack för det vänliga meddelandet.

Mottag, Herr Minister, min förnyade försäkran om min utomordentliga högaktning.

Günther.

Till herr Herschel V. Johnson,

Amerikas förenta staters utomordentliga sändebud och befullmäktigade minister etc.
etc. etc.

TEMENTET

eriges hjälp åt
a judar.

ungerish

STOCKHOLM

79

Stockholm, September 5, 1944.

N:o

564

Bt

INK. D. No

250/445

AVD.

GR.

MIL.

IS

21

Eu

Mr. Minister,

With your letter of the 2nd of September 1944 you have been good enough to forward to the Government of Sweden your Government's kind appreciation for Sweden's humanitarian aid to the Jews of Hungary.

In the name of my Government I have the honour to ask you to convey to the Government of the United States their most sincere thanks for this kind message.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Günther.

schel V. Johnson Esq.,

oy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary

the United States of America etc. etc. etc.

F. H. Overstr.

Telegram i chiffer från Kungl. Maj:ts beskickning i Budapest den 15.10.1944.

Utrikesministern anmodade mig klockan två att via Sveriges regering till regeringarna i USA, Storbritannien och Nordirland och de Förenade rådsrepublikernas union framföra följande meddelande:

"Ungerska regeringen har beslutat att upphöra med fientligheterna mot de förenade nationerna och ber regeringarna i Amerikas förenta stater, Storbritannien och Nordirland och Sovjetunionen att meddela den var och när ungerska regeringens befullmäktigade ombud skulle kunna tas emot för att sluta fördrag om vapenstillestånd. Samtidigt vänder sig den ungerska armén till den sovjetiska arméns överkommando för att bestämma de former under [vilka] ett omedelbart upphörande av fientligheterna skulle kunna äga rum."

Danielsson.

Översättning 38
OBS!
volym 58

Stillestånd frist

INK. UTRIKES DEPT	
D. No 5:0	421
16 OKT. 1944	
AVD. 1	2
HP	Se

Telegram i chiffer från
 Kungl. Maj:ts Beskickning

i Budapest den 15/10
 1944, kl. 16.10 m.
 Inlände den 15/10 kl. 21.00 m.

Fotnot: 8 plulius
Anger den reserigen
skrivet ang 19-
per stillaständ texter
avfatta på papper.
Der ha vidarebefad-
14th i sub. D. till
14D, 14th. 8

Översättning i förhållande!!

Le ministre des Affaires Etrangères me a deux heures prié de faire parvenir par l'entremise du Gouvernement Suédois aux Gouvernements des Etats Unis d'Amérique, de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande du Nord et de l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques le message suivant;
 "Le Gouvernement Hongrois a décidé de faire cesser les hostilités contre les nations unies et prie les Gouvernements des Etats Unis d'Amérique, de la Grande Bretagne et de l'Irlande du Nord et de l'URSS de bien vouloir lui communiquer où et quand les plénipotentiaires du Gouvernement Hongrois pourraient être reçus en vue de la conclusion du traité d'armistice. En même temps le haut commandement de l'armée hongroise s'adresse au haut commandement de l'armée soviétique pour régler les modalités dans lesquelles la conclusion immédiate des hostilités pourrait avoir lieu."

Danielsson

Fatnot: Översätt.

Till 14D, 14th.
4. 14D, 14th. 8
Anger den reserigen
skrivet ang 19-
per stillaständ texter
avfatta på papper.
Der ha vidarebefad-
14th i sub. D. till
14D, 14th. 8

Telegram i chiffer från Kungl. Maj:ts beskickning i Budapest den 15.11.1944 kl. 14.

Vid möte idag [...] med orden "*skulle vara glad att inleda såväl officiella som personliga relationer med Ers Excellens*". [...]

Danielsson.

Telegram i chiffer från
Kungl. Maj:ts Beskickning

i Budapest den 15/11
1944, kt. 1400 m.

~~Antände den 15/11 kt. 1930 m.~~

~~Skrivet i 2 ex.~~

Vid möte i dag hos nuntien för utarbe-
tande av ny gemensam protestnot från
neutrala representationer mot regeringens
utrotelsepolitik mot judar, meddelar
spanske chargé d'affaires, som uppskju-
tit sin avresa, då ryska hotet mot Buda-
pest något lättat, att han i dag mottagit
instruktion från spanska regeringen att
besvara nya ungerska regeringens notifi-
kationsskrivelse bl. a. med orden "serai
heureux d'entrer en relations tant offi-
cielles que personnelles avec Votre Excel-
lence". Detta i avsikt att underlätta den
spanska juderäddningsaktionen. I Madrid
hade den senaste Horthyrepresentanten
förklarat sig villig representera Szala-
siregeringen tills efterträdarens ankomst
vilket accepterats av spanska regeringen.

Danielsson.

x 2

Futur

x överikt

Avskrift.

ORDFÖRANDENS KANSLI
KRIGSFLYKTINGBYRÅN
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

VERKSTÄLLANDE DIREKTÖRENS KANSLI.

Den 6 december 1944.

Bäste herr Wallenberg,

Genom amerikanske ministern i Stockholm och herr Iver Olsen har Krigsflyktingbyrån hållits noga underrättad om Ert svåra och betydelsefulla arbete för att lindra det judiska folkets situation i Ungern. Vi har med stort intresse följt rapporterna om de åtgärder Ni har vidtagit för att utföra Ert uppdrag och om Ert personliga engagemang för att rädda och skydda de oskyldiga offren för naziförföljelsen.

Jag tror inte att någon som har deltagit i denna stora uppgift kan undgå en känsla av besvikelse över att omständigheter utanför vår kontroll har gjort att våra ansträngningar inte har varit helt framgångsrika. Å andra sidan har resultaten varit betydande med tanke på de hinder man har stött på, och vi är övertygade om att Ni har lämnat ett mycket stort personligt bidrag till den framgång som har uppnåtts i dessa strävanden.

På Krigsflyktingbyråns vägnar vill jag till Er uttrycka vår djupa uppskattning för Er lysande medverkan och för den energi och sinnrikhet som Ni har lämnat till vårt gemensamma humanitära företag.

Er mycket tillgivne,
J. W. Pehle,
verkställande direktör.

Herr Raoul Wallenberg, Sveriges Utrikesdepartement, Stockholm, Sverige.

7
Avskrift.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WAR REFUGEE BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES DIRECTOR.

Dec 6 1944.

My dear Mr. Wallenberg:

Through the American Minister in Stockholm and Mr. Iver Olsen, the War Refugee Board has kept closely informed of the difficult and important work you have been doing to alleviate the situation of the Jewish people in Hungary. We have followed with keen interest the reports of the steps which you have taken to accomplish your mission and the personal devotion which you have given to saving and protecting the innocent victims of Nazi persecution.

I think that no one who has participated in this great task can escape some feeling of frustration in that, because of circumstances beyond our control, our efforts have not met with complete success. On the other hand, there have been measurable achievements in the face of the obstacles which had to be encountered, and it is our conviction that you have made a very great personal contribution to the success which has been realized in these endeavors.

On behalf of the War Refugee Board I wish to express to you our very deep appreciation for your splendid cooperation and for the vigor and ingenuity which you brought to our common humanitarian undertaking.

Very truly yours,
(undert.) J.W. Pehle
Executive Director.

Raoul Wallenberg,
Swedish Foreign Office,
Stockholm, Sweden.

Brev till utrikesrådet E. von Post, Stockholm
Berlin p.t. Alt Döbern den 23 december 1944


rad 9: "Öfters" = upprepade gånger

rad 10: "Judenbüro" = judekontor

rad 12 ff = ... på ett alltigenom ovanligt sätt
engagerat sig för de ungerska judar som beordrats
till arbetstjänst vid gränsen; faktum är också att
försök gjorts att med helt och hållet illegala
medel undandra dessa judar från den lagstadgade
arbetsplikten genom att dela ut skyddspass till
dem.

(Handbrev)

KUNGL.
BESKICKNINGEN



Berlin p.t. Alt Döbern den 23 december 1944

Strängt förtroligt

62

?

Handbrev

Solger

REG

1778		
1778	30/12	B74
1778	30/12	B74
P/2		
(H/P 21 befäl)		

Broder,

I anslutning till mitt handbrev den 17 de förra veckan betet mot svenska Budapestbeskickningen ber jag härmed tillkänna, att envoyé-én von Erdmannsdorff i dag omtalat, att man nu mottagit svar från Budapest i anledning av det telegram, som i förra veckan expedierades från Auswärtiges Amt. I svaret hade ej bestritts, att yttranden i den riktning som av oss angivits (om att "judisken" Wallenberg komme att skjutas) kunde ha fällits, men framhållits, att dessa i så fall självfallet ej vore att ta på allvar. De borde emellertid ses mot bakgrunden av att anledning till kritik "öfters" förelagat mot svenska Budapestbeskickningens "Judenbüro", och alldeles särskilt mot legationssekreteraren Wallenberg, som (för att ordagrant citera telegrammet) "sich in durchaus unüblicher Weise für ungarische Juden eingesetzt hat die zum Grenzärbeitsdienst eingezogen waren; es steht auch fest dass dabei mit absolut illegalen Mitteln versucht worden ist diese Juden unter Verteilung von Schutzpässen der gesetzlich festgelegten Arbeitsverpflichtung zu entziehen."

Herr von Erdmannsdorff var angelägen om att detta i objektivitetens intresse skulle framföras till Stockholm, vilket jag lovade med framhållande av att vad som från ungarskt regeringshåll så vore att säga särskilt om herr Wallenbergs verksamhet vid vår Budapestbeskickning, så kunde detta dock under inga förhållanden ursäktas sådana yttranden som här fällits, vilket herr von Erdmannsdorff naturligtvis utan vidare medgav. Jag framhöll också, i vilket svårt

rikesrådet E. von P o s t,
S t o c k h o l m.

10 ven 16 i juni 45



SVERIGESAMBASSAD
RIGA

Sid 1 (2)

1997-09-30

Handläggare: H Magnusson

aa/p

(EC)

Grupp	1/2
2	Eu'

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET :

Till: EC(Hallqvist)
Kopia: EI(Olson), amb Moskva

Re Raoul Wallenberg
amb Moskva 1997-09-29

Jag har med intresse tagit del av promemorian med K kommentarer eller snarare reflektioner över RW-ärendet och är inte heller förvånad över vad som kommer fram. Liknande synpunkter har i varje fall antytts av och till de senaste två åren.

Det är ju en riktig iakttagelse att de s k oberoende experterna dominerar agendan mer idag än tidigare, men detta är en ganska naturlig följd av ärendets utveckling och även av arbetsfördelningen. Det är en utveckling som har skett i takt med att de ursprungliga huvudspåren -intervjuer och arkivgenomgångar i centralarkiven- i stort sett följts i botten. Det är ju egentligen bara i avsaknad av det avgörande, övertygande beviset om RW:s öde som vi känner oss tvingade att genomföra mer perifera undersökningar. Även ryska sidan måste dock vara medveten om de trovärdighetsproblem arbetsgruppen, och därmed de svenska och ryska regeringarna har att brottas med när rapporterna skall publiceras. Det måste därför i grund och botten också vara ett ryskt intresse att kunna redovisa en så gedigen och heltäckande undersökning som möjligt. Allt som därför rimligen fortfarande kan göras, bör också göras. Det betyder inte att jag(eller de andra) nödvändigtvis skulle ha så mycket större förhoppningar än ryska arkivtjänstemän att undersökningarna kommer att leda till något påtagligt resultat - annat än i bästa fall(och det är inte helt oviktigt) att ytterligare vittnesmål och teorier kan avföras från listan.

Adress

Telefon

Telefax

Telex

Att ryska sidan hela tiden, eller i varje fall
tidvis, velat se undersökningen som en bilateral
svensk-rysk historia och haft svårt att förlika sig
med deltagandet av tredjelandsexperter är också sant.
Jag menar dock, och har flera gånger framfört, att
det är orimligt och "self-defeating" att hantera RW-
ärendet som en rent bilateral affär. RW är en gång
för alla en internationell personlighet, som så att
säga "tillhör mänskligheten". Det internationella
engagemang hans insatser i Ungern och vidare öde
väckt måste respekteras. I slutändan kommer det att
vara en styrka för arbetsgruppen att kunna hänvisa
till oberoende internationella experters medverkan,
även om det på vägen ofta kan förefalla besvärligt
och struligt.

MAGNUSSON

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

Sid. 1 (1) /

1997-09-30

Aamb's Anders Wallberg

aa/r

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

Avd.	Grupp	Mär
P	2	Eu'

För: UD-EC (Hallqvist)✓

Kopia: UD-EI (Olson), :

amb Riga (Magnusson)✓

Re Raoul Wallenberg

Elpost Makinen-Hallqvist 1997-08-29

Ambassaden erhöill vid det senaste arbetsgruppsmötet en kopia av elpost från Marwin W. Makinen till Hallqvist och Olson med förslag till nytt tillvägagångssätt för erhållande av information från registerkort i Vladimir-fängelset.

Någon instrux från departementet mot bakgrund av ovanstående har ännu ej inkommit, men vi förmodar att tanken är att vi skall överlämna en ny begäran till den ryska sidan. Vi utgår från att detta passar in i de överväganden om Wallenberg-ärendet som görs inför Jeltsins besök i december.

Av Makinens brev framgår fyra alternativa undersökningsmetoder. Vilken av dessa bör framföras? Metodbeskrivningarna är i sin nuvarande form komplicerade och kan lätt misstolkas. Tacksam om den metod som väljs omformuleras inför en hänvändelse till den ryska sidan.

HIRDMAN

746 UD 30/9/97

Carl G Persson
Krokvägen 6
182 74 STOCKSUND

Stocksund 1997-09-30

Kopia till:

Susanne Berger,
(Arlington, VA, USA)

exp. 97-10-14

273/004

09-30

~~10-1~~

P 2 Eu¹

Ambassadör Lage Olson
Utrikesdepartementet

Carla.
I min bok år 1990 "Utan Omsvep" behandlade jag fallet Raoul Wallenberg och återopade därvid en del anteckningar och några promemorior av Otto Danielsson om Carl Gustaf Svingel i Berlin.

Guy (= Susanne Berger) har nu i mycket påstridig ton krävt att få läsa mina anteckningar.

Då jag anser att det inte är "de amerikanska damerna" som skall styra vår utredning, överlämnar jag härmed i stället kopior av handlingarna till Dig.

Guy efterlyser vidare en handling från den 24 augusti 1974 angående Svingel. Det enda jag kan finna är bifogade lapp där det med blyerts står antecknat 17 september 1974 med frågetecken efter.

Guy (Susanne Berger) har nu fått för sig att historien med Svingel är av avgörande betydelse, men Svingel hade ju aldrig något substansieellt att komma med och han vägrade dessutom att svara på frågor. Han vägrade också att träffa mig vid ett tillfälle då han besökte Stockholm. Hans största ambition var ju att få ett diplomatpass! Ärendet handlades inom UD av Sven Backlund, då generalkonsul i Berlin.

Hälsningar

Carl G. Persson
Carl G. Persson

P. m.

C.F.V.

Den 15 Mars 1966 kl. 10:00 hade Rpe
och undertecknad blivit kallade till sam-
manträde inför stats- och utrikesministrar-
na för att diskutera fallet Orel.

Värdarande: de båda sakkunniga: justiti-
och utrikesministern, Kon. sek. Belfrage
och utrikesrådet Hihens-Bergström samt
General Konsul Backlund.

Belfrage gav en kort resumé, och
sedan diskuterades Sv:s person. ~~Det visade~~
~~sig, att Klump överlämnade sig konung,~~

~~Klump har redan förvisat Klump Berlin på något sätt~~
~~och att Klump var en sprucken operatör~~
~~och att Klump var en sprucken operatör~~
~~och att Klump var en sprucken operatör~~

På uppdrag av Rpe drog undertecknad tidigare
Kända fall, där Sovjetunionen inlett
spel i och för utbyte. Det bäst dokumente-
rade fallet Boel-Powers redovisades
med hänvisning till boken "Strafgeron a
bridge", vilken bok lästs av Belfrage. Vidare
nämndes fallet dousdale alias Molodt
och utbytet mot Wynne. Det tredje fallet
Gerald Brooke Loutha parets Kroger alias
Cohen, som är under utredning, nämndes
vidare med hänvisning till franska Dagbla-
dets art. av d. 13/3 1966.

Beträffande Orel nämnde jag, att Sovjet unio-
nen kan lyra förhandlingsfri om att på ett
konsum, så ja kommer det enligt egen

utsaga är sovjetisk medborgare, har rykt general-
titel och kan få en hög sovjet lön. Jag påpe-
skade det vänd att om händer tagande från sovjé-
tiska sida av Orel måste innebära. Om flori-
feiran Jorge och Abel. Vilken för trening
har inte sovjet, så det gäller att övertyga tvåkande
blivande agenter. Man kan så peka på deras
flotta gest att taga hand om sina agenter.
Sovjetunionen vinner aldrig.

Rpe påpekade det nära nog slakta spelöppning
en i fallen Abel och Orel.

Belpage gav en utförligare berättelse om
hur Donovan följande, och att den att typen
advokaten Vogel figurerade i båda fallen.

Rpe påpekade ytterligare, att man måste
se ansvarigt på erbjudandet. Han om X:et
på den tyska sidan aldrig medgivit, att bytes-
objektet mot Orel skulle kunna vara RW.
utan tvärtom - enligt Sv. - förklarat.
"He does not exist", så både i saken med
att det trots allt kunde vara RW, som var det
av X. tänkte bytes objektet. (I detta samman-
hang bör påpekas, att det kunde stå klart för envar,
som är bevakad i den sovjetiska allmaktens mys-
terier, att det givetvis är otänkbart, att Sv. skall
ha fått ett några gånger i den "Känslosp"
som X:et i Berlin försökt starta).

Rpe påpekade vidare, att det av X:et inleda
försöket nog borde ses mot bakgrunden av
tidigare försök; ex. vis förfäringarna till

Dark-Holst. i Moskva 1946 och vetenskapsman-
nens medgivande till professor Hanna Aretz.

McC. Berlander frågade om Kling, vilka
föresattningar som kunde följnas beträffande
"ett lämnande" av orol. Kling förklarade,
att enda utvägen vore benädhets, och
sedan lämnade han en redogörelse för möjlig
utvärdering av enligt lagens ~~best~~ bestämmelser
få permissionen resp. villkoret frigiv-
ning.

Fråga uppstod sedan, om icke Sv. borde
höras av erfaren polisman. Denna fråga
avböjdes bestämt av Rpt och underteck-
nat. (Här här igen påpekas, att X:et ep-
istvis ej givit Sv. några detaljer. Det
skulle helt strida mot allt vad erfaren-
heten lärt ut. En pokerspelare av den
kalibern vi här har att göra med, visar varken
sina kort eller låter minspelat röja tan-
karna).

Det framstod för undertecknat som om McC
Berlander och Wilsson samt Berfrage
och Backlund redan före sammankommet
kommit till en slutsats, att icke några
på den utkastade kroken? och efter någon kort
tare diskussion stod denna tankegång klar.
Från Rpt:s och min sida framträdde, att det
lästa vore, om någon från myndigheterna
fristående person kunde äka med och kan
lämna svärgel om föra förhandlingar på
någon annan sätt som advokaten

4). Samman gjordes i Abel-fallet.

Detta förslag avisades, och man resolverade, att ingenting skulle göras f. n.; emellertid man räknade med att främling och hans uppdrag, givare nog komme igen.


Från undertecknads sida påpekades, att man kunde räkna med, att främling finge i uppdrag att kontaktera Rikets med eller familjen W. — "Ja, det vore ju bra," replikerade Berlander. Jag påpekade då, att en större chance att byta loss, om familjen finge reda på, att myndigheterna icke tagit emot det fränsträckt främling. Det till Berlander med en, men det fattade beslutet om att ingenting göra för att rensa upp det stora fästet.

Frågan var också uppe, om man icke måste räkna med, att främling skulle räknas med, att han utbytesobjekt mot Orel "ta" någon helt oskyldig" och att man, om man började hundra förhandlingar därmed, skulle till en sådan våldsåtgärd från de sovjetiska myndigheterna vara sista. Rysk påpekade då, att den möjligheten var ju sovjetmyndigheterna vilken var som helst, och att de alltså beträffade något incitament av dylikt art. K. K. Nilsson sade sig vara fäst på det klara med, att de sovjetiska

3) Myndigheterna icke skulle dra sig för att vid-
taga en sådan åtgärd.

Frågan är, om icke denna skräckteori redan
från början skisserats ty redan Backlund var
vit siel samtal med Rysse och undersökarna
någon på tankegången i det att Backlund sade
"Som kan ju mycket väl tänkas arresteras någon
generaldirektor under någon förevändning och
ha honom som utbytte."

Tusen tycktes beleyra sig om, att, som
Rysse efteråt uttryckte det, en oskyldig
fortvinar i Sovjetiska Fängelser sedan
2 1 år till baka.



Adr. Frynäs väg. 16; utang. Bräntenna-
C. M. Tel. 0167 20389. (Marta Skola)

Över samtal med herr Carl Gustaf Fringel
fredagen den 5 augusti 1966.

Före incidenten med pastör Jansson i Berlin; då
pastör Arnold Häktars hade Fringel icke
haft något med "transiteringen" i Berlin
att göra. Sedan pastör Jansson gjort en del
vidlyftiga uttalanden hade en person från öst sidan
sökt kontakt med ^{en person i Västerås som} Fringel om att komma försö-
ka dämpa Janssons uttalanden. Om denna
aktivitet vetat, vet ej Fringel, men affären
skedd hade i varje fall varit något mindre tillfred-
ställande.

Därefter har Fringel varit verksam i
vissa utväxlingar ^{och prövningar på öst} mellan öst och väst. Vilka
kontaktman Fringel haft vid östra utväx-
lingar vill han på grund av tåmlöst typ
hetslöfte icke nämna vid namn. Men
en viss tysk advokat i Öst-Berlin är av in-
teresse i sammanhanget, tryckte jag på att
detta namn borde stannas, men Fringel
vill icke heller i detta fall nämna något
namn. I fortsättningen kommer jag
därför att nämna ~~den öst-tyska~~ kontakt-
mannen som "öckrepresentanten" plus
en mer eller mindre ring.

Tidigt på våren 1964 hade en person från
"Väst" sökt upp Fringel om ett om hjälp
för en i väst väl känd persons påkänning.
Denne man - en professor - hade anlit-
regat Bear i Öst-Tyskland. Efter förhandlingar
med öst-tyska myndigheter - de projektiska
myndigheterna stegrade sig - hade det

lykats för Frängel att få ut Professorens autografer
under tiden fram till hösten 1965 hade andra
fall lösts på liknande sätt. Något som helst som
arbetet med Svenska Konsulatet i Berlin hade
Frängel inte haft för lösaandet av dessa upp-
gifter.

Någon gång under hösten 1965 sammankom
jag och Frängel med en person, som var be-
traktad som art-representanten nr 1. Förhan-
dingar hade forts om ett utväxlingsfall
och vid slutet av dessa förhandlingar hade
östrepsentanten nr 1 frågat:

"Tror ni, att Svenska regeringen skulle vara
intresserad av en 'utväxling' av Wenner-
ström?" —

Jag bad här Frängel tänka efter noggrant,
som "utväxling" var ~~en~~ ^{en} beaktat överstätt-
ning ^{från} ~~en~~ det språk, på vilket östrepsen-
tanten uttryckt sig. På samtaleet hade
jag forts på Svenska utgick jag ifrån med Kan-
nedom om generalkonsul Bruckners re-
sultat.

Frängel ville inte yttra sig om på vilket
språk samtaleet forts, men efter en stund
frunderade jag honom, att östrepsentan-
ten, just ansett mot svarigheten till "ut-
växling".

De östrepsentanten kastade fram denna fråga,
hade Frängel tagit det som ett stort
skämt och i samma skämt samma ton
hade Frängel sagt: "Ge oss Wallenberg!"
Östrepsentanten hade då på nytt upprepat
sin fråga: "Tror ni, att Svenska regeringen

Skulle vara intresserad av en "utväxling" av Wen-
nerströms?"

Denne gång förstod Frängel att östrepräsen-
tanten menade fullt allvar.

Frängel i sin tur sade: "Ge oss Wallenberg!"

— eller möjligen: "Varfanns Wallenberg?"
* Östrepräsentanten svarade: "Jag återkom-
mer!"

Mera yttrades icke i denna sak vid detta
teefälle.

Ge sköt här in en fråga, om någon an-
dren representant var närvarande från
Östs sida, då denna replikväxling tog
form. Frängel genmälde, att han på grund
av tystnad liksom icke ville beröra frågan.

Tidpunkten för replikskiftet var Frängel
icke närmare bestämd. Det måste ha
varit någon gång under februari 1965,
möjligen några veckor före julen.

Med anledning av östrepräsentansens fråga
had Frängel tagit kontakt med Back-
lund och uttalat att redovisning för östreprä-
sentansens fråga, ställs en förfrågan,
om Backlund kunde utrika, att Frängel
finge ett personligt samtal med utrikes-
ministern eller statsministern, vilka
båda herrar Frängel tärt kände under
deras besök i Berlin.

Backlund hade förklarat, att det icke fanns
stora utsikter för ett personligt samtal med
utrikesministern, om icke anledet att
kunna avgivas.

De därpå följande hade Frängel nämnt

ärendets art och affären hade fått codnamnet
"Jacobson-Jensen". Utrikesministeren hade
beslutat ett personligt sammankommande
och Aringel hade troligen i februari 1966
gett till Stockholm och inget utrikesminis-
terien redogjort för öst-representantens
fråga.

Någon gång på vintern 1966 hade en annan
östrepresentant - här kallad östrepresen-
tant nr 2 - på nytt tagit upp frågan
om Wernnerström. Först förklarade
om han erinrade sig ordalydelsen - han
har inte vid något tillfälle gjort några
som helst antagningar - hade öst-
representant nr 2:

"Jag återkommer till fallet Wernner-
ström och har fullmakt att förhandla
med för."

Detta sammankommande ägde liksom det
förra rum på östtypiskt berråde.

Här gör Aringel ett tillägg beträffande
sammankommandet med östrepresentan-
ten nr 1. - Denne hade på Aringels
fråga om Wallenberg svarat: "Han
lever inte". (Detta hade givits vid ett samtal nr 2
med repr. nr 1.)

Så östrepresentanten nr 2 framförde till
ovan citerade meddelande hade Aringel
troligen frågat: "Var finns Wallenberg?"
- Östrepresentanten nr 2 hade då
replikerat:

"Fråga först om intresse från svensk
sida."

2/12/66 i ett på stället med egen förs. på återkommande till Wernnerström.
"Wallenberg lever inte". Nu hade de sagt "Jag vet inte, det kan ju vara".
Någon höglj. fr. nr 1.

24/2-66

En studie ut i det okända.

- 1) Kan det ligga något i S:s erbjudande eller rättar
Sagt X:s genom S. gjorda erbjudande?
- 2) Kan uppdragsgivaren bakom X. verkligen mena,
att "man" är beredd att köpa Orel för genom
att bjuda på RM?
- 3) Kan "man" verkligen tro, att transaktionen skulle
släppa ut Orel?
- 4) Varför skulle "man" vilja köpa Orel?
- 5) Kan Orel verkligen vara värd något ur "manns"
synpunkt?
- 6) Vilka risker löper "vi", om "vi" köper
Orel?

- Jag skall här försöka ge svar på dessa frågor,
varvid jag öppet medger, att jag för det första,
ej är någon matematiker, som är van vid att
känna med "obekanta" och för det andra står
det klart för mig, att den som ställer upp talen
icke lyder under vanliga matematiska regler uti
synsket väl kan påstå, att 2×2 blir sex eller
3 i stället för vårt vanliga 4.
- Till fråga 1. Svaret blir ett obetvingat "ja".
För "Strangers on a Bridge." Under hela
förhandlings tiden träddes den verkliga upp-

dragsvären aldrig fram. Skäl vidtogs icke av
sovjettunionen, varken såsom varande ryss eller
som att ha arbetat för sovjets u-väsen. Nej, till
tjugarna - de våra anhålls-brev kom alls icke
från sovjettunionen utan från Öst-Tyskland, och
de förhandlingar inleddes mellan honom blev
ett förhandlingar i Öst-Berlin, där dels en öst-
tysk förhandlare och dels den mäktige sovjettiske
KGB-mannen agerade.

Tus fråga 2. Svaret på denna fråga blir tväret obe-
tingat "ja". Vi måste komma ihåg att Orel på all-
var förklarats, att han blivit korad sovjettiskt med-
borgarskap och att han som tack för gjorda tjänster
konstade han sovjettiskt medborgarskap. Prof. Andru-
na som sovjettisk tack och att Orel påstod sig
ha befordrats till sovjettisk general. Orel be-
trakts säkerligen såsom mycket värdfull av
sovjett, och för att få ut en sådan värdfull
person, måste man ge en förtjänst med ett
verkligt fett fläsk - eller oststycke.

Tus fråga 3. Svaret blir även här lika obetingat "ja".
Sovjet riket har Orel som sin landman. Han
har ju fått hög titel, högt honorar, höga ädnen
och sovjettiskt medborgarskap; på var för honom
önskar man vilja föra en sådan förskämd utlän-
ning. Tre år har snart gått sedan förskämden
avslutades och de flesta militära skadorna

1. Har man försökt reparera och för övrigt så har
tillnått så fort fram, att var som avslöjades ha
icke längre aktualitet - alltså kan icke heller den sym-
fonikten utgöra något hinder för att utlämnas
de.

Till fråga 4. Denne fråga är icke lika lätt att be-
svara uttömmande. Det närmast till hands
liggande svaret är, att man nu börjat glorificera
sina "hjältar". Från att tidigare ha förnekat att
all kända som Abel och att han var deras lands-
man har man nu inte bara accepterat honom
som landsman utan förklarat honom vara förfä-
rnadens hjälte. Men åtnjuter han sin väl-
förtjänta pension. Till exempel som Abel nu glori-
fieras så blir George Eastman förklarad som en
nationalhjälte. Lonsdale alias Molody utval-
lades och en bok - visserligen icke skriven på
det egna språket - har utgivits, i vilket Molody
skildras som den smarte spionen, som varade
både Amerikas och Englands kända spionage.
Man kan visserligen säga, att Orel icke i likhet
med Abel och Molody var så ståndaktig, att
han lyckades hålla tätt utan att skända, men om
man nu lyckas få ut honom från Sverige, vil-
ken fin triumf får man då icke, när det gäller
att väva andra agenter - "Titta på Orel!" Ser
du icke hur väl vi verkligen förför för oss,
som arbetar här för ett oss? Du riskerar på
sin höjd ett par års humanitärt fängelse, och ta-
kar vi ut dig och lyller dig som hjälte. Ar

Det icke något att kämpa för? ²

Till fråga 5. Denna fråga kan lika lätt som de 3 första besvaras med ett vårt nog obetydligt "ja". - Vilket naturligt triumfiskt blir icke Anne Orel, om han kan gå upptäcka som radio-kommentator och skribent. Vi ha alltså en fullständig bild av hela det världsuttryck, som "Generalen" gav honom, väl att märka sig för "egen" käckning utan för andras. Åh, vilket "härligt" utpressningsmedel kan man tydligen låta sovjeterna utropa. I varje fall blir det ett "härligt" propagandamedel.

Till fråga 6. Risterna ligger helt inom det område, som diskuteras i svaret till fråga 5. Skall vi då avstå från förhandsutrop? - Tyskland. Risterna ja vi ta med alla ovissheter. De bli bara sljutna lite grann påsumtiden. Då Orel får permission andra gånger väntar honom en u-båt, som för honom till hans drömmars land. Låt oss därför sluta en, ty om vi ja ut byter objektet så vill vi icke helt utan tämligen goda trumpfar.

24/2 66

2

17/9-74, 2
Angående Raoul WALLENBERG-ärendet.

Enär Carl-Gustaf SVINGEL för några dagar sedan per telefon hört av sig till f.byråshefen Otto Danielssons bostad med begäran om att denne skulle ta kontakt med SVINGEL anmodades undertecknad att telefonledes kontakta SVINGEL eftersom Otto Danielsson för närvarande sedan en månad tillbaka är intagen på sjukhus.

Detta skedde måndagen den 16.9.1974 vid 19-tiden. SVINGEL nåddes på det uppgivna telefonnumret i Berlin - 00949/308869070. Först svarade en tysktalande dam därefter SVINGEL själv. Han trodde först att det var Otto Danielsson som ringde och då så ej var fallet blev SVINGEL tveksam om han kunde framföra sitt ärende. Sedan jag förklarat skälet varför Otto Danielsson icke personligen kunde höra av sig och förklarat vem jag var och att jag var informerad om SVINGELs tidigare kontakt med Otto Danielsson förstod SVINGEL att han kunde framföra sitt ärende och därvid bli rätt uppfattad.

SVINGEL berättade - utan att nämna några namn - att han nyligen träffat en av de tidigare omnämnda östrepresentanterna. Denne hade därvid frågat om det verkligen var sant som tidningspressen uppgivit att den man som de tidigare talat om inom kort skulle frigges - härmed avsågs uppenbarligen den i Sverige dömda spionen Stig WENNERSTRÖM. Då SVINGEL bejakade detta ansåg östrepresentanten att detta förfarande var märkligt. Därigenom ointetgjordes den tidigare diskuterade planen - därmed avsågs uppenbarligen en tidigare omnämnd tänkbar utväkling av Raoul WALLENBERG mot Stig WENNERSTRÖM. Efter WENNERSTRÖMS frigivning kunde östsidan - om så önskades - erhålla WENNERSTRÖM utan motprestation.

På fråga uppgav SVINGEL att han icke inom överskådlig tid planerade någon resa till Sverige. I sitt arbete inom "stiftelsen" i Berlin har han under senare tid fått allt mindre anledning till hemlandsbesök.

På slutlig fråga om skälet till hans omnämnande av Lübeck som en aktuell ort för några år sedan lämnade SVINGEL ej något svar.

vill kont.

W frigges

18/9-74

Crans pios
tid

R

To: Mrs. Irene S. B. Anderson
Counsellor
Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosí Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest
Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

aa

INK. M.B. BUDAPEST		
D. No. 16/337		
1997.09.30		
AVD.	GR.	MAL.
<i>R</i>	18	<i>Wallenberg</i>

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Budapest 1997-10-02

Överlämnas av Ambassaden i Buda-
pest till Ambassadör Martin
Hallqvist, UD EC-3.

Уважаемая госпожа Ирене Андерсон,

направляю Вам мои биографические данные, составленные мною 17 сентября 1997 года, когда я вернулась в Москву из Будапешта.

“Отец” - Драгульский Александр Семёнович, 1912 года рождения, 17 сентября, в паспорте русский, родился в семье телеграфиста, Сальской области, Ставропольского края. Его отец был расстрелян белогвардейцами в гражданскую войну, коммунисты дали ему возможность закончить финансовый институт в Ростове-на-Дону. Он познакомился с Хосровьян Марией Семёновной в городе Ставрополе.

Хосровьян Мария Семёновна работала до замужества секретарем в НКВД, не помню точно город - Орджоникидзе или в Ставрополе. В 1938 году 20 апреля у них родился сын Вадим в городе Ставрополе. Драгульский А.С. был переведен на работу в г. Куйбышев в июне 1941 года и переехал с семьей в г. Куйбышев. В 1941 году 27 октября у них родился сын Семён. Вадим в детском саду сломал коленную чашечку в г. Куйбышеве и остался инвалидом.

В 1944 году А.С. Драгульский переведен на работу из г. Куйбышева в Москву и работал в должности начальника финансового отдела наркомата обороны СССР у маршала Воробьева, руководителя отдела лагерей для политических заключенных.

“Отец” получил одну комнату в 3-х комнатной квартире в 1944 году, по адресу ул. Малая Тульская, дом 2/1, корп. 19, кв.506. Этот жилой корпус во время бомбежки г. Москвы был разбит бомбой, от него остался один подъезд, пригодный для жилья, два других подъезда были восстановлены в 1947 г. В 1944 г. в нашем подъезде также временно получили комнаты сотрудники из аппарата маршала Воробьева, впоследствии они все получили новые благоустроенные квартиры.

В нашем доме жил с семьей адъютант маршала Воробьева полковник Андрей Михайлович Трофимов. Мою “мать” он всегда называл “грузиночкой”, зная, что она армянка. Я позднее поняла почему. Когда я стала взрослой, полковник Трофимов А.М. объявил мне, что я приёмная дочь и добавил, что я дочь шведа, и чтобы я запомнила фамилию - Валленберг, но эта фамилия мне была уже знакома.

Драгульский А.С. не был военнотружашим, но он являлся образцом коммуниста. Он всегда гордился своим партийным билетом, выслуживался и

был карьеристом. Его сын Семён впоследствии подражал своему отцу и тоже являлся образцом коммуниста, очень гордясь своим партийным билетом. Я ненавижу коммунистов! Мне "мать" на мой вопрос, почему мой "отец" сидит в тюрьме, ответила, что он любил ходить по ресторанам и когда он входил в ресторан, за ним закрывалась дверь и больше в ресторан никого из посетителей не впускали, а он мне, своей дочери, даже не купил шоколадки! Я думаю, что эту информацию она получила о моем папе, когда забирала меня на реке Печора, из политлагеря в 1947 году. Но она мне рассказывала также, что Драгульский А.С. боялся ресторанов и приглашал гостей к себе домой на пиво. Её нелогичности нашли в моей душе подтверждение и мои воспоминания детства. Я помню, как моя мама положила меня на детские весы и ушла от меня навсегда!

Я помню, как меня "мать" забирала из политлагеря. Я стояла у стены, а моя "мать" сидела за столом с женщиной в белом халате, а я очень сильно плакала. У меня на руке привита оспа на все плечо, так делают девочкам только в тюрьме.

Моя "мать" в Воркуте, в гостях, перепутала кружки, из которых пили спирт, и дала мне вместо воды - спирт, я чуть не задохнулась, я тоже это помню; она мне всегда рассказывала об этом эпизоде смеясь. Моя "мать" мне говорила, как я маленькая ездила на оленях на реку Печора, но этого я не помню. Но я помню самое первое и дорогое воспоминание моей жизни - это моя родная мама! Мы с ней лежим ногами вперед к окну, за окном зима, на окнах занавески в широкую полоску, и моя мама, видимо, шептала мне на ухо фамилию моего папы. Разумеется, я этого не помню. Но когда я впервые услышала эту фамилию в 1949 или в 1950 году, она мне была очень знакомой.

К нам приезжал в гости родной брат Драгульской М.С. (После войны родной брат Драгульской М.С. - полковник Хосровьян Георгий Семенович, был комендантом г. Магдебурга или г. Потсдама, точно не помню.) Мы были одни в комнате: мой "отец", "дядя" и я, и я услышала, как они произносили фамилию моего папы и я стала напевать: Валленберг, Валленберг. Этот эпизод я хорошо помню.

1949 или 1950 г. мой отец отвел меня на новогоднюю ёлку в клуб НКВД, и показал меня офицеру, я этот эпизод тоже помню. НКВД контролировали мою жизнь. Мы с "матерью" ездили зимой в кинотеатр "Метрополь", она тоже показывала меня офицеру - генералу (я запомнила широкие красные лампасы, и он мне сказал, что я хорошая девочка). Этот эпизод я тоже помню, 1951 или 1952 год.

Моя "мать" называла меня Лялей и в школе меня также звали Лялей. Только когда я стала взрослой, я сама стала называть себя Людмилой, по паспорту. Нелогичность "матери", (она была неумной женщиной), меня всегда удивляла. Я ее спрашивала, почему вы все меня зовете Лялей, когда я в паспорте Людмила, моя "мать" мне ответила, что когда я родилась, "отец" был в командировке, и они (два "брата" и "мать") не знали, как меня назвать, и поэтому называли Лялей. Затем она мне могла рассказать противоположный вариант, что она меня очень не хотела, то есть иметь третьего ребенка. Но "отец" ее уговорил, чтобы у них была дочь Людмила, я еще не родилась, а мой "отец" меня назвал Людмилой. Так меня назвал мой родной папа! Он дал мне это имя, чтобы я была милая людям, чтобы мне

легче жилось среди чужих людей одной. Я помню, как я периодически получала в подарок синее платье и зеленое пальто. Все остальное при встрече с Вашим русским переводчиком.

В 1947 году мои "отец" и "мать", были приглашены в Большой театр, в правительственную ложу, два раза на одну и ту же оперу - "Князь Игорь" А.П. Бородина. Объясню, почему два раза : Сталин лично хотел видеть новых родителей дочери Валленберга. Первый раз он не смог приехать, а во второй раз он тайно мог посмотреть на моих "родителей". Обо всем писать невозможно, прошу меня понять и извинить.

В 1950 году Драгульского А.С. направляют на работу в г. Холмск, остров Сахалин, в качестве начальника финансового отдела пароходства и мы всей семьей "отец", "мать", два "брата" и я едем на остров Сахалин, в город Холмск. В 1951 году он получает 15 лет заключения и отправляется в тюрьму г. Паранайска, остров Сахалин.

Летом мы возвращаемся в Москву, моя "мать", два "брата" и я тоже. Моя метрика высылалась "матери" в г. Холмск, когда шел судебный процесс над моим "отцом".

После 1954 г. моего "отца" освободили из заключения и он проездом через Москву видел только своих двух сыновей, а меня не захотел видеть. Алименты он платил только на своих сыновей, а на меня нет.

После тюрьмы, со своей новой женой, тоже бывшей заключенной г. Паранайска, он поехал жить в г. Вильнюс. Моя "мать" меня отправляла к нему в 15 лет в г. Вильнюс, но мой "отец" отослал меня обратно в г. Москву. Я его еще один раз видела, весной 1970 года в Москве. С ним отношения я не поддерживала и он никогда мной не интересовался.

И еще я хочу рассказать, что моя мать физически хотела отделаться от меня в детстве, да и не только в детстве. Об этом я расскажу при встрече.

Драгульская М.С., армянка, родилась 18 сентября 1914 года, в городе Моздок, Северный Кавказ, в семье священнослужителей. Ее дед и прадед были протоиереями, но её отец не захотел быть попом и стал чиновником. Её мать была дочерью богатого купца первой гильдии, Герасим Эстатов (Эстотян) . НКВД постаралось по приказу Сталина подобрать новых родителей для дочери Валленберга, с приблизительно похожей биографией.

Драгульская М.С. меня ненавидела всю свою жизнь! Я работала на неё и её сыновей с раннего детства. Мы жили бедно, она шила бюстгалтеры на дому, я ей помогала: в раннем возрасте я ездила по магазинам, покупала нужный материал, пришивала пуговицы, гладила, стирала, убирала. Когда я училась в 8 классе, она пошла работать продавцом.

В 1996 году она скончалась 29 июня в г. Москве.

Я, (Драгульская Людмила Александровна, русская, родилась 18 октября 1945 года в г. Москве) в 1953 году поступила в первый класс. Ещё один эпизод из детства, а именно: мы жили очень бедно, но моя мать мне срочно из старых мужских брюк сшила платье, приехала женщина с фотоаппаратом и мы с ней вдвоем спустились во двор. Она меня сфотографировала и уехала, в те времена приглашать фотографа на дом было неслыханной роскошью, это было в 1953 году. В 1964 я закончила школу, в 1965 я работала в институте

стюардессой в Аэрофлоте, аэропорт Внуково. Летала по всей России на всех типах самолетов: Ил-18, Ту-134, Ту-104, Ту-154, от Сочи до Анадыря, от Мурманска до Магадана и, разумеется, в Воркуту.

В 1969 вышла замуж за Прокофьева Владимира Викторовича, офицера. Когда сыну было восемь месяцев, я вернулась в Аэрофлот, расставшись с мужем. В 1973 году мы оформили развод. Отношения с 1973 года с мужем я не поддерживаю.

В 1976 году я устроилась на работу в Управление по обслуживанию Дипломатического корпуса МИД СССР, на должность горничной. Работала телефонисткой, поваром, горничной, официанткой, курьером. Самые светлые воспоминания о семье господина посла Ирландии Эдварда Джона Бренана и его супруги госпожи Т.Л. Бренан. Они меня любили и я их тоже. Я обслуживала ланч и приемы г-на посла. Мне предлагали в УПДК следить за иностранцами. Я этого никогда не делала! Я была очаровательной обезьянкой с тремя достоинствами. Подробно о своей личной жизни я надеюсь Вам рассказать при личной встрече.

Мои "братья", Драгульский В.А. и Драгульский С.А., проживают в г. Москве, отношения я с ними не поддерживаю более 20 лет. Сын - Виктор Владимирович Прокофьев, родился в Москве 23 сентября 1970 года. Живет самостоятельно.

Убедительно прошу Вас извинить меня за отсутствие перевода.

С уважением к Вам



Людмила Прокофьева

To: Mrs. Irene S.B. Anderson
Counsellor

Embassy of Sweden
Ajtosi Durer sor 27/A
1146 Budapest

Fax: 36 - 1 - 3522807

From: Mrs. Prokofeva L.A.
Russia, Moscow, Samarinskaya st., 1-5, 158
Tel.: 952-98-75

Уважаемая госпожа Ирене Андерсон,

сообщаю Вам, что справки от 12 и 14 сентября 1997 года не правильные. Моя справка от 12 сентября 1997 составлена господином Нибаумом утром, в отеле "Фортуна", город Балатонфюред.

Все эпизоды моей жизни господин Нибаум просил меня пересказывать не один раз, включая мою информацию в свой компьютер. Я полностью ему доверяла. Я даже не заподозрила его, когда справку от 12 сентября он попросил подписать в трех экземплярах. Господин Нибаум болен сахарным диабетом, но он специально спровоцировал меня на большой скандал 13 сентября 1997 года, симулируя истерию и занимаясь рукоприкладством.

Утром 14 сентября 1997 года мы выехали в город Будапешт машиной. Вечером в отеле он опять спровоцировал скандал, а утром 15 сентября 1997 года он сел за компьютер и перепечатал справку перед самым отъездом в посольство, объяснив мне, что он хочет дополнить текст, а в вестибюле отеля я ее подписала и только обратила внимание на дату: 14 сентября. Он ответил мне, что это не имеет значения и мы поехали в посольство к господину Лондваллю.

Тексты справок он составлял самостоятельно; я не имею возможности досконально проверить текст, я плохо знаю немецкий язык, а господин Нибаум плохо знает русский язык, но за восемь лет мы научились понимать друг друга. Один экземпляр письма от 12 сентября 1997 года он порвал у меня на глазах, а два других экземпляра у него остались с моими подписями. После визита к господину Лондваллю, когда мы сели в машину, на обратном пути в наш отель, в машине, он мне устроил истерику и был ужасно недоволен тем, что я сказала господину Лондваллю, что он мой друг, а не спонсор. Я потребовала у него копию справки от 14 сентября, он мне ее вернул с большим нежеланием. А копии от 12 сентября при нем не было, я его попросила их уничтожить. Он сказал мне, что он это сделает.

Справку от 14 сентября 1997 года я догадалась перевести на русский язык в Москве, меня ужаснул искаженный текст моих данных, несерьезный характер письма, особенно извращен эпизод с театром, который господин Нибаум знает наизусть, я ему много раз рассказывала об этом факте.

Господин Нибаум прекрасно знает, что с письмом непременно работает психолог (он мне сам об этом говорил). Но он мою справку умышленно искажил так, чтобы Вы приняли меня за идиотку не только умственно, но и физически, травмируя меня на Балатонфюред и перед поездкой в посольство, которую я ждала всю жизнь!

Он уехал машиной 16 сентября 1997 в Германию, сразу после обеда, а я улетела самолетом 17 сентября утром в Москву.

Господин Нибаум говорил мне о себе, что он китаец, который всегда улыбается, но держит нож в кармане. Я в этом лично убедилась!

Я самостоятельно приехала в Будапешт ко дню рождения моего папы, и сама хотела пойти в шведское посольство в городе Будапеште, но г-н Нибаум предупредил все мои действия, взяв все в свои руки. Пользуясь моим доверием и Вашим незнанием этого человека, господин Нибаум продумал все заранее.

На озеро Балатон я приехала 5 августа утром, а он приехал 6 августа утром. А 8 августа мы поехали к Вам. Господину Нибауму была очень интересна Ваша реакция по отношению ко мне, как мне кажется она была положительной и господин Нибаум остался этим очень доволен и я тоже. На другой день, 9 августа 1997 года он рано уехал машиной обратно в Германию, заверив меня в том, что он через неделю обязательно прилетит самолетом, специально для того, чтобы передать Вам мою справку, но приехал только 10 сентября на машине из Германии. На протяжении моего пребывания он мне ежедневно в 18-30 звонил в отель "Фортуна" (с 10.08. по 9.09.) и спрашивал меня о моей работе. Я хотела составить краткую справку и дать основную информацию о себе и привести Вам, но он мне сказал, чтобы я все написала о своей жизни подробно обо всем, и добавил, что психологи сами отберут нужные данные и факты.

Господин Нибаум в данное время имеет 2 юридических процесса в Германии, которые он очень надеется выиграть и получить большие деньги. На эти деньги он хочет купить нам квартиру в Германии и оформить развод с Е. Нибаум. А когда я буду жить в Германии - повезти меня к своему правительству как трофей, а не в шведское посольство. Я разгадала его план!

Я делаю Вам официальное заявление, что мои справки от 12 сентября и 14 сентября, составленные господином Нибаумом, являются неправильными и подлежат аннулированию.

Пользуясь моментом, сообщаю Вам, что я делаю свои переводы в Бизнес-Центре отеля "Метрополь", все квитанции сохраняю, а дублирую факсы на Центральном телеграфе. В гостинице "Метрополь", я думаю, что мой папа был арестован именно здесь и обвинен в шпионаже.

Несколько слов о себе. Я люблю классическую музыку, много читала, люблю живопись, знаю историю России.

Да, и еще я обнаружила две большие неточности в справке от 15 сентября 1997 года, составленной господином Нибаумом, а именно: я себя никогда не отождествляла с Великой княжной Анастасией, это фантазия г-на Нибаума.

Г-н Нибаум допустил серьезную ошибку, написав о моем шведском гражданстве и я его исправляю: я хочу быть верноподданной Его Величества Короля и Ее Величества Королевы Швеции.

Я заканчиваю, с большим уважением к Вам, госпожа Ирене Андерсон. Еще раз хочу поблагодарить Вас за то внимание, которое было оказано мне. Прошу Вас позвонить мне в Москву по моему домашнему телефону в 11-00 (время московское). Телефон : 952-98-75.

Уважаемая госпожа Андерсон, убедительно прошу Вас меня извинить за отсутствие перевода.

С уважением



Л. Прокофьева

P.S. Господин Нибаум продолжает мне звонить ежедневно, желая получить от меня информацию, но я ему никакой информации не даю. 29 сентября я сделала большой акцент на эпизоде с театром, он опять сказал, что это не важно. Я ответила, что для меня это очень важно и потребовала, чтобы он позвонил Вам и извинился перед Вами за искаженный текст моих справок, составленных им лично. Он ответил, что сделает это, позвонит и извинится.